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 1 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis identifies and interrogates commonalities and divergences in the works of T.S. 
Eliot and Ernest Hemingway in relation to their focus on how to make sense of the world 
of experience in the early twentieth century, and the complex mediations in which feeling 
and consciousness are involved. Chapter One considers Eliot’s and Hemingway’s 
common concern in their early works with the experience and representation of a 
fragmented self, and the extent to which this feature led them to involve their characters 
in a flow of sensations that liberates consciousness from the chains of rational constructs. 
Chapter Two examines Eliot’s and Hemingway’s later ambivalent consideration of this 
glorification of the sensual beyond any intellectual categorization of reality. The chapter 
shows how their shared mistrust of this primitive state of mind guided them to pay 
attention to collective modes of experience intrinsic to ritual patterns. The focus of 
Chapter Three is on Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922) and Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises 
(1926). This chapter analyzes the rituals to which they paid attention and how these 
shaped their distinctive consideration of a common unifying sense of feeling to revitalize 
society. Chapter Four investigates Eliot’s interest in religious feeling and Hemingway’s 
concern with moral feeling as modes of reinforcing the interrelation between the 
individual and society. The aim in the final chapter is to consider Eliot’s Four Quartets 
(1943) and Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea (1952) within the framework of the 
American Jeremiad to analyze the outcomes of the final quest of these two authors to 
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attain a unity of experience that moves beyond the frontier of the contradictions of the 
material world.  
 Critics have commented on the relationship between Eliot and Hemingway in 
different terms. My overall argument, however, is that the similarities and differences 
between these two authors result from Eliot and Hemingway occupying two poles of a 
dissociated experience of reality, and that they attempted in comparable yet contrasting 
ways to transcend the disorder of experience. This analysis is situated within the 
intellectual context of the turn of the twentieth century and the emphasis on a philosophy 
that defends an original flux of sensations as opposed to a rational formulation of reality. 
This contextualization establishes the consonance between the philosophies of Bergson, 
James and Bradley, and the concern with consciousness and experience deployed by Eliot 
and Hemingway in their early works. By analyzing this within their texts, the thesis 
provides a framework for an understanding of the progression Eliot and Hemingway 
engaged with from a reflection on individual consciousness and experience to a later 
consideration of collective experiences and culture. This second discussion focuses on the 
confluence between Eliot’s and Hemingway’s later works and the theories of early 
twentieth century social scientists such as Lévy-Bruhl, Frazer and Freud. 
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Introduction 
 
 
A number of critics have worked on the relationship between T.S. Eliot and Ernest 
Hemingway.1 Joseph M. Flora claims Eliot’s role as a mentor for the young Hemingway 
(73). He argues that “T.S. Eliot did for twentieth-century poetry what Ernest Hemingway 
would do for twentieth-century fiction” (73). He notes curious biographical sketches and 
points out commonalities and similar references between texts. But, surprisingly, he does 
not connect that initial statement with his final suggestion about the tangled relationship 
between those two authors as being settled around the concept of experience: “Readers 
continue to juxtapose the lives and works of T.S. Eliot and Ernest Hemingway. We 
scarcely read one without the other, and we read them similarly. Hemingway and Eliot 
shared more than they realized (or would admit), as is emblemized in the riverine 
dimensions of their experience and their writing” (84). Unfortunately, Flora does not 
develop further this insightful framework, and the question of the value of articulating an 
analysis of the works of these two authors remains unanswered. 
 Other critics focus on how Eliot and Hemingway shared a commitment to 
emotions and feelings in their works.2 Alan Brown and Nicholas Joost state that “[i]n 
                                                
1 I have chosen not to reflect on Eliot’s and Hemingway’s biographical commonalities 
and the different remarks these two authors made about each other. First, I consider that 
these anecdotes would not offer any useful line of argumentation to my analysis. Second, 
most of the critics that have analyzed the relationship between Eliot and Hemingway 
have already dealt with all this information. In that respect, see Flora, P. Eby or Curnutt.  
 
2 Critics have mainly focused on two aspects to make their cases. Firstly, they claim the 
similarities between Eliot’s “objective correlative” (SP 48) and Hemingway’s “real 
thing” (DIA 2) as two broadly similar aesthetic formulas. Secondly, they have paid 
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‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ Eliot anticipates Hemingway’s belief that learning 
how to capture the emotions of common experience is one of the greatest challenges 
facing aspiring writers” (428). P. Eby argues that Hemingway’s formulation—to evoke 
emotions—“sounds remarkably like the ‘objective correlative’ defined by […] Eliot” 
(177). In a comparable way, Watkins suggests Eliot’s and Hemingway’s interest in the 
evocation of emotion and the similarities between their respective literary formulas. 
According to Watkins, “Eliot is indicating how literature effectively conveys feeling” 
(18). Similarly, this critic uses Hemingway’s remarks about the work of the writer to 
show Hemingway’s commitment to emotion and feelings: “‘[The writer should] convey 
everything, every sensation, sight, feeling, place and emotion to the reader’” (100). 
Watkins compares Eliot’s and Hemingway’s comments on emotion and feelings, but he 
does not contrast them. He sees the correlation between external fact and emotion as 
pointed out by these two authors, but he dismisses the opportunity to engage further with 
some of the ideas that this analysis suggests.   
All these critics point convincingly to experience and feeling as the cornerstone of 
the commonalities between Eliot and Hemingway, but to a certain extent all of them 
make the same mistake. They consider these two authors’ examination of feelings and 
emotions in isolation. They do not take into account the key feature of a troubled 
consciousnesses attempting to come to terms with a fragmented experience of reality.3 As 
                                                                                                                                            
attention to the common use of the legends of the Grail. For the first aspect, see Grimes, 
Baker, and Kenner. For the second aspect, see Cowley, Flora, Baker and Lupack.  I shall 
deal in detail with all these critics in Chapter One and Chapter Three respectively.   
 
3 Since the very beginning of their careers Eliot and Hemingway showed their common 
concern with a fragmented experience of reality. The very title of one of Eliot’s earliest 
poems “Do I know how I think? Do I know what I feel?”—collected in the posthumous 
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Stasi argues, the only mode of confronting the critique of modernism is to examine more 
closely the relationship between aesthetic form and historical ground (5). It is necessary 
to analyze Eliot’s and Hemingway’s aesthetic propositions as being the result of an 
intellectual terrain concerned with a set of intellectual problems in a particular period. 
Matthew J. Bolton takes this approach and involves Bergson’s philosophy in the textual 
interaction between Eliot’s and Hemingway’s works. Bolton persuasively considers the 
early work of Hemingway and Eliot in the context of problematic representations of 
consciousness and their common use of images to render multiple planes of perception 
(38). Bolton points to Bergson’s philosophy as a way of situating Eliot and Hemingway 
in a textual interaction in a common terrain of intellectual ideas. He also underlines their 
common use of memory-images (38, 43).4 Bolton contends that Hemingway learned from 
Eliot how to represent the processes of the conscious mind through fragments of texts and 
images. Bolton accurately points out how these two authors reflected in comparable ways 
on the impossibility of conjugating a sensuous self which experiences inwardly, and an 
intellectual self conditioned by the outer world. However, he fails at the same time to 
realize the extent to which this shared reflection led them to explore an experience that 
                                                                                                                                            
Inventions of the March Hare—points out the dissociation between two levels of 
experience. In this poem Eliot splits “what I think” and “how I feel” to reflect on this 
fragmented experience (IMA 80). In comparable ways, Hemingway shows his suspicion 
of a dissociated experience of reality when he differentiates in Death in the Afternoon 
between “what you really felt” and “what you were supposed to feel, and had been taught 
to feel” (2).     
 
4 “[M]emory-images” (Bolton 43) relates to a term developed by Henri Bergson in 
Matter and Memory and to the correlation between object and image. I shall explain this 
in detail in Chapter One.  
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may transcend these contradictions.5 This is a comparatively superficial approach in that 
it overlooks the correlation between Eliot’s and Hemingway’s preoccupation with a 
dualistic conception of reality and their common pursuit of an experience that transcends 
such fragmentation.   
Adams indirectly takes account of the lead ignored by Bolton to focus on Eliot’s 
The Waste Land and Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises in relation to their common use of 
the mythical method.6 In his analysis of the similarities between these two works, he 
argues that the novel “does embody the feeling Hemingway shared with Eliot and others 
that Western civilization was dying” (126). Furthermore, he relates this feeling to the loss 
of religious faith: “Hemingway at this period seems to have shared Eliot’s opinion that 
one prime cause of sterility in Western civilization was loss of religious faith […]. Eliot’s 
conviction has since increased, while Hemingway has said less and less about orthodox 
Christianity; but in The Sun Also Rises Christian and pagan religious feelings work 
together in perfect harmony ” (130). Adams identifies the coexistence of Christian and 
pagan rituals that Hemingway explores in the novel as a mode of overcoming a 
fragmented experience of reality, but he fails at the same time to analyze the extent to 
which this distinction symbolizes Eliot’s engagement with spiritual experiences and 
                                                
5 Bolton notes how Eliot and Hemingway realized that “[t]he answer lay not in adding a 
traditional narrative framing device but in eschewing such contrivances altogether in 
order to create a mosaic-like arrangement of brilliant fragments” (40). But this critic 
overlooks the real purpose of the arrangement which is to transcend the contradictions of 
the material world.  
 
6 “[T]he mythical method” (Eliot, SP 177) is an expression used by Eliot to praise Joyce’s 
Ulysses for its inclusion of ancient myths as a mode of reflecting on the “panorama of 
futility” (177) of early twentieth century society. I shall explain in detail the meaning of 
this term in Chapter Three. 
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Hemingway’s concern with a physical experience of reality. Brooks indirectly confronts 
this distinction in his analysis of Eliot and Hemingway. He represents the writer of fiction 
concerned with depicting “the struggle of man to be a human being in a world which 
increasingly seeks to reduce him to a mechanism” (6). Alternatively, this critic analyzes 
Eliot as a poet mainly focused on reconstituting the Christian meaning of life (73). 
Brooks ignores how this distinction results from the distinctive rituals they explored as a 
mode of pursuing a unifying sense of feeling to transcend the contradictions of the 
material world.  
 Despite the possible limitations and differences in method and conclusion, all 
these critical works about the relationship between Eliot and Hemingway offered me 
points of embarkation in this study. The commonalities and divergences in the works of 
Eliot and Hemingway are at the centre of this dissertation. The aim is to explore the 
extent to which these similarities and differences result from Eliot and Hemingway 
occupying two poles of a dissociated experience of reality. It is necessary to comprehend 
how these two authors attempted in the realms of fiction and poetry to envisage forms of 
unified experience (often only variably successful, if at all). Thus, this dissertation 
establishes a framework to deploy this analysis within modernist poetics understood as a 
product of an intellectual crisis. The chapters provide an understanding of the intellectual 
transition from nineteenth century confidence in scientific advances to the questioning of 
these secure scientific formulations in the early twentieth century. The consideration of 
this progression offers a social historical context that clarifies not only Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s literary practices, but also the correlation between the modernist aesthetics 
and intellectual ground that cohabited with this literary movement. It is necessary to be 
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aware of the consonance between Eliot’s and Hemingway’s works and their reflections 
on feeling and experience within a particular intellectual and social context.  
To do so, I address five key and interrelated questions. First, if Eliot and 
Hemingway shared a consideration of a fragmented experience of reality in which mind 
and body break up experience, how did this feature condition their literary practices, and 
to what extent did these practices involve the pursuit of a sensuous flow of experience 
beyond the limitations imposed by the intellect? Second, in what ways did the exploration 
of this sensuous flow of experience, or primitive state of mind, condition their reflections 
on modern civilization? Third, in what ways did Eliot and Hemingway focus on 
collective modes of experience absent in modern civilization to pay attention respectively 
to experiences intrinsic to Christian and pagan rituals? Fourth, in what ways did the 
engagement with these rituals lead Eliot to focus on religious faith and Hemingway to 
become involved in political ideology in their common, but distinctive, attempt to 
reinforce the interaction between individual and society? And fifth, to what extent does 
an understanding of these lines of thinking offer a productive way of reading Eliot and 
Hemingway as part of the American literary tradition and, more importantly, to what 
extent does it offer the opportunity to analyze the final outcomes of their common 
attempt to reach a unifying experience of reality? 
 The methodology I shall use in this dissertation to confront these questions is to 
articulate an analysis of the textual interaction of the works of Eliot and Hemingway in a 
terrain of common ideas. Schwartz’s work on Modernism has shaped in part my own 
approach: “I will construct a matrix that brings together a significant number of 
philosophers and poets, and articulate the relationships among them. […]. This study, 
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then, will situate an important literary movement in its intellectual context” (3-4). To do 
so, I shall locate the works of Eliot and Hemingway within the intellectual context that 
cohabited with literary modernism at the turn of the twentieth century.7 Prompted by the 
expression “dissociation of sensibility” (SP 64) that Eliot popularized in his essay “The 
Metaphysical Poets,” I argue that Eliot and Hemingway were part of a similar cultural 
and philosophical paradigm. In his essay about the Metaphysical poets, Eliot writes that 
“[i]n the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have 
never recovered […]. The language went on and in some respects improved; […]. But 
while the language became more refined, the feeling became more crude” (SP 64). I 
claim that this concern with a dissociated sensibility is still at the core of the 
philosophical debate at the turn of the twentieth century and the subsequent patterns of 
thought promoted by a philosophy that prioritizes sensory experiences of reality over 
rational abstractions developed by the intellect to impose order in the material world. By 
underlining the extent to which Eliot and Hemingway felt attracted in comparable ways 
by a flow of experience beyond the limitations of the outer world, I engage with the 
concept of primitivism.  
 I argue that Eliot and Hemingway were part of the dichotomy intrinsic to the idea 
of ‘the primitive’ in the early twentieth century. These two authors felt attracted by the 
concept of the Noble Savage inherited from Rousseau, but at the same time, they 
recognized the necessity of controlling this tendency in order to prevent society sinking 
                                                
7 When I use the term modernism I refer particularly to the literary movement that 
exploded “onto the international scene in the aftermath of World War I” (Murfin and Ray 
268). This literary movement “reflected the pervasive sense of loss, disillusionment, and 
even despair in the wake of the Great War” (268).  
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into chaos.8 Eliot’s and Hemingway’s conflicting involvement with the primitive resulted 
in the consideration of collective experiences intrinsic to the performance of rituals. My 
argument is that this commonality in Eliot’s and Hemingway’s works is underscored by 
the progression undertaken after the events of World War One from interest in the 
centrality of the self towards the consideration of collective experiences. This framework 
clarifies the common interest of these two authors in ritualistic patterns of experience and 
the extent to which the different nature of the rituals they paid attention to conditioned 
their proposition to secure social cohesion. Only within this context will the opposition 
between Eliot’s engagement with the Christian faith and Hemingway’s concern with 
political ideology be grasped. As I shall attempt to show, without an awareness of the 
intellectual context I identify, the literary analysis of Eliot’s works alongside 
Hemingway’s fiction would be impoverished.  
 In the first chapter, I shall explore Eliot’s and Hemingway’s common reflections 
on the dissociation between the consciousness of inner and outer worlds. I shall focus on 
the extent to which Eliot’s first volume Prufrock and Other Observations (1917) and 
Hemingway’s first collection of short stories In Our Time (1925) are the result of the 
engagement of these two authors with William James’s and Henri Bergson’s similar ideas 
of the concept of the self, in which two levels of experience are identified with two levels 
                                                
8 Rousseau never used the phrase “noble savage”, although his “savage man” is closely 
related to this term and it has become associated with views he expressed in his 
Discourse on Inequality: “If I strip the being thus constituted of all the supernatural gifts 
that he may have received, and of all the artificial faculties that he can have acquired only 
through a long process of time, if I consider him, in a word, as he must have emerged 
from the hands of nature, I see an animal less strong than some, less agile than others, but 
taken as a whole the most advantageously organized of all. I see him satisfying his 
hunger under an oak, quenching his thirst at the first stream, finding his bed under the 
same tree which provided his meal; and, behold, his needs are furnished” (81). 
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of consciousness. In a comparable way, Eliot and Hemingway considered time and space 
as intellectual categories imposed by the human intellect to arrange external reality. This 
shared concern leads them to propose similar aesthetic formulas based on the deployment 
of images to represent an experience in which the boundaries between internal thinking 
and external reality dissolve. This shared attempt to overcome a dissociated experience of 
reality led them to consider primitivism as a reaction against the mechanical 
categorization of reality.  
 Chapter Two pays attention to the common reflections on civilization pointed out 
by Eliot and Hemingway as a result of their shared engagement with the dangerous allure 
of the primitive. I reflect on Eliot’s second volume of poetry, Poems (1920), and some of 
Hemingway’s early short stories in the context of conflicts between individual sensual 
tendencies and social conventions and constraints. This common concern relates Eliot 
and Hemingway to the parameters of thought promoted by Irving Babbitt and Sigmund 
Freud and their shared questioning of the primitive. Similarly, Eliot and Hemingway 
portrayed characters involved in sexual and violent actions to call attention to the 
necessity of restraining the tendency towards a primitive state of mind. This 
consideration of the primitive as opposed to the civilized led Eliot and Hemingway to 
reflect on the necessity of restoring the correlation between individual and society, and 
reflect on collective modes of experience that they found absent in modern civilization.  
In comparable ways, these two authors paid attention to ritual patterns of experience as a 
mode of involving the whole of society in collective modes of experience.  
 Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922) and Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises (1926) are 
the focus of Chapter Three. I analyze Eliot’s and Hemingway’s common interest in a 
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“mythical-religious feeling of community” (Cassirer, PSF 175). I focus on the similar use 
by these two authors of a mythic paradigm to reflect on an incoherent experience of 
reality. Eliot’s reflections on “the mythical method” (SP 117) along with F.H. Bradley’s 
theory of experience will clarify the common concern of these two authors with an 
absolute order of experience. They explored the myth of the Fisher King and the rites tied 
to this myth in their shared pursuit of such a unifying sense of feeling. This engagement 
led Eliot to focus on Christian rituals and Hemingway to explore the pagan ritual of 
bullfighting. The distinctive nature of those rituals disposed Eliot to consider religious 
experiences and Hemingway to explore experiences resulting from the individual’s 
behaviour in the material world.  
 In Chapter Four the focus of attention is Eliot’s religious faith and Hemingway’s 
political ideology. I shall examine the way Eliot’s interest in religious experiences led 
him to focus on the Christian tradition and the extent to which Hemingway’s concern 
with individual actions led him to focus on the tradition of bullfighting. I shall decipher 
how each tradition represents a distinctive way of feeling that similarly implies the 
interrelation between individual and society. I shall then focus on Eliot’s Murder in the 
Cathedral (1935) and Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940) to clarify the social 
institutions that Eliot and Hemingway proposed to guarantee the social cohesion that they 
related to the experience of religious and moral feelings respectively.   
 In Chapter Five I discuss the extent to which Eliot and Hemingway were part of a 
common literary tradition. I shall focus on the extent to which they paid attention in 
comparable ways to the correlation between language and the experience of reality. This 
shared consideration relates these two authors to an understanding of language inherited 
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from their American literary forefathers. I shall focus on the communalities between 
Ralph Waldo Emerson and William James in relation to their reflections on language and 
the extent to which they urged the use of symbols to prevent language from becoming 
useless to explain the experience of reality. I focus then on the symbol of the American 
Jeremiad to read Eliot’s Four Quartets and Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea 
(1952) as works connected to this American literary tradition. This analysis shall offer the 
framework to contrast the distinctive outcomes of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s shared 
pursuit of a transcendental centre to reach a unified experience of reality that significantly 
is also at the core of the American Jeremiad.    
 Reynolds contends that “[t]he relationship between Hemingway and T.S. Eliot has 
drawn little critical interest despite the several signs pointing the way” (112).9 In this 
dissertation I plan to explore these signs to gain a better understanding of this relationship 
that may shed some light on unexplored aspects of each of these two authors. I intend to 
demonstrate that juxtaposing Eliot and Hemingway in this way reveals hitherto 
unavailable ways of reading both authors. 
                                                
9 In his personal library Hemingway owned not only the complete collection of Eliot’s 
poetry and plays, but also all of Eliot’s criticism. For further information about the books 
owned by Hemingway in his private library, see Brash and Sigman, and Reynolds.  
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Chapter One  
Dramas of Experience in Early Eliot and Hemingway 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The focus of this chapter is on Eliot’s and Hemingway’s shared consideration of a 
dissociated experience of reality in which mind and body break up experience. Their 
earliest work represents a fragmented self that is immersed in a flow of perception trying 
to recover the unity of the mental and the physical in pure experience.1 I shall consider 
how this feature frames these two authors in patterns of thought promoted by a 
philosophy that prioritizes sensory experiences of reality over rational abstractions 
developed by the intellect to establish order in the material world. I exemplify this 
philosophy in the theories of William James and Henri Bergson. These two authors 
articulated at the turn of the twentieth century a debate about the opposition between 
conceptual abstractions and immediate experience. Their common conviction that reality 
“transcend[s] intellect” (Bergson, CE 46) was shared by others philosophers of this 
period who engaged in dismantling the nineteenth-century concept of the intellect and 
showing the falseness of an unguarded faith in scientific progress (Douglass 8-9). James 
                                                
1 Pure experience is a concept from William James that I shall consider more fully later in 
this chapter as part of my analysis of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s first published works 
within the framework of late nineteenth and early twentieth century psychology. For a 
further reference to the relevant psychology of that time, see Levenson. 
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and Bergson in particular argued the existence of an original flux of concrete sensations 
as opposed to the instrumental conventions developed by the intellect. They reconceived 
the categories of time and space as artificial units of analysis that disguise this vital 
reality of flux and duration. The consideration of this more vital reality of human 
intuition led them to reflect on a  “double form of the real” (matter and life) that suited to 
a “double form of consciousness” (intelligence and intuition) (Bergson, CE 188). James 
and Bergson redefined the real by relocating it in experience and this feature was at the 
core of modernist aesthetics.  
 My intention in this chapter is to explore how far Eliot and Hemingway were part 
of this cultural and philosophical paradigm at the turn of the twentieth century. Firstly, I 
want to reflect on the forms of consciousness that these two authors represented in their 
early works. I shall consider William James’s and Henri Bergson’s similar ideas of the 
self in which two levels of experience are identified with two levels of corresponding 
consciousness. I shall consider Eliot’s early poem “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” 
and Hemingway’s earliest short story “Up in Michigan” to show how these two authors 
presented in a similar way the clash between the inner and the outer world: the opposition 
between sensations and intellectual conventions used to shape daily existence. Secondly, 
I shall focus on how Eliot and Hemingway considered time and space as part of that 
problematic experience of reality. My reading of Eliot’s Prufrock and Other 
Observations (1917) and Hemingway’s In Our Time (1925) will exemplify the extent to 
which these writers treat these categories as artificial conventions disguising a more vital 
reality or stream of sensations. Thirdly, I shall consider Eliot’s “objective correlative” 
(SP 48) and Hemingway’s “real thing” (DIA 2) as two aesthetic propositions related to 
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shared reflections on the experience of fragmented selfhood. Eliot’s prose poem 
“Hysteria” and Hemingway’s short sketch in chapter 14 from In Our Time will be read as 
two similar attempts to represent through the use of images an experience in which the 
boundaries between the inner and the outer world disappear. When I use the term image I 
refer to the concept developed by Henri Bergson in relation to intuition. According to 
Bergson, “[l]ife and its meaning […] can be grasped only through intuition. An intuition 
[…] is inseparable from a sensuous reception of images” (Brooker, Mastery 50). Finally, 
some of the images deployed by Eliot in his early poems and Hemingway’s “Big Two-
Hearted River: Part I” will be considered as the representation of an experience, or state 
of mind, previous to any intellectual category that fragments reality to take action in the 
material world. I shall show how these two authors pointed to the categories of time and 
space as the agents that prevent the individual from experiencing the flux of vital reality 
in the modern world.  
  In his early critical writings Eliot positioned consciousness at the centre of his 
reflections on poetry. In his essay “Dante,” compiled in his first published collection of 
criticism The Sacred Wood (1920), Eliot wrote that “[t]he aim of the poet is to create a 
vision, and no vision of life can be complete which does not include the articulate 
formulation of life which human minds make” (144). In a similar way, in his appraisal of 
Donne’s poetry in “The Clark Lectures” (1926), Eliot wrote that “[o]riginal movements 
of mind created the forms, you cannot by simulating the forms revive the mind” (VMP 
189). In these remarks Eliot stresses the articulation between mind and poetry; and hence, 
the extent to which poetry is the result of distinct states of mind. I consider that when 
Eliot uses the term ‘mind’, he is referring to consciousness and its creative capacity as 
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considered by William James: “Only those items which I notice shape my mind—without 
selective interest, experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, 
light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective in a world” (qtd. in 
Kress 24). As Kress makes clear, “the ultimate principle of Jamesian consciousness is its 
creative capacity. The human mind […] is constantly ‘shaped’ and reshaped by 
experience, by the imaginative energy ‘inside’ it and by its connection to the fluid world 
outside it” (24). This consideration of the creative capacity of mind can be identified in 
the “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921). In this essay Eliot made a remark about the 
dissociation of sensibility established in England between the time of Donne and the time 
of Tennyson. When Eliot affirms that “[i]n the seventeenth century a dissociation of 
sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered” (SP 64), he is suggesting that a 
dissociated mind created a particular poetry during that period.2  
 The term ‘dissociation of sensibility’ frames a form of consciousness that 
confronts a dualistic conception of reality in which mind and body fragment experience.3 
As Nancy K. Gish clarifies, dissociation of sensibility is not only an aesthetic style but 
also a “psychological condition to be resolved in part through poetic means” (114). This 
form of consciousness implies a constant interaction between the outer and inner worlds 
and a “bifurcation of experience between subjective and objective domains” (Schwartz 
                                                
2 For an explanation of Eliot’s uses of the phrase “dissociation of sensibility” throughout 
his criticism, see Beasley 53-54. 
 
3 For an overview of the connection between Eliot’s dissociation of sensibility and 
Cartesian substance dualism, where mind and body are held to have the distinct essences 
of thought and material extension, see Wunderlich: “If we replace in the Cartesian 
terminology dualism with dissociation, mind with thought and body (senses) with 
feelings, we can derive Eliot’s term dissociation of sensibility from the Cartesian divide” 
(19-20). 
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177). Eliot’s reflections on the dissociation of sensibility engaged with the modern debate 
about the breakup of stable relations between subject and object and the consequent 
enshrining of consciousness as the repository of meaning and value.4 As Eliot asks in one 
of his essays, written as a graduate student, on the philosophy of Henri Bergson: “Where, 
again, is the reality, […] in the consciousness, or in that which is perceived? Where is the 
one reality to subsume both of these, and can we or can we not know it?” (qtd. in Jain 
159). In order to understand the communalities between Eliot and Hemingway it is 
necessary to approach their work as a reflection on the psychological condition of the 
self.   
 Hemingway’s early short stories show the same concern with the contemporary 
debate about the unstable balance between subject and object in the experience of reality. 
As De Falco suggests, the troubled individual consciousness of the characters is part of 
the material Hemingway worked with in some of his stories (19). Jim Barloon is more 
specific, framing In Our Time within a context in which the old epistemological ways of 
delineating a character no longer apply: “[W]hen consciousness itself—or, as Lawrence 
put it, the ‘old stable ego’—has slipped its moorings, new ways of transcribing 
experience must be found ” (7). In this vein Matthew J. Bolton considers Hemingway’s 
first writings to be under the direct influence of Eliot in the context of the modern 
preoccupation with “the representation of layering of multiple planes of perception” (38). 
Bolton states that “[Hemingway] learned from Eliot how to work with fragments of text 
and how to arrange images […] that would enact the processes of the conscious mind” 
(54). Aspects of the discussion of the representation of consciousness in the early work of 
                                                
4 See Levenson 22.  
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Eliot and Hemingway are key to an understanding of their later work as alternative 
responses to the similar dissociated experience of reality they confronted in their first 
writings. Thus, it is necessary to be aware of the extent to which the early works of these 
two authors were under the influence of reflections on consciousness and experience at 
the turn of the twentieth century, and the philosophies that looked at the interaction 
between the physical and the psychological world. 
 At the turn of the twentieth century rational constructs were questioned by many 
philosophers, who considered intellectual concepts as instrumental forms imposed upon 
the flux of sensations. As Schwartz argues, the philosophy of that time focused on the 
opposition between conceptual abstractions and immediate experience. Bergson’s ‘real 
duration,’ James’s ‘stream of consciousness,’ Bradley’s ‘immediate experience’ and 
Nietzsche’s ‘chaos of sensations’ refer to the opposition between the instrumental 
conventions that shape ordinary life and the original flux of concrete sensations (5). 
William James and Henri Bergson entered this debate by considering an original flux of 
experience beneath the forms that organized daily existence. I take as my point of 
embarkation James’s and Bergson’s similar consideration of the double form of the real. 
They differentiated between the mental and the physical, but as part of a “flux” (James, 
ERE 49) or “stream of life” (Bergson, CE 196) in which these two levels of experience 
are in constant interaction. They reflected on this stream of vital reality beyond the 
intellectual concepts deployed to arrange the material world. Furthermore, they embraced 
a fluid understanding of consciousness in which these two levels of experience are in 
constant interaction with each other as part of this stream of continuous experience. 
These parameters of thinking may be identified in the earliest characters of Eliot and 
 25 
Hemingway. Prufrock and Liz in “Up in Michigan” are trapped within the dissociation 
between the self that experiences inwardly a flux of sensations and the self that 
understands his sense publicly and constrains those inner experiences through intellectual 
categories. So Eliot and Hemingway presented the minds of these characters as a prison, 
unable to conjugate the inner and the outer world, the physical and the psychological, in 
order to experience the stream of life. 
 James and Bergson had a common belief in a stream of experience beyond the 
intellectual categorization of reality. As part of this reflection they called attention to the 
constructions of artificial categories that break this continuous flow of vital reality. They 
differentiated between the self who depends on the superficial level of actions—framed 
by time and space in the outer world—and the deeper self for whom those intellectual 
categories do not exist. In Time and Free Will, Bergson affirms that “[b]y separating our 
conscious states we promote social life, but raise problems soluble only by recourse to 
the concrete and living self” (137). James also looks at these two levels to claim that 
“[t]here is no thought-stuff different from thing-stuff, […], but the same identical piece of 
‘pure experience’ (which was the name I gave to the material prima of everything) can 
stand alternatively for a ‘fact of consciousness’ or for a physical reality, according as it is 
taken in one context or in another” (ERE 72). Eliot and Hemingway explored in their 
early characters these two selves at war; and, hence, they similarly identified the modern 
devices that break the continuous stream of experience in fragmentary mechanical units 
of space and time. As Hugh Kenner elucidates, Eliot’s work was deeply affected by the 
technological changes of the time. Eliot was “his time’s chief poet of the alarm clock, the 
furnished flat, the ubiquitous telephone, commuting crows, the electric underground 
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railway” (25).5 Hemingway also framed the experience of his earlier characters within a 
world conditioned by clocks, trains and artificial categorizations of time as a reflection on 
how this mechanical approach to experience disguises the continuous stream of real time.  
This rejection of the intellectual categories that fragment reality in artificial units 
of space and time turned into an interest in experiencing an immediate state of mind 
previous to any distinction between object and subject. Therefore, the consideration of 
primitivism—or pre-civilized states of mind—became part of a reflection on 
consciousness and experience articulated by James and Bergson in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. The fundamental characteristic “of primitive sensibility […] is 
the absence […] of a firm and rational distinction between the inner world of feelings and 
the external order of existence” (Bell, Primitivism 8-9). The primitive state of mind is 
beyond the intellectual categorizations of reality: for Bell, “[the primitive’s] sense of 
space and time were radically different from ‘ours’” (21). Both Eliot and Hemingway 
were attracted by primitivism as a reaction against the intellectual categorization of 
reality.6  
 My intention in this chapter is to demonstrate how the lines of thinking that 
emerged from philosophical reflections on consciousness and experience at the turn of 
the twentieth century can be identified in the early work of Eliot and Hemingway. In the 
first section I identify how William James and Henri Bergson distinguished between two 
levels of consciousness which interact within the continuous flow of experience they 
                                                
5 See Trotter 239. 
 
6 In a 1919 review entitled “War-Paint and Feathers,” Eliot wrote that “it is certain that 
some study of primitive man furthers our understanding of civilized man […]. The 
maxim, Return to the sources, is a good one” (qtd. in Manganaro 393).  
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considered reality. One level refers to social life and the other to a more vital reality of 
flux. I analyze Eliot’s and Hemingway’s earlier works to show the extent to which these 
works are dramas of consciousness based on the confrontation between two levels of a 
fragmented experience. As Brooker affirms in relation to Eliot’s early poems, “[t]he gap 
between body and brain is a major motif in the four great poems Eliot wrote between 
1909 and 1911” (“War” 2). Eliot’s and Hemingway’s characters are involved in a flow of 
experience in which the inner life clashes with the requirements of the outer world. In 
section two I reflect on how James and Bergson considered the categories of time and 
space as functional units of analysis that arrest a more vital reality of flux and duration. I 
focus on how Eliot and Hemingway explored these two categories as artificial constructs 
used for convenience in the public sphere of reality. This common rejection of the 
artificial categorizations of time and space led them to propose aesthetic formulas based 
on the deployment of images to represent an experience in which the boundaries between 
subject and object disappear. Furthermore, they explored through the deployment of these 
images a primitive state of mind beyond the framework of the modern world.  
 
 
2. Experience and the fragmented self 
 
Eliot’s poem “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and Hemingway’s short story “Up 
in Michigan” provide a number of coordinates for my analysis of the confrontation 
between a self longing for sensory experiences and a social self preventing the sensuous 
flow of experience. In these two works there is a constant interaction between the inner 
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and the outer world. The impossibility of combining these two levels of experience is at 
the core of the drama that takes place in the mind of the characters. Eliot’s poem opens 
with a formal request: “Let us go then, you and I” (CPP 3).7 This separation points to 
duality as the cornerstone of Prufrock’s dramatic monologue. At one level, the poem 
presents the society where Prufrock lives and from where he gets the sense of his social 
self: “There will be time, there will be time/To prepare a face to meet the faces that you 
meet” (4). At another level, the poem points to an inner flux of experience beyond the 
social world: “I should have been a pair of ragged claws/Scuttling across the floors of 
silent seas” (5). In a comparable context, Hemingway explores the dissociated self in “Up 
in Michigan.” In this short story the young Liz suffers a clash between her inner feelings 
for Jim and her thoughts about how those feelings are controlled by society. Eliot and 
Hemingway represent in a similar way the confrontation between the self that 
experiences inwardly a flux of sensations and the self that understands this sense publicly 
and controls those inner experiences.   
 The theories of James and Bergson are relevant to my analysis for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, they refer to comparable senses of the self in which two levels of 
experience are identified with two states of consciousness. Secondly, both philosophers 
share a preoccupation with the fluid nature of human consciousness in which those two 
levels or states of experience function with each other as part of a flux of experience. In 
The Will to Believe (1897), James comments on “ordinary” and “total consciousness” and 
says that “[t]he result [of this proposal about the self] is to make me feel that we all have 
                                                
7 For a succinct analysis of the alternative interpretations of the meaning of “You and I” 
made by different, see Child 65-73. Sanford Schwartz also refers to “internal and external 
self” (190), but he focuses on conflicting points of view rather than in levels of 
experience or forms of consciousness as I do in my analysis of the poem.  
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potentially a subliminal self, which may make at any time irruption into our ordinary 
lives” (qtd. in Johnson 14). Similarly, in Time and Free Will (1889), Bergson 
distinguishes between “two aspects of conscious life” (128) to affirm that when 
consciousness adapts to the requirements of social life it “gradually loses sight of the 
fundamental self” (128). In their early work Eliot and Hemingway represent these two 
aspects of conscious life that are in continuous change and interaction in the experience 
of reality. They also look to the social world as the agent that aborts any possibility of 
experiencing this fundamental or subliminal self discussed by James and Bergson in their 
reflections on consciousness and experience.  
 The first line of “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” splits Prufrock’s 
experience into “you” and “I” (CPP 3). This separation is followed by the delimitation in 
lines four and nine between the public space of “certain half-deserted streets” and the 
private inner sphere of “a tedious argument/Of insidious intent” (3). Eliot mentions two 
levels of experience at the same time that he underlines the separation between the inner 
and the outer world. In the first stanza Eliot frames the parameters in which he plans to 
dissect Prufrock “[l]ike a patient etherized upon a table” (3). This division is a constant as 
Prufrock journeys, or not, through the city space: “Time for you and time for me” (CPP 
3). The poem presents the society where he lives and where he experiences the charade of 
social conventions: “After the cups, the marmalade, the tea,/Among the porcelain, among 
some talk of you and me” (4). Cultural and societal rules must be followed: “Before the 
taking of a toast and tea” (4). The outer social world is the physical space where Prufrock 
interacts with this social routine and in which he realizes the apprehension of his social 
identity: “[They will say: ‘But how his arms and legs are thin!’]” (CPP 4). Society 
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unavoidably comments and exerts control over him: “And I have known the eyes already, 
known them all—/The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase” (5). The character of 
Prufrock symbolizes the confrontation between the physical world and his interior life; 
but, within the latter, this dissociation splits into two levels of consciousness that 
meaningfully refer to the two realities that are in constant interaction in the scenario that 
comprises this poem.  
 In “Portrait of a Lady” Eliot also outlines the separation between the outer and the 
inner world at the same time that he explores how these two levels of experience 
condition the consciousness of the female character. The lady constantly refers to the 
outside world and how societal rules determine her sense of self. She insists on how 
important her friends are for her life: “You do not know how much they mean to me” (8), 
but at the same time, she realizes that their opinion about her relationship affects her own 
feelings for the male character: “‘For everybody said so, all our friends,/They all were 
sure our feelings would relate/So closely! I myself can hardly understand’” (11). She is 
aware of being trapped within the control that society has over her life, as she points out 
when she recognizes that once her male companion is gone she “shall sit here, serving tea 
to friends” (11). As Mayer notes, “[t]he poem insistently points up the contrast between 
the outdoor public world […] and the indoor domestic world of the woman—a single 
room that is identified by both parties with the life of feelings” (111-12). But in “Portrait” 
feelings are under the control of the outside world in the case of the lady. She envies the 
male character because he is able to ignore the chains of society that control the 
experiences of her own life: “‘You let it flow from you, you let it flow’” (9). She cannot 
ignore the control that the outside world exerts over her feelings even when she is in the 
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private world of her room. She cannot access to this flow of life as her male companion 
does, because the social role-play also governs her private life. In this poem Eliot again 
reflects on two levels of experience that, as in Prufrock’s case, are at war in the 
consciousness of the character. A reflection on the fragmented experience of the self is 
also found in Hemingway’s first published short story.  
 In “Up in Michigan” (1922) Hemingway presents a character confronting a 
dissociation similar to that experienced by Prufrock in his dramatic monologue. As in 
“Prufrock,” there is a gap between the outer and the inner world. Hemingway presents 
both the space of Horton Bay where Liz acts, and the private sphere of Liz’s feelings: 
“When she saw the wagon coming down the road she felt weak and sick sort of inside” 
(CSS 60). This confrontation between the two levels of experience is transferred into 
Liz’s troubled consciousness. On the one hand, there is an aspect of consciousness that is 
concerned with the outer space where Liz acts: “She was afraid to ask Mrs. Smith” (60); 
and, on the other hand, there is an aspect of consciousness that is concerned exclusively 
with Liz’s own desires for Jim: “If she let herself go [thinking about Jim] it was better” 
(60). Liz experiences the imperative of unifying these two levels of consciousness, but 
the impossibility of doing so leads her towards a moment of crisis.   
 At the end of the story, Liz’s feelings about Jim push her towards a sexual act, but 
when the moment arrives she is reluctant to engage in it voluntarily: “She was frightened 
but she wanted it. She had to have it but it frightened her” (CSS 62). Liz knows that the 
people in the village will talk about it. Society unavoidably exerts some kind of control 
over her doubts: “You mustn’t, Jim. You mustn’t. […] Oh, it isn’t right” (62). Once she 
thinks about what has happened to her, she tries to recover from Jim’s action but cannot: 
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“Liz started to cry. She walked over to the edge of the dock and looked down to the 
water. There was a mist coming down from the bay” (62). The mist not only symbolizes 
the confusion experienced by Liz after Jim’s abuse, but also the impossibility of 
combining her own desires for him before he took advantage of her and the consequences 
of such an act. Liz experiences the gap between the two levels of consciousness as a 
result of the impossibility of conjugating her flux of sensations and her thoughts about 
how those feelings are controlled by the social world. Prufrock and Liz experience 
dissociation between the two levels of consciousness that are part of the same fragmented 
experience of reality, in which the inner and the outer world are in constant confrontation 
in the construction of selfhood. This double form of consciousness corresponds to a 
double form of reality that—as Bergson and James argue—is in constant interaction 
within a continuous flux of experience. 
 In Essays in Radical Empiricism (1911) William James alludes to the distinction 
between the mental and the physical, but he affirms that this distinction is part of the flux 
of experience8: “In this full, concrete, and undivided experience, such as it lies before us, 
as a given, the objective physical world and the personal inner world of each one of us 
meet and merge as lines merge at their intersection” (ERE 120). James points to a double 
form of the real, “external realities” and “internal thinking” (12), but he insists that these 
two aspects are part of an immediate experience he calls pure experience: “‘Pure 
experience’ is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the 
material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories” (ERE 48). James 
                                                
8 For an extensive explanation of William James’s treatment of the dualism between the 
mental and physical in Essays in Radical Empiricism, see Myers.   
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distinguishes between the physical and the mental, but as part of a vital reality that is 
beyond the categories we use to arrange our experiences within this “flux of life” (12). 
 In Creative Evolution (1907) Henri Bergson also develops an analysis about the 
physical and the mental converging in a flux of experience or “[p]ure duration” (TFW 
100).9 He points to “the double form of the real” (matter and life) to state that “[t]he 
double form of consciousness is then due to the double form of the real” (CE 196). 
Bergson distinguishes between matter and inner life before splitting consciousness into 
two forms: intelligence and intuition. Intelligence produces inert workings to arrange the 
material world. Intuition, as Gilles Deleuze expresses in Bergsonism, “leads us to go 
beyond the state of experience toward the conditions of experience” (27). The form of 
consciousness guided by intuition tends toward the conditions of experience or “stream of 
life” (Bergson, CE 196).10  
 The double form of reality analyzed by James and Bergson as being in constant 
interaction within “a flux” (ERE 12) or “stream of life” (CE 196) is also manifested in 
Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and Hemingway’s “Up in Michigan.” 
These two works represent the interaction between the two levels of experience and the 
correlative double form of consciousness. However, a clash emerges when the sensuous 
flow of the inner life of the characters is reduced to a permanent objective truth. The flux 
                                                
9 In Time and Free Will Henri Bergson refers to this flux of experience as pure duration. 
Critics often use the original French term: durée réelle.   
 
10 This “stream of life” (Bergson, CE 196) is reminiscent of James’s streams of 
consciousness. James affirms: “Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up 
in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the 
first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by 
which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter let us call it the stream of 
thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life” (POW 177). 
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of sensations cannot be reduced to a rational formulation as “Prufrock” suggests: “And 
when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin,/ When I am pinned and wriggling on the 
wall,/ Then how should I begin” (CPP 5). The utilitarian categories used to arrange the 
outer world expel Prufrock from his inner sensory stream. Once this happens, he is not 
sure how to act: “And should I then presume?/And how should I begin?” (5). The inner 
life of the self cannot be controlled by categories developed by the intellect. Hemingway 
explores an equivalent thought in his first short story about Nick Adams.  
 In “Indian Camp” Hemingway allows the young Nick to reject the fixed 
explanations offered by Doctor Adams about the bloody spectacle he witnesses when 
they help an Indian woman in labor. When the woman starts to scream, Nick asks, “can’t 
you give her something to make her stop screaming” (CSS 68). After this enquiry, Nick’s 
father can only find an answer to the suffering of the woman from his rational point of 
view as a doctor: “No. I haven’t any anesthetic […] But her screams are not important. I 
don’t hear them because they are not important” (68). Once the cesarean has been 
performed with a jack-knife—“That’s one for the medical journal” (69)—they realize 
that the Indian husband has committed suicide. Nick tries to understand the bloody scene: 
“Is dying hard, Daddy?” (CSS 70). Doctor Adams does not have an accurate answer for 
all the suffering his son has witnessed and, from his scientific approach to mortality, the 
only explanation he can offer is a laconic one: “No, I think it’s pretty easy, Nick. It all 
depends” (CSS 70). The young Nick rejects these words. They do not belong to the 
sensorium of screams and pain he has experienced in the camp. As Lisa Narbeshuber 
observes, Doctor Adams is split off from the woman’s scream, the Indian husband’s 
distress, and Nick’s inability to deal with the crisis. This passage suggests “Nick’s own 
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perceptual disassociation” (14). Nick and his father experience the same scene differently 
as they are immersed in different levels or states of consciousness at the time of 
confronting it. 
 Nick’s inner feelings do not correspond with his father’s rational explanations, 
hence their alternative perceptions of the same event. It is remarkable how Hemingway 
uses the words ‘think’ to refer to the father’s experiences—“I think” (CSS 70)—and 
‘feel’ for Nick’s—“[he] felt” (70). This simple distinction underlines the clear 
confrontation between the intellectual thinking of the doctor versus Nick’s private 
approach to the experience of reality. In the very last sentence of the story, Hemingway 
presents father and son sitting apart in the boat. Nick rejects his father’s approach to 
reality and embraces his own inner sensations: “[H]e felt quite sure that he would never 
die” (70). In this story Hemingway presents not only a young man who has witnessed 
death, but also the impossibility of his understanding those experiences through the fixed 
rational symbols offered by his father. Nick—like Prufrock—represents the impossibility 
of controlling the inner flux of life through the same utilitarian categories that work in the 
outer world.  
 The flux of experience cannot be reduced to the intellectual premises that are 
developed within society. In Time and Free Will Henri Bergson states that the two levels 
of experience refer to two conflicting selves in constant interaction in “pure duration” 
(100):  
 Hence there are finally two different selves, one of which is, as it were, the 
 external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representation. 
 We reach the former by deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner 
 states as living things, constantly becoming. (231)  
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Bergson relates the social self to spatial representations and the inner life to a sphere 
above those artificial limitations. He distinguishes between “two possible conceptions of 
time” (100) to oppose real time to space: “time, understood in the sense of a medium […] 
is nothing but space” (91). William James’s ‘pure experience’ shares with Bergson’s 
‘pure duration’ the concept of a stream of life that is in a continuous state of becoming in 
time: “According to my view, experience as a whole is a process in time” (ERE 33). 
Therefore, both philosophers consider time and space as artificial categories that arrest 
the fluid time of the vital reality. Eliot and Hemingway explored this flux of vital 
experience. In the next section I shall analyze representations of the categories of time 
and space to reflect on the extent to which these two authors embraced that sensuous flow 
to experience reality.   
 
 
3. Time, memory and space  
 
Eliot’s Prufrock and Other Observations and Hemingway’s In Our Time treat the 
categories of time and space as artificial conventions disguising a more vital reality of 
flux and duration. The poet and the writer of fiction explore in their early writings two 
levels of consciousness which refer to both the outer and the inner world. As part of this 
experience of the fragmented self they also look at two alternative conceptions of time 
that correspond to those two levels of experience. They identify the public conception of 
time used to organize public spaces. Moreover, they ponder the extent to which an 
alternative consideration of time in continuous duration may be experienced beyond the 
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public sphere of reality. In their first published works Eliot and Hemingway depict how 
human intellect imposes the categories of time and space to arrange the external reality 
that constrains the stream of life.  
 The fact that they wrote in the early twentieth century means that Eliot and 
Hemingway reflected on a world facing important technological and cultural changes. 
Discoveries in physics in the first years of the century, most notably Einstein’s theory of 
relativity, questioned the standardized textures of reality based on Newton’s notions of 
absolute time.11 For the latter, time exits in an absolute succession and it is alien to 
anything external.12 In contrast, Einstein rejects the notion of an absolute time and 
contends that “the dilation of time was only a perspectival effect created by the relative 
motion between an observer and the thing observed” (Kern 18).13 These changes resulted 
in a flexible and dynamic consideration of time that was at odds with the industrial 
modernization of the nineteenth century and the necessity of adopting a standard public 
time. For Kern, economical changes and new modes of mass production, along with the 
wireless telephone and railroad timetables, necessitated the creation of a universal public 
time to coordinate life in the modern world (34). Therefore, at the turn of the century 
                                                
11 For a full discussion of the alternative considerations of time and space under 
Newton’s Principia Mathematica and Einstein’s theory of relativity, see Kern.  
 
12 For a more detailed explanation of Newton’s description of time, see Schleifer 37. 
 
13 In the “London Letter, March 1921”—one of the Eliot’s essays that appeared 
periodically in the magazine the Dial—the poet makes reference to the presence of 
Einstein in England: “Einstein the Great has visited England, and delivered lectures to 
uncomprehending audiences, and been photographed for the newspapers” (Rainey 183). 
This reference to Einstein suggests that Eliot was not unaware of Einstein’s work and the 
impact of his discoveries in physics. For a detailed explanation of this reference, see 
Rainey.  
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there was a conflicting coexistence between a static public consideration of time and the 
reconfiguration of space-time as dynamic and mutable. Bergson articulated this debate as 
part of his preoccupation with a flux of vital reality beyond the fixed symbols developed 
by the intellect to arrange daily experiences.14  
 Henri Bergson claimed that time is fluid and continuous. He defined real duration 
as what is “the most removed from externality and the least penetrated with 
intellectuality” (CE 218). Fluid time is in permanent development, “the past, always 
moving on, is swelling unceasingly with a present that is absolutely new” (219). As 
Deleuze clarifies, “[d]uration is essentially memory” (Bergsonism 51). There is a 
connection between pure duration and pure memory, because as Bergson makes clear, 
“[m]emory, laden with the whole of the past, responds to the appeal of the present state” 
(MM 168). Beyond this undivided movement of life, Bergson considers the categories of 
past, present and future as artificial constructs developed by human activity to arrange the 
external world. Bergson looked at the clock as a symbol of the devices developed to 
impose divisions upon pure duration in the outer world, “[b]ut what we call measuring 
time is nothing but counting simultaneities. The clock taken as an illustration” (108). 
Furthermore, this artificial measure leads to the consideration of space; after all, public 
time is “time that has become quantity by being set out in space” (TFW 127). For 
Bergson “pure duration” (100) cannot be measured by using artificial devices to control 
time. He was reluctant to “project time into space” or “express duration in terms of 
extensity” (101), considering that the continuous becoming of real experience is beyond 
                                                
14 The English writer Wyndham Lewis accused Bergson of putting a hyphen between 
space and time. He viewed Bergson’s philosophy, Einstein’s physics and some of the 
literature of the period as responsible for removing clean lines from art and separating 
faculties from human perception (Kern 26-27).  
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the intellectual control intrinsic to the human activity. Beyond intellectual categorizations 
there is a stream of real duration.  
 These lines of thinking that emerge from Bergson can also be located in Eliot’s 
and Hemingway’s first published collections of works. In their early writings these two 
authors reflect on the nature of space-time and subsequent repercussions in the 
organization of the outside world that developed in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. So, bearing in mind this common interest I shall analyze the extent to which the 
poet and the writer of fiction considered a stream of life beyond those intellectual 
categories that oppress a vital reality.  
 Eliot’s early poems offer a clear framework for representing and analyzing the 
alternative considerations of time explored by the poet. In the first lines of “Preludes,” 
Eliot depicts an urban landscape framed by the rhythm of a clock: “The winter evening 
settles down/With smell of steaks in passageways./ Six o’clock” (CPP 12). In the second 
section, the urban landscape becomes an object of experience: “The morning comes to 
consciousness/ Of faint stale smells of beer” (12). In this stanza Eliot does not name the 
rhythm of any clock, but he presents the life of the modern city under the arrangements of 
its daily public activity with all these “muddy feet” in their way to work heading to “early 
coffee stands” (12). Kern explains how at the turn of the century, “[as] the economy in 
every country centralized, people clustered in cities” (34). “Preludes” explores the 
condition of the modern metropolis. Eliot reflects on “all the hands/That are raising dingy 
shades/In a thousand furnished rooms” (12). Eliot portrays a desolated panorama of 
“broken blinds and chimney-pots” and a street with “[a] lonely cab-horse” (CPP 12). He 
refers to “smoky days”, a “blackened street”,  “stale smells of beer”, “dingy shades.” 
 40 
Eliot equates this urban landscape with ugliness and decay. This depiction implies a 
negative impression of the material world that Eliot relates to the daily requirements of 
urban life. In “Morning at the Window” Eliot also reflects on this daily rhythm of the 
cities when he refers to “breakfast plates in the basements kitchens” (16) at the same time 
that he connects this landscape with “the damp souls of housemaids/ Sprouting 
despondently at area gates” (16). Eliot locates all the “twisted faces” and “passer[s]-by 
with muddy skirts” (16) in an urban scenery that is arranged by a mechanical 
categorization of time. 
 The self is trapped in urban life and the rhythm of the clock organizes it. Eliot 
equates the material world with the public function of time. Moreover, he refers to 
activity in the outer world as “the other masquerades/That time resumes” (CPP 12). All 
these public activities or masquerades are framed within public time, but in the last two 
stanzas of the poem Eliot looks at it differently. He refers again to the urban landscape as 
“sordid images” (12); but, for the first time, Eliot uses the experience of the self to allude 
to an inner flow of experience: “I am moved by fancies that are curled/Around these 
images” (13). In the last section of the poem the experience of the ‘I’ is not framed within 
the time of the clock, but within a flow of experience alien to any artificial device that 
may control it. Eliot opposes the experience of the ugly urban world framed by clock 
time to an experience beyond these boundaries. Eliot refers to “[t]he notion of some 
infinitely gentle/Infinitely suffering thing” (13). In these two lines Eliot alludes to 
something beyond the previous conception of time that he uses to depict the images of 
the city. As Sigg notes, “[t]hinking about ‘Preludes’ involves beholding something that is 
not there as well as the something that is” (37). Eliot opposes the material world, with its 
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clock time, to the experience of something that is beyond the world of the city depicted in 
“Preludes.”  
 Eliot confronts standard time as a mode of organizing daily life in modern cities 
and the needs of urban life. In “Portrait” Eliot engages with this feature when he explains 
how the female character has “the scene arrange itself” (CPP 8). Eliot reflects on the 
social demands of the inhabitants of cities by alluding to “watches” that are corrected by 
“public clocks” (9). In “Prufrock” Eliot again explores this aspect when Prufrock 
complains how he has “measured out” his “life with coffee spoons” (5). All the social 
activity he gets involved with demands certain manners and time organization. The 
coffee spoons are not simply an element of the cutlery, but a sign of the schedules and 
arrangements according to which Prufrock lives his daily activities. Modern life demands 
certain routines and Prufrock reflects on this aspect through the use of clock time: “In a 
minute there is time/For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse” (5). Eliot 
opposes this dimension of the modern world to a consideration of a time beyond the 
requirements of this world. The same concern is at the core of “Rhapsody”, but in this 
poem Eliot uses lampposts as a new modern device to reflect on two alternative 
considerations of time at war in these early poems.  
 In “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” Eliot presents a city in movement within a span 
of time from “Twelve o’clock” to “‘Four o’clock’” (CPP 14-16). The street lamp marks 
the mechanical rhythm of life: “The street-lamp sputtered/The street-lamp muttered” 
(14), but Eliot also introduces in the poem the natural sources that conventionally 
differentiate between day and night: “The lamp hummed:/‘Regard the moon,[…] She is 
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alone/With all the old nocturnal smells’” (15).15 “Rhapsody” uses the streetlights as 
agents of the development of modern life: “The street-lamp said, ‘Regard that 
woman/Who hesitates toward you in the light of the door’” (14). The lamp represents the 
selectivity of the practical intellect that pays attention to some objects and ignores others. 
As Childs argues by using Bergson’s philosophy, “individual consciousness is limited to 
those aspects of the universe that can affect the individual, the nature and extent of our 
consciousness of an object promising to affect us varying with the proximity of that 
object. […]. In ‘Rhapsody on a Windy Night’ lamps […] draw very particular objects to 
the speaker’s attention, objects illuminated by a circle of light that includes the object in 
question and excludes all others” (54). The activity of the urban area involves the 
perception of the outside world under modern devices symbolized in the public lighting.  
 Eliot uses these devices to present the outer world in a mechanical mode. The 
lampposts lead the attention towards certain images in the way in which they “sputtered,” 
“muttered,” and “said” (CPP 14-15). Eliot repeats this pattern three times in different 
stanzas in the poem to depict the city. He emphasizes the role of the lamps to present the 
different images of the street within a span of clock time. “Rhapsody” uses the hours of 
the clock to divide experience at the same time that it directs the perception of the outer 
world through the regularly spaced streetlamps (Mayer 79). This brings a mechanical 
experience of the city, but by doing so, Eliot simultaneously calls attention to those 
aspects of the experience of the urban landscape that remain obscured under the 
automatism of modern life.  
                                                
15 The use of a public electric supply system at the end of the nineteenth century implied 
a blurring of the division between day and night (Kern 29). 
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 Eliot represents in the street lamp the dichotomy between artificial impositions of 
the standardized time and the flow of experience beyond such a conception of time. A 
different sort of rhythm hovers within this urban landscape: “Every street-lamp I 
pass/Beats like a fatalistic drum” (14). As B.C. Southam identifies, when Eliot wrote this 
line he may have had in mind Bergson’s statement in Creative Evolution about how 
“‘incidents’ seem to be ‘discontinuous’ but they ‘stand out against the continuity of a 
background on which they are designed…they are the beats of the drum [cf. line 9] which 
break forth here and there in the symphony’” (63). At one level, Eliot explores a flow of 
time under the practical life of the metropolis; and, at another, the poet introduces a 
conception of time beyond the frame of urban life: “Whispering lunar 
incarnations/Dissolve the floor of memory” (14). By introducing memory in the poem, 
Eliot goes deeper into the representation of time to explore its correlation with memory 
within the framework of Bergson’s analysis.16    
 In Matter and Memory Bergson distinguishes between “pure memory” and “habit 
memory” (151), the former being “[c]oextensive with consciousness, […] leaving to each 
fact its place and consequently marking its date, truly moving in the past” (151). This 
memory equates to real duration as it “gnaws on things and leaves on them the mark of its 
tooth” (CE 7). Contrarily, habit memory “is nothing else but the complete set of 
intelligently constructed mechanisms […]. This memory enables us to adapt ourselves to 
the present situation” (MM 151). Bergson differentiates between two types of memory as 
he does with time. When Eliot mentions the dissolving floors of memory that end with 
                                                
16 For an explanation of Eliot’s exposure to Bergson’s philosophy during the year he 
spent in Paris in 1910-1911, see Beasley 41. 
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“all its clear relations,/Its division and precisions” (14), the poet portrays habit memory—
and its mechanistic function in practical life—vanishing among the limitless flow of the 
pure memory. In these lines Eliot portrays two types of memory at war in the same way 
that he does with time in the symbolism of the street lamp. “Rhapsody” represents the 
extent to which two conceptions of time, and hence memory, coexist in modern life.17 
Hemingway’s early writings exhibit the same concern with time.  
 In some of the stories and short sketches from In Our Time, Hemingway frames 
action by using a mechanistic conception of time. The first line of the sketch from 
Chapter V narrates how “[t]hey shot the six cabinet ministers at half-past six in the 
morning” (51); the events in the sketch from Chapter VIII take place“[a]t two o’clock in 
the morning” (79); and in Chapter XV Sam Cardinella was hanged “at six o’clock in the 
morning in the corridor of the county jail” (143).18 Hemingway also depicts events with 
precision in some of his short stories; for example “The revolutionist” situates the events 
“[i]n 1919 [when] HE was traveling on the railroads of Italy” (81). Hemingway uses 
artificial measures of time to describe action in the outer world, but he also looks at a 
continuous and fluid time beyond the limits of its mechanistic conception as part of his 
reflections.  
                                                
17 There is extensive work on the relation between Bergson’s philosophy and this poem. 
In his analysis of “Rhapsody” David J. Childs engages with the most relevant critics—
Smith, Gray and Gordon—to develop an enriching argument. He considers that this work 
does not anticipate Eliot’s later revision of Bergson as these critics have argued but rather 
is the culmination of it (51). My own analysis owes a great deal to Childs’ insights as I 
consider this poem to be part of Eliot’s reflections on consciousness under the influence 
of Bergson’s philosophy, and not a critique of those theories.    
 
18 Italics in original. 
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 In “Soldier’s Home” Hemingway depicts the life of a veteran who has returned to 
his hometown. His mother hopes he will get involved in the social world and she 
constantly relates action to time as part of her discourse. She allows him “to take the car 
out in the evening” (IOT 73), she talked to his father “last night” (73), and when she 
suggests that he should get a job she says that “it’s about time” (75). Alternatively, the 
young vet does not seem to be interested in his mother’s approach to daily experiences 
and he tries to focus on “[a]ll the times that had been able to make him feel cool and clear 
inside himself” (69). He has no intention of following the dictates of the social world as 
“[h]e did not want any consequences” (71). When he realizes how the girls from the town 
have grown up, he prefers to ignore them and he neglects all the “intrigue” and “politics” 
(71) they involve. “He wanted to live along without consequences” (71). The vet is 
interested in a flow of experiences beyond the arrangements of society or any work 
routine: “He had tried so to keep his life from being complicated. […]. He wanted his life 
to go smoothly” (76-77). In this story Hemingway explores the mechanical time 
symbolized in his mother’s appeal to the organized outer world and the vet’s search for 
an alternative experience of reality. The clash between these two characters symbolizes 
Hemingway’s exploration of time. In this story the writer of fiction looks at a flow of 
continuous inner experience to ponder the extent to which this real duration may be 
engaged beyond social activities and, as part of this analysis, he is compelled to focus on 
memory.19  
                                                
19 For alternative considerations of memory in Hemingway’s work, see Ernest 
Hemingway and the Geography of Memory, edited by Mark Cirino and Mark P. Ott. This 
essay collection focuses on the geographic elements in Hemingway’s writings and how 
his work “evolves through his travels and across the texture of his constructed images of 
different spaces” (xi). Critics use different approaches to consider the relation between 
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 The first two paragraphs of “Soldier’s Home” describe two pictures in which the 
character appears in different moments of his life: “There is a picture which shows him 
among his fraternity brothers […] There is a picture which shows him on the Rhine with 
two German girls and another corporal” (IOT 70). On the one hand, these pictures 
symbolize the evolution of mechanistic time: “He enlisted in the Marines in 1917” (70) 
and he did not return home until “the summer of 1919” (70); on the other, this span of 
time covers the memories of the main character from that period and how these have 
affected him. Grimes, when reflecting on the character of this story, suggests that 
“[m]emories of pain and disillusionment blot out the expectations of glory, honor and 
valor with which […] [he] entered the war. […]. He wants to live above the turmoil, the 
chaos of his time” (45). These memories take him to the past and back again to the 
present, but the origin of the vet’s anxieties is the “chaos of his [present] time” (45) that 
Grimes insightfully refers to. Therefore, the young vet pursues a flow of time and 
memory that may move him beyond the frame of the present time and the “habit 
memories” (Bergson, MM 151) that unavoidable torment him in his daily experiences. 
 Hemingway also refers in “On the Quai at Syrma” to the two levels of time along 
with two levels of memory. The writer of fiction uses memory and time to narrate the 
tragic experiences of a soldier in the Turkish war. However, there is a clear 
differentiation between, on the one hand, the narrator recalling the memories of events 
under the clock-time: “The strange thing was, he said, how they scream every night at 
                                                                                                                                            
memory and Hemingway’s fiction.  For example, Hewson and Seals focus on 
Hemingway’s own memory and the role it played in his work; Perosa reflects on memory 
as “[w]hat mediates between experience and invention, or what allows the passage from 
one to the other for narrative purposes” (32); and Cirino reads A Farewell to Arms “as an 
extended autobiographical memory” (151) to decipher the truth that memory may 
represent in Hemingway’s fiction.  
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midnight. I do not know why they screamed at that time. We were in the harbor and they 
were all in the pier” (IOT 11); and on the other hand, the allusion to a deeper level of 
memory under duration: “You remember the harbor. There were plenty of nice things 
floating around it. That was the only time in my life I got so I dreamed about things” 
(12). The memories of the screams are framed by the public space of the harbor. The 
memories of “things floating around” (12) are part of the inner life of the soldier. These 
two levels in the soldier’s experience relate to the inner and the outer world. In this short 
story Hemingway stresses the unavoidable correspondence between time and memory, 
but he also involves space when he depicts the two alternative conceptions of these two 
categories at war in the soldier’s life.  
  In their early works Eliot and Hemingway reflect on a mechanistic time which 
distorts the real duration that flows beyond the restrictions of social or public space. 
These two authors depict the same two processes of mind that Henri Bergson explores in 
Creative Evolution when he refers to “continuous creation” or “free activity” and the 
reversion of that activity which turns into “extension” and “geometrical mechanism” 
(244). Therefore, it is necessary to consider space as part of the equation because, 
according to Bergson, “we live for the external world rather than think; we ‘are acted’ 
rather than act ourselves. To act feely is to recover possession of oneself to get back into 
pure duration” (TFW 231-32).  Mechanistic time “is nothing but space, and pure duration 
is something different” (90). Eliot and Hemingway pursued that ‘something different.’ 
They unavoidably framed the experience of ordinary consciousness in mechanistic time 
and public space. Furthermore, they looked at private spaces, searching for the vital 
reality, but they faced the fact that even the private inner life of the individual works 
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under the categorizations of the outer world. Hemingway and Eliot have been considered 
by critics in this context only in partial and random ways.20  
 In “Portrait of a Lady” Eliot frames the scene in a private room, but the inner 
experiences of the characters are under the influence of the public world: “Correct our 
watches by the public clocks./Then sit for half an hour and drink our bocks” (CPP 9). In 
the second line of the poem, Eliot stresses the arranged order of the space: “You have the 
scene arrange itself—as it will seem to do—/With ‘I have saved this afternoon for you’” 
(8). Nothing is left to improvisation and everything seems to move under a mechanistic 
tone that suffocates the rhythm of the private experiences of the male character: “The 
voice returns like the insistent out-of-tune/Of a broken violin” (9). In “Aunt Helen” Eliot 
explores the same feature when he depicts the “small house” of his aunty, where the 
“Dresden clock continued ticking on the mantelpiece” (17). In these two poems Eliot 
attempts to move away from the public sphere of reality and therefore he turns to the 
space of the private rooms, but this movement unavoidably turns into a failure as the 
private is also under the influence of the public.21 The poet leads these characters to 
private spaces beyond the limits of the social world, but they still act according to the 
rhythms of public time. A similar movement may be identified in some of Hemingway’s 
short stories when he confronts private and public spaces.  
                                                
20 See Sigg or Narbeshuber.  
 
21 For an alternative analysis of Eliot’s use of rooms in his poetry, see Lobb. This critic 
insightfully considers the image of the closed room as central to Eliot’s entire poetic 
career, and he compares Eliot’s use of this image in his early and late poetry. Lobb reads 
the image of this claustrophobic atmosphere as a symbol of “a enclosed consciousness” 
(23). However, he overlooks the extent to which in his early poems Eliot uses this image 
in contraposition to the world beyond this space as a mode of reflecting on the correlation 
between the inner and the outer world.  
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 In Hemingway’s “Cat in the Rain” the American woman is trapped in the privacy 
of the limits of the hotel room, and only when she crosses those boundaries can she 
experience a “feeling of being of supreme importance” (IOT 93). But this is only a 
momentary feeling as she comes back to the room to look out “of the window” (94). The 
origin of the American woman’s anxieties does not come from the outside world, but 
from her own inner experiences. In the same way, in “The Doctor and the Doctor’s Wife” 
Hemingway positions the story between the physical boundaries of the cottage and the 
world outside that private space. At the end of the story Nick refuses to visit his mother 
where “[h]er Bible, her copy of the Science and Health and her Quarterly were on a table 
beside her bed in the darkened room” (26). Significantly, he decides to leave the spatial 
limits of the private house to hunt squirrels, as a reaction against the restrictions his 
mother symbolizes. The private sphere of reality is under the influence of the mechanistic 
conception of reality and those characters are trapped in their own incapability to leave 
such a situation.  
 In their early collections of writings, Eliot and Hemingway represented the 
constant interaction between the inner and the outer world in the experience of reality. 
They considered time, memory and space as part of a problematic experience of reality. I 
believe that these earlier works explore the correlation between a deeper state of 
consciousness and an alternative conception of time beyond a mechanistic conception of 
reality. They attempted to move beyond the public sphere of reality to a realization that 
the private inner life of the individual also works under these intellectual categorizations. 
They failed in their shared attempt to enter into that stream of pure duration that—as 
Bergson stated—“is something different” (TFW 90). Therefore, both Eliot and 
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Hemingway continued to pursue in their later works an experience in which 
consciousness, and that which is perceived, coexist in a principle of duration. It is 
necessary to bear this in mind to understand the extent to which Eliot’s “objective 
correlative” (SP 48) and Hemingway’s “real thing” (DIA 2) were aesthetic propositions 
relating to reflections on the experience of a fragmented self.  
 
 
4. Image, emotion and the flow of vital reality 
 
Eliot’s “objective correlative” (SP 48) and Hemingway’s “real thing” (DIA 2) show a 
corresponding concern with the permanent interaction between physical and mental—
external reality and internal thinking—in the experience of reality. These formulas point 
to the deployment of images in their shared attempt to unify these two levels of 
experience. When I use the term image I refer to the concept of movement-image 
developed by Henri Bergson in the first chapter of Matter and Memory. As Deleuze 
explains, “[t]he movement-image is the object; the thing itself caught in movement as 
continuous function. The movement-image is the modulation of the object itself” 
(Cinema 2 26). Moreover, Eliot and Hemingway turn on the emotion associated with the 
image as the final experience of such union. Therefore, I shall analyze Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s aesthetic propositions by juxtaposing the physical and the mental as 
articulated by Henri Bergson and William James. Firstly, I shall focus on Bergson’s 
reflection on movement-image as an attempt “to overcome this duality […] of 
consciousness and thing” (Deleuze, Cinema 1 58). Then, I shall consider James’s 
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treatment of emotion and its key function in perception, “unifying the physical and the 
mental” (Opdahl 119).  My argument is that Eliot’s and Hemingway’s propositions are 
attempts to recast the union of the inner and the outer world in a “pure duration” 
(Bergson, TFW 232) beyond a mechanistic conception of reality deployed in the public 
sphere. These formulas are part of their shared reflection on the impossibility of 
conjugating a sensuous self which experiences inwardly, and an intellectual self 
conditioned by the experiences of the outer world.  
 In his essay “Hamlet” (1919), Eliot defends the “objective correlative” (SP 48) as 
“the only way of expressing emotion in the form of art” (48). It is a “set of objects, a 
situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion, such 
that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the 
emotion is immediately evoked” (48). At one level, he points to external objects— 
“external facts” (48). At another level, he alludes to the inner experience of the subject— 
“sensory experiences” (48). Eliot’s “objective correlative” (48) presents a concept of the 
self in which consciousness implies the interaction between the inner and the outer world. 
Even more importantly, he points to an image—a particular “situation” (48) or distinctive 
arrangement of objects in the material world—to produce the emotion in which these two 
levels of experience converge.  
 In a related way, Hemingway wrote in Death in the Afternoon that his main 
struggle at the beginning of his career was “to put down what really happened in action, 
what the actual things were which produced the emotion that you experienced” (2). 
Hemingway aims to offer an intense experience in an instant of time; “the real thing, the 
sequence of motion and fact which made the emotion and which would be as valid in a 
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year or in ten years” (2). In this remark Hemingway differentiates between the outer 
world of the “actual things” (2) and the inner world of the subject. Furthermore, as Eliot 
does in his “objective correlative” (SP 48), Hemingway also refers to image—what 
happens in “action” (DIA 2)—as the vehicle for producing an emotional experience that 
allies the physical with the psychological. Therefore, these two authors situate images—
and their intrinsic emotions—as the key feature that may offer the desired unification of 
these two levels of experience.22  
 In Matter and Memory Bergson argues that the image is everything that can 
possibly be known about the material world. As Deleuze explains, “Bergson constantly 
says that we cannot understand anything unless we are first given the set of images” 
(Cinema 1 65). In Creative Evolution Bergson clarifies this idea further in order to claim 
that it “is no longer reality” that will be “reconstruct[ed], but only an imitation of the real, 
or rather a symbolic image” (xxi). According to Bergson, the intellect uses these images 
as a representation of the real to understand and organize it. Bergson presents an intellect 
gathering together images to arrange reality, but, as Beasley clarifies, he also calls 
attention to the impossibility of the intellect’s grasping “reality in its pure state of flux” 
                                                
22 Most of the critics who have previously analyzed the communalities between these two 
authors point to the relation between Eliot’s “objective correlative” (SP 48) and 
Hemingway’s “real thing” (DIA 2). For alternative considerations of this correspondence 
see Adams, Baker, Grimes, Joost and Brown and Watkins. Baker argues that 
Hemingway’s formula has an advantage over Eliot’s because it does not require any 
previous “literary” experience (56). Joost and Brown accurately note how “Hemingway’s 
own theory of writing reflects the imagist technique of T.S. Eliot” (427). Grimes looks at 
Pound’s definition of an image to connect Eliot’s and Hemingway’s aesthetics formulas. 
To a certain extent all these critics insightfully focus on emotion and image to build the 
correlation between these formulas, but I shall go beyond this obvious communality to 
develop further the reasons why these two authors turned to these aesthetic formulas as a 
result of their common concern with a problematic experience of reality.  
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(35). Bergson underlines the double form of the real, one based on intellect and one based 
on intuition.23 The former is oriented to action and reduces reality to spatial 
representations for practical purposes. The latter is not oriented towards practical action 
in the outer world.24 Therefore, there is a confrontation between the reality organized by 
the intellect that breaks the pure movement of life, and the reality of constant flow 
beyond the mechanism of intellectual arrangements. The intellect works scientifically, 
separating things from motion, to ponder the actions that may be executed over those 
things to arrange the public sphere of reality. Contrarily, the internal life of intuition is a 
constant flow of movement through time: “As soon as we go out of the encasings in 
which radical mechanism […] confine[s] our thought, reality appears as a ceaseless 
upspringing of something new” (CE 53). The question then is that of the extent to which 
these images constructed by the intellect have access to the internal and continuous 
reality of intuition.  
  In An Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson argues that the inner life of pure 
duration “cannot be represented by images” but  “many diverse images, […], by the 
convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point where there is a 
certain intuition to be seized” (16). Therefore, although the deployment of images by the 
intellect does not offer access to the real, Bergson states that “we must find again and 
rejoin to the intellect proper, in order to grasp the true nature of the vital activity” (CE 
56). Bergson encourages regaining access to the flow of pure duration or intuition. 
Furthermore, he points to cinema as a metaphor of the process experienced by the 
                                                
23 As I have extensively argued in Section One and Section Two (see pp. 25-47).  
 
24 For a more detailed explanation about Bergson’s epistemology, see Brooker’s Mastery 
and Escape.  
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intellect and its use of images: “Such is the contrivance of the cinematograph. And such 
is also that of our knowledge. Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of 
things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming 
artificially” (CE 332).25 As Armstrong agues, “cinema offered many modernists a new 
[…] language of images” (106). 
 In her essay “The Cinema” (1926), Virginia Woolf reflected on the distinctive 
mental experience intrinsic to cinema to affirm that objects in the screen “have become 
not more beautiful in the sense in which pictures are beautiful, but shall we call it (our 
vocabulary is miserably insufficient) more real, or real with a different reality from that 
which we perceive in daily life” (349). Woolf distinguished between the experience of 
daily life and an alternative experience of reality beyond that life. She also compared 
cinema to language to affirm that “[f]or a moment it seemed as if thought could be 
conveyed by shape more effectively than by words” (350). Just as Eliot and Hemingway 
did in their early works, in her essay on cinema Woolf looked at an experience beyond a 
mechanistic conception of reality deployed in the public sphere of reality to ponder the 
extent to which language may have access to it. This shared concern amongst modernist 
writers clarifies the correlation between cinema and the common language of images, as 
deployed by Eliot and Hemingway. These two authors adopted Bergson’s recognition of 
the need to ally the physical reality of movement in the external world with the image as 
psychological reality in consciousness, and hence, they looked into the movement-image 
to explore such an enterprise.   
                                                
25 As Deleuze expresses, in spite of Bergson’s critique of the cinema, “nothing can 
prevent an encounter between the movement-image, as he considers it, and the 
cinematographic image” (Cinema 1 xix).  
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            In the sketch from Chapter 14 in In Our Time Hemingway narrates the death of a 
bullfighter. In this short paragraph, he presents the events in three movements. First, 
Hemingway presents the image of an immobile bullfighter: “Maera lay still, his head on 
his arms, his face in the sand. He felt warm and sticky from the bleeding” (131).26 
Secondly, Hemingway presents the events in movement in the outside world: “Some men 
picked Maera up and started to run with him toward the barriers through the gate out of 
the passageway around under the grandstand to the infirmary” (131).27 Finally, the static 
image of the bullfighter and the image of the outer world delimited in space lead to the 
experience of the bullfighter in a final image:  
 Maera felt everything getting larger and larger and then smaller and smaller. 
 Then it got larger and larger and larger and then smaller and smaller. Then 
 everything commenced to run faster and faster as when they speed up a 
 cinematograph film. Then he was dead. 28 (IOT 131) 
 
These three steps in the narration correspond to Bergson’s thesis on movement-image in 
the first chapter of Matter and Memory. For Deleuze, “there are not only instantaneous 
images, that is, immobile sections of duration; there are movement-images, which are 
mobile sections of duration; there are, finally, time-images, that is, duration-images, […], 
which are beyond movement itself” (Cinema 1 12). In the first two movements of the 
sketch, space and time are used to arrange the scene in the outer world. Bullfighting is 
strictly ordered by space and time and the execution of the fight should be performed 
within spatial and temporal divisions. As Hemingway underlines in Death in the 
                                                
26 Italics in original. 
 
27 Italics in original. 
 
28 Italics in original. 
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Afternoon, “[t]he bullfight itself takes place in a sand-covered ring enclosed by a red 
wooden fence a little over four feet high. This red wooden fence is called barrera. Behind 
it is a narrow circular passageway that separates it from the first row of seats in the 
amphitheatre” (30-31). The ring itself is spatially divided in portions where the different 
parts of the fight take place.29 Significantly, Hemingway takes into account these spatial 
divisions to arrange the narration of the action. He moves Maera from the sand in the ring 
to the infirmary. Hemingway clearly considers the spatial portions of the ring when he 
refers to “barriers,” “passageway” and “infirmary” (IOT 131).30 When the bullfighter is 
evacuated and he leaves the ring through the protective fences, he crosses all the 
imaginary and physical boundaries that conform to the spatial configuration of the 
bullfight. 
 Hemingway also alludes to temporal division when he explains that “[t]he doctor 
came running from the corral, where he had been sewing up picador horses” (131).31 It 
implies that the picador has already done his work and the fight is in the last act where 
the bull should be killed. As Hemingway clarifies, “[t]here are three acts to the fighting 
of each bull and they are called in Spanish los tres tercios de la lidia, or the three thirds of 
the combat. The first act, where the bull charges the picadors […]. Act two is that of the 
                                                
29 McCormick argues that “[t]he division between the medios and the tercios is 
imaginary, but in Spain a line in white or red whitewash is painted on the sand to mark 
the division between tercios and tablas. The picador is not permitted to ride beyond that 
line into the tercios. The burladeros, or protected fences, are comparatively modern; 
originally access to and egress from the ring were over the top of the barrera, via the 
estribo, or narrow wooden shelf placed about 16 inches above the sand” (134-35).  
 
30 Italics in original. 
 
31 Italics in original.  
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banderillas. […]. [T]he third act and final division is the death [of the bull]” (DIA 96-97). 
Maera is fighting the bull when he is gored, so the fight is in the third or final act. 
Hemingway frames the first two movements of the paragraph within the spatial and 
temporal divisions intrinsic to bullfighting. But at the end of the scene, time and space are 
presented as fluid, beyond the mechanical categorization used in the outer world of the 
bullring. By referring to the “cinematograph” (IOT 131) along with the way he depicts 
the death of the bullfighter in the final image, Hemingway makes a statement about these 
images as devices to unify the inner and the outer world in a flow of experience. He 
presents an image in which time is flowing beyond its mechanical considerations in the 
outer world.32 This final image is different to the initial immobile image of Maera and the 
second image in movement of the bullring. Furthermore, in the last image he clearly 
dissociates the experience of time from that of a homogeneous categorization of space. In 
essence, he disembodies space-time as an intellectual device to organize reality. As Lisa 
Narbeshuber states, “[p]aralleling the chaos of the ‘external’ world, the dying Maera’s 
perception of space and time breaks down” (19). The final image of Maera dying is 
beyond movement as an intellectual category. 
 In these few lines Hemingway cancels the mechanical conception of space-time 
used to arrange the outer world. His writing aligns with the conclusion made by Bergson 
in his consideration of how pure duration has been decomposed by the intellect into 
artificial categories, and the extent to which this may be reverted to come back to a flow 
                                                
32 For an alternative consideration of the influence of cinema on Hemingway’s 
deployment of language, see Trodd. This critic argues that Hemingway’s use of “a 
camera-eye aesthetic […] rejected all apparently coherent and exclusive ways of 
perceiving the world” (8), but she fails to notice the extent to which this concern is result 
of his reflection on the interaction between external reality and internal thinking.  
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of intuition through the use of images. In this short sketch the writer of fiction offers an 
important clue when he points to the cinematograph, which as Deleuze explains “does not 
give us an image to which movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-
image.” (Cinema 1  2-3). The sketch in Chapter 14 is part of Hemingway’s reflections on 
a dissociated experience of reality and the concern with “free[ing] ourselves from the 
space which underlines the movement in order to consider only the movement itself, […], 
pure mobility” (Bergson, IM 16).33 Hemingway explored this movement within the 
spatial and temporal divisions of bullfighting.34 Significantly, Hemingway looked at the 
action between the matador and the bull to explore images in which the categorical 
distinctions of time and space are blurred and a moment of pure duration is reverted, as 
he aimed for with his aesthetic formula “the real thing” (DIA 2).35 The exploration of 
                                                
33 It is worth noting how Ortega y Gasset argues that genuine bullfighting “assumes 
unavoidably a strange cinematic inspiration” (128, my translation). In his analysis of 
bullfighting Gasset refers to cinematic movements in his attempts to discern the value of 
the matador’s performance (119-20).  
 
34 For further considerations of time and space in relation to bullfighting, see Chapter 5 of 
Wolff’s Filosofía de las Corridas de Toros—Philosophy of Bullfighting.  
 
35 Most of the criticism is unhelpful in the context of my research in relation to 
Hemingway and bullfighting. Critics have overlooked the extent to which Hemingway 
considers bullfighting as a result of his attempt to make sense of the world of experience. 
For example, in one of the most recent works about Hemingway and bullfighting, Mandel 
deploys an interesting analysis about the evolution of bullfighting in Spain and how 
Hemingway reflected on it in his works. This critic states that “Hemingway recognized 
the bullfight as a rich subject for his own art” (235), but the question of what Hemingway 
found in this subject to deploy in his fiction requires further consideration. In this 
dissertation I attempt to go deeper in the analysis of the correlation between bullfighting 
and Hemingway’s reflections on experience. I engage extensively with that issue in 
Chapter Three and Four and I involve studies about bullfighting that have not 
traditionally been used in Hemingway criticism e.g. (Filinich, Ortega y Gasset or Wolff), 
but offer enriching approaches to that matter.   
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Bergson’s consideration of images as a mode of entering into that flow of “[i]nner 
duration” (11) may also be identified in Eliot’s short prose poem “Hysteria”.36   
 In “Hysteria” Eliot narrates the scene of a man and a woman waiting to have tea 
in a restaurant.37 Eliot presents the woman as an object observed by the man. The man 
contemplates her and, as soon as he focuses his attention on her laughter, the boundaries 
between external reality and internal thinking start to blur: “As she laughed I was aware 
of becoming involved in her laughter and being part of it” (CPP 19). Eliot involves space 
and time in the representation of this image-movement. Furthermore, as Hemingway does 
in the sketch from Chapter 14, the poet dissolves the intellectual categorization of space-
time in the outer world when he presents the image in which the man becomes one with 
the woman’s laughter: “I was drawn in by short gasps, inhaled at each momentary 
recovery, lost finally in the dark cavern of her throat” (19). The rhymes of the woman are 
beyond the mechanical consideration of time. The darkness of the cavern also cancels the 
clearness of any physical boundaries in the outer world. As Henry Christian states in his 
analysis of this prose poem, the “dark caverns” remind us of the narrator’s spatial 
confusion (77). This confusion is a consequence of the suspension of the intellectual 
categories that are represented as dysfunctional in this image, in which the man becomes 
one with the object. The reunification of these two levels of experience is interrupted by 
the inclusion of a waiter in the scene. Eliot turns again to time and space to organize the 
                                                
36 For an analysis of Eliot’s comments on cinema in his poems, essays and letters, see 
Trotter.  
 
37 It is worth noting the possible influence of Freud’s Fragment of an Analysis of a Case 
of Hysteria (‘Dora’) (1901) on Eliot at the time of writing this prose poem.  For evidence 
of Eliot’s knowledge of Freud’s studies about hysteria, see MacDiarmid. This critic 
compiles the most relevant criticism about “Hysteria.” 
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action in the scene. The waiter invites them “to take their tea in the garden” (19)—a 
physical boundary—and the man thinks about “the fragments of the afternoon” (19)—a 
mechanical delimitation of time. After the arrival of the waiter, the man tries to regain 
some control over the scene. He hopes that “the shaking of her breast could be stopped” 
(19), but as McCabe remarks, this hope “only accentuates an awareness of corporeal 
fragmentation” (35). Once the waiter interrupts the movement- image in which the man 
and the woman are becoming one, the dissociation between these two levels of 
experience returns to the scene. 
 Eliot and Hemingway deploy in these short pieces images in which the boundaries 
between the physical and the psychological momentarily blur. They present first an 
immobile image of an object, then they depict an image in movement that leads to a final 
image in which matter and inner life—intellect and intuition—converge in an experience 
beyond the intellectual mechanism of the outside world.38 Eliot and Hemingway do not 
simply depict the subject’s perception of the object. They present an experience in which 
subject and object become one through a combination of images in movement. The poet 
and the writer of fiction felt under the influence of those “modern poetic methods [that], 
assimilating those of cinema, can enact the dissociated body and offer an alternative 
mode of embodiment” (McCabe 227). For Kenner, “[i]n the 1920s the most pertinent 
influence on narrative art was surely the reading public’s newest habit: it was starting to 
go to the movies” (127-28). Eliot’s “objective correlative” (SP 48) and Hemingway’s 
                                                
38 It is worth noting how these two authors string together in these short pieces the three 
steps that correspond to the three sorts of images that compound the “movement-images 
[…] when they are related to a centre of indetermination as to a special image: 
perception-images, action-images and affection-images” (Italics in original, Deleuze, 
Cinema 1 68). 
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“real thing” (DIA 2) are not simply aesthetic propositions, but rather a distinctive mode of 
presenting images, as part of the authors’ shared attempt to overcome a dissociated 
experience in which mind and body fragment experience. Furthermore, these two authors 
focus on an emotional experience as a consequence of the deployment of such 
movement-images because “that affection must, at a given moment, arise out of the 
image” (Bergson, MM 55). As Grimes affirms in relation to Maera’s sketch, “the emotion 
to which Hemingway refers is analogous to the subjective awareness of the life-force that 
Bergson calls intuition” (Religious 120).  Therefore, it is necessary to question why this 
emotion intrinsic to the image recasts the intellectual categorization of the outer world 
into a flow of inner life. 
 In his essay “The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience” 
William James argues that emotion fulfills a key function in all perception, as it unifies 
the physical and the mental. James emphasizes the correlation between subject and object 
at the same time as underlining how “the affective meaning belongs to not just the mind 
that perceives but the object that is perceived” (Opdahl 119). So, the affective meaning 
depends on images—particular arrangement of objects—that, combined in a distinctive 
mode, redirect consciousness toward intuition. “It is by the interest and importance that 
experiences have for us, by the emotions they excite, […], by their affective values, in 
short, that their consecution in our several conscious streams, as ‘thoughts’ of ours, is 
mainly ruled” (ERE 79). I consider that Eliot’s and Hemingway’s deployment of images 
imply particular “affective values” (79). Even more importantly, these images present the 
external world in a particular way to offer distinctive experiences. Therefore, in the next 
section I shall analyze some of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s images from their early works to 
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ponder why these experiences recast the self within the stream of life beyond the 
intellectual categorization of the outside world. I shall argue that Eliot and Hemingway 
present images beyond the mechanical restrictions of the modern world, and, hence, an 
emotional experience alien to any rational categorization of reality.  
 
 
5. Primitivism in early Eliot and Hemingway; or, the shared pursuit of 
immediate experience  
  
Eliot and Hemingway reflected on the pursuit of a sensuous flow of experience beyond 
the limitations imposed by the intellect. They identified the intellectual categorizations 
used in the material world as agents that prevent the individual from experiencing this 
flux of vital reality. Therefore, in some of their early works they depicted distinctive 
images as a representation of temporary immersions of the individual in a stream of 
becoming or pure duration. In this section I analyze some of these images deployed by 
Eliot in his earliest poems and Hemingway’s “Big Two-Hearted River: Part I” to show 
the extent to which these two authors shared an endeavour to reach an experience in 
which the boundaries between the inner and the outer world merge. To do so, I shall 
consider Bradley’s “immediate experience” (KE 31) along with the “primitive 
sensibility” (Bell, Primitivism 7) as two concepts in which the differences between 
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subject and object disappear in a state of mind beyond the mechanism of the modern 
world.39   
  In the first chapter of his Harvard doctoral dissertation—published as Knowledge 
and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley—Eliot focuses on the concept of 
immediate experience as a basic premise of reality: 
 Immediate experience, we have seen, is a timeless unity which is not as such 
 present either anywhere or to anyone. It is only in the world of objects that we 
 have time and space and selves. By the failure of any experience to be merely 
 immediate, by its lack of harmony and cohesion, we find ourselves as conscious 
 souls in a world of objects. We are led to the conception of an all-inclusive 
 experience outside of which nothing shall fall. 40 (KE 31) 
 
According to Eliot, immediate experience is a timeless unity. So, it is previous to any 
limit imposed by the intellectual categorizations of time and space in the material world. 
Similarly, the primitive state of mind has a psychological continuity with his world; the 
sense of space and time is alien to any rational category used to fragment the material 
world. Primitive sensibility and Bradley’s immediate experience are previous to any 
distinction between the inner and outer world. Bradley’s concept takes place “before 
distinctions and relations have been developed, and where as yet neither any subject nor 
object exists” (KE 16).41 In a similar way, the fundamental characteristic of the primitive 
                                                
39 For an analogous consideration about the connection between primitive mentality and 
Bradley’s ‘immediate experience’ see Brooker, Mastery 43-44 or Brooker, 
Transcendence 63-67. 
 
40 T.S. Eliot wrote his dissertation between 1913 and 1916. Although it was passed, Eliot 
never travelled to Harvard to defend it. Faber and Faber published Eliot’s dissertation on 
the philosophy of F.H. Bradley in 1964. For a more detailed explanation of the 
correlation between Eliot’s thesis and Bradley’s philosophy, see Lyndall Gordon.   
 
41 Bradley’s “immediate experience” has much in common with Bergson’s real duration 
and James’s stream of “pure experience.” These three concepts point to the original and 
undivided “whole of feeling” beneath the level of common awareness. Despite this 
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sensibility is that there is no distinction between the inner and the outer world. As Ernst 
Cassirer argues, for the primitive state of mind “there is no separation of a total complex 
into its elements, but […] only a single undivided totality is represented—a totality in 
which there has been no ‘dissociation’ of the separate factors of objective perception and 
subjective feeling” (PSF 46). Eliot and Hemingway shared the pursuit of a state of mind 
prior to the intellectual conventions used to order the outer world. Furthermore, they 
presented similar movements beyond the landscape of modern civilization in their 
representation of such an experience. 
 At the beginning of “Big Two-Hearted River: Part I” Nick Adams arrives by train 
to the burned town of Seney. Once the train has left the young man heads towards the 
river and he contemplates the rubble of the town. These two simple movements lead to 
Nick’s attempt to leave everything behind: “The River was there” (IOT 133). Nick finally 
faces the river, but in the first three paragraphs of the story all his activity is reduced to a 
contemplation of the surroundings: “Nick looked down […] watched the trout keeping 
themselves steady […]. He watched them holding […] he watched far down […] he saw 
them” (133). Nick observes the river and then he focuses in a particular trout. “[A] big 
trout shot upstream in a long angle, […], and then, as he went back into the stream under 
the surface, his shadow seemed to float down the stream with the current, unresisting, to 
his post under the bridge where he tightened facing up into the current” (IOT 134). Then 
Hemingway deploys for the first time in the story the correlation between subject and 
                                                                                                                                            
similarity, Bradley’s immediate experience is previous to any distinction between 
consciousness and its objects. In contrast, James and Bergson presuppose the external 
object in their effort to show that consciousness is not a mere reflection of that object 
(Schwartz 32).  
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object. “Nick’s heart tightened as the trout moved. He felt all the old feeling” (IOT 134). 
The trout tightens in the river at the same time that Nick’s heart also tightens by 
observing the scene. These two sentences point out the unification of Nick’s feeling and 
the trout’s actions. There is no difference between the object and the subject, and Nick 
experiences a state of mind that allows him to enjoy a psychological continuity with the 
trout and the river. This state of mind offers Nick a feeling that he has not experienced in 
a long time, as the use of the adjective “old” points out. This is not a new feeling for 
Nick, but something that he experiences only in the river. He fulfills the expectation that 
he had when he jumped from the train. Nick finds out that the river, the trout and the 
fishing still provide him with “the old feeling” (134). Hemingway does not explain 
further the nature of that feeling, but he offers a series of images in movement that may 
bring some understanding of the purpose of Nick’s fishing trip. I consider that this 
affective experience is related to Nick’s need to leave behind the requirements of the 
modern life to recast into the stream of vital reality.42  
                                                
42 In the wide range of criticism on this story, scholars have used different approaches to 
make their cases. One of the most convincing interpretations of Nick’s traumatic 
experience for a long time was the war wound thesis. This thesis was first advanced by 
Edmund Wilson and later developed by Malcolm Cowley. Others scholars such as Philip 
Young or William Adair have suggested alternative readings of this story, but always 
using the same war experience as the cornerstone of their interpretations. Even 
Hemingway himself supported that thesis when in his posthumously published memoir, A 
Moveable Feast, he wrote that “[t]he story was about coming back from the war but there 
were no mention of the war in it” (76). Kenneth S. Lynn has made a case for Nick’s 
troubled sexual identity based on Hemingway’s childhood, while Robert Paul Lamb has 
tried to prove that the war wound thesis and childhood thesis are not exclusive. Sarah 
Mary O’Brien dismantles Lamb’s thesis in terms of his approach to the story as critical 
reading of the pastoral world. My own reading of the story converges in some points with 
O’Brien thesis, but I pay more attention to Nick’s fragmented experience of reality and 
the dissociation between object and subject, between the psychological and the physical. 
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 Nick picks up his backpack and starts to walk. The physical exercise makes him 
happy. “His muscles ached and the day was hot, but Nick felt happy. He felt he had left 
everything behind, the need for thinking, the need to write, other needs” (IOT 134). It is 
remarkable how Hemingway constantly refers to Nick’s physical actions and how he 
connects them to his feelings. Hemingway involves Nick in a stream of actions in which 
the main character does not need to think. In fact Nick deliberately leaves any intellectual 
activity behind him: “Nick had wondered about them as he walked, without really 
thinking about them” (IOT 135). As Narbeshuber explains, “Nick learns to enjoy himself 
[…] and generally attend to the particular rhythms of his body, he develops a 
consciousness able to resist the speed of modern life” (Narbeshuber 25). Walking in the 
woods he again gets in touch with his deepest sense of self.43 He does not need to follow 
the intellectual thinking prevailing in the modern world.  He is experiencing a state of 
mind in which there is no differentiation between internal thinking and the experience of 
the material world. As Bell explains in relation to primitive mentality, “long before the 
human consciousness forms its first concepts concerning the basic objective 
differentiation of number, time and space, it seems to acquire the subtlest sensitivity to 
the peculiar periodicity of rhythm of human life” (Primitivism 108). Nick is beyond any 
intellectual categorization of reality that breaks time and space into artificial units. He 
does not need them as he acts now according to his instincts. “He did not need to get his 
                                                
43 There is a long-standing tradition in American literature of characters entering in the 
woods running away from civilization. A clear example would be Thoreau’s Walden: Or, 
Life in the Woods: “I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front 
only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, 
when I came to die, discover that I had not lived.[…]. I wanted to live deep and suck out 
all the marrow of life, to live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to rout all that was not 
life, to cut a broad swath and shave close, to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its 
lowest terms” (143).   
 67 
map out. He knew where he was from the position of the river” (IOT 135). Nick is one 
with the external world. As Lévy-Brul explains about the primitive state of mind, “he 
feels a participation with himself—and separation in space, as we know, constitutes no 
obstacle to the unity of the individual” (NPM 124). There are no boundaries between 
subject and object in Nick’s experiences in the woods.  
 Nick has left behind every sign of modern life. There is no sight of the train line. 
He faces “the country alive again” (IOT 136). He is not trapped in a fragmented 
experience of reality: “Nothing could touch him” (139). When he is preparing dinner he 
remembers his old friend Hopkins. These memories from urban life create anxiety: “His 
mind was staring to work” (142), but Hemingway does not allow Nick’s mind to work: 
“He curled up under the blanket and went to sleep” (142). Eliot also presented in some of 
his early poems an experience beyond the rational constructions of the modern world. 
The poet also used the pattern deployed by Hemingway in Nick’s fishing trip to present 
movement images in which the boundaries between the inner and the outer world blur.  
 In “Preludes” Eliot presents the interaction between inner and outer worlds, 
between consciousness and the objects of the material world. Then, he explores the 
dissociation between these two levels of urban life to present an image in which this 
fragmentation disappears. Eliot alludes twice to the notion of an “infinite[ly] […] thing” 
(CPP 13) as opposed to the intellectual categorization of time and space that he uses in 
the other preludes to depict the life of the city. Eliot attempts to connect all these 
fragments into a unity, but he finally relates this illusion to “fancies” (13). Eliot neglects 
this “infinite[ly] […] thing” (13) and he finishes the poem by referring again to an image 
of modern life where “ancient women” gather “fuel in vacant lots” (13). In “The Love 
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Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” Eliot also explores images to represent an experience beyond 
the rational categories that fragment experience in the outer world. 
 In Prufrock’s dramatic monologue, Eliot depicts in the first stanza the dissociated 
experience of a fragmented self—“you and I” (CPP 3). Then, throughout the rest of the 
poem he explores the interaction between these two levels of experience within urban 
life. Finally, in the last two stanzas, Eliot presents an image in which the initial 
fragmentation disappears: “I have seen them riding seaward on the waves/Combing the 
white hair of the waves blown back/When the wind blows the water white and black./We 
have lingered in the chambers of the sea” (CPP 7). Here, Eliot presents an image beyond 
the rhythms of modern life that earlier in the poem frames Prufrock’s life. This image is a 
form of representation of  a state of mind in which—as Lévy-Bruhl clarifies about the 
primitive mentality—“[t]he determinations in space and time which are indispensable in 
order for facts to have a place in the series of the real phenomena are here entirely 
lacking” (NPM 87). Once the “I” focuses its attention in the movement of the waves 
beyond the spatial movement of urban life, the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ become a ‘we’. They are 
immersed in the boundless space of the sea where the intellectual categories of time and 
space do not work anymore. 
 In their first works Eliot and Hemingway focused on a state of mind prior to the 
fragmentation of the inner and the outer world induced by modernity in all its 
technological and routinizing forms. As I have pointed out before in relation to the 
concept of the noble savage (p. 11), there never was such a state. It was a convenient 
fiction, a thought that related society to the corruption of the individual. Eliot and 
Hemingway represented through distinctive images experiences similar to Bradley’s 
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immediate experience and the primitive state of mind. I consider that Eliot and 
Hemingway deployed these images as a reaction against the intellectual premises that 
fragment the flow of vital reality in the modern world. As Bell clarifies, “primitivism […] 
is born of the interplay between the civilized self and the desire to reject or transform it” 
(Primitivism 80). These two authors repudiated any limitation imposed by the intellect in 
order to pursue a flow of a sensuous experience beyond civilization. Therefore, in the 
next chapter I shall consider the consequences of this common movement undertaken to 
overcome the dissociated experience of reality. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
My analysis of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s concern with a fragmented experience of reality 
results in four main points that I consider crucial to an understanding of the literary 
practices in their early careers. First, both shared a way of thinking about a problematic 
experience of reality that was under the direct influence of the philosophical debate at the 
turn of the twentieth century. In their first works, Eliot and Hemingway explored the 
dissociation between two levels of consciousness that meaningfully refers to the inner life 
and the outer world. Under the influence of psychological theories that elevate sensations 
over abstract concepts, they confronted the intellectual categorization of reality that 
fragments a stream of vital reality. Secondly, they treated the categories of space and time 
as artificial intellectual conventions that arrest this “stream of life” (Bergson, CE 196). 
Thirdly, their consideration of the artificial fragmentation of time and space in the 
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material world led them to propose broadly similar aesthetic formulas. Eliot’s “objective 
correlative” (SP 48) and Hemingway’s “real thing” (DIA 2) are based on the deployment 
of images to represent an experience in which the boundaries between internal thinking 
and external reality dissolve. Finally, their attempt to overcome this dissociated 
experience of reality led them towards an interest in primitivism as a reaction against the 
mechanical categorization of reality in the modern world.  
 This chapter has established a way of understanding Eliot’s and Hemingway’s 
common immersion in a similar intellectual landscape to reflect on the experience and 
representation of the troubled modern self. The poet and the writer of fiction involved 
their characters in a flow of sensations to liberate consciousness from the chains of the 
rational constructs. This feature would bloom in the development of distinctive paths 
back to wholeness; but, first, the next chapter will look into the meaning of Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s regressive movement into a spiral of pure sensations beyond any 
restriction imposed by the intellect. 
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Chapter Two 
Reflections on Civilization 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on Eliot’s and Hemingway’s reflections on modern civilization.1 
Whereas the first chapter concluded that Eliot and Hemingway shared an interest in 
primitive states of mind, this chapter considers how they depict civilization as a barrier to 
experiencing this state of mind. On the one hand, these two authors paid attention to the 
idea of a primitive mentality prior to the separation between objective perception and 
subjective feeling. On the other hand, this can also be seen as a dangerous allure. Eliot 
and Hemingway reflected on the tendency of going back to earlier stages of human 
development and the necessity of controlling this impulse. This consideration relates both 
authors to the parameters of thought promoted by Irving Babbitt and his questioning of 
the primitive in The Masters of Modern French Criticism (1912): “[A]t the very time that 
                                                
1 As Williams explains, the word civilization “has come to be a relatively neutral form for 
any achieved social order or way of life” (Keywords 59). When I use the term modern 
civilization I refer to the early twentieth century and the period of the aftermath of World 
War One. I focus on the confluence of the modernist dismissal of “the reign of 
instrumental reason” (Armstrong 4), the subsequent longing for a pre-civilized state of 
mind alien to the urban life and the consequences for the social order of such a longing. 
Freud points out this dichotomy when he affirms in Civilization, “it is impossible to 
overlook the extent to which civilization is built up on renunciation, how much it 
presupposes the non-satisfaction of powerful drive—by suppression, repression or some 
other means” (34). 
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one side of our civilization is sentimentalizing about the primitive, another side of this 
same civilization is just as surely killing it” (MFC 24). My intention is to analyze the 
extent to which Eliot and Hemingway engaged with this dichotomy in their work and 
how it affected their reflections on modern civilization.   
 Firstly, I shall consider how they explored the sensuous disposition of the 
individual as a result of their shared attraction to the primitive. I shall use Lévy-Bruhl’s 
insights about the primitive mind, as opposed to a civilized consciousness, to analyze to 
what extent Eliot and Hemingway considered the confrontation between these two 
radically different states of mind. I analyze Eliot’s Sweeney poems and Hemingway’s 
“The Battler” in the context of conflicts between individual sensual tendencies and social 
conventions and constraints. I argue that Freud’s vocabulary in Civilization and Its 
Discontents (1930) is a useful way of exploring Eliot’s and Hemingway’s ambivalent 
consideration of civilization. Freud reflects on the assertion that civilization is a source of 
suffering at the same time that he recognizes the necessity of controlling the individual 
tendency towards abandoning civilization to prevent society from sinking into chaos. 
Finally, I shall argue that these conflicting ideas about the primitive and the civilized are 
integral to the analysis of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s reflection on the necessity of 
restoring the correlation between individual and society. Lévy-Bruhl’s concept of the 
primitive “feeling of participation” (NPM 61) as distinct from Freud’s insights about 
“[c]ommunal life” (32) results in a way of reading Eliot’s “Gerontion” and Hemingway’s 
“Big Two-Hearted River: Part II” that makes visible the interrelationship between these 
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two writers in this context.  Both attempt to regenerate the collective modes of experience 
they see as lacking in modern civilization.2    
 In T. S. Eliot’s review of Wyndham Lewis’s Tarr, he affirms that the “[p]rimitive 
instincts and the acquired habits of ages are confounded in the ordinary man” (qtd. in 
Levina 81). Eliot suggests that in the civilized state of mind there are residues of a 
primitive mentality. The same dichotomy is identified by Hemingway in a private letter 
in which he recalls the personality of the journalist Lionel Moise: “I remember him as a 
sort of primitive force, a skilful and extremely facile newspaper man who has his troubles 
and his pleasures with drink and women” (SL 775). Hemingway represents in the figure 
of Moise the coexistence of two opposing forces. He points out that primitive instincts 
are still at the core of civilized man, just as Eliot does in his review of Lewis’s novel. 
Eliot and Hemingway suggest that the primitive exists within the civilized. The former is 
somehow under the control of the latter. These two authors felt attracted by a primitive 
state of mind and they reflected on the presence of this primitive disposition in the 
modern man. As Bell affirms, primitivism is by definition the paradoxical product of 
civilization itself; it is born of the interplay between the civilized self and the desire to 
reject or transform it (Primitivism 80). Thus, it is necessary to consider Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s part in this debate about the primitive.  
                                                
2 In the last section of the previous chapter I analyzed “Big Two-Hearted River: Part I” 
(see pp. 62-65). In this chapter I examine “Big Two-Hearted River: Part II.” It is 
important not to neglect the relation between these two stories. They narrate the same 
Nick Adams’s fishing trip to the woods, but I treat them as independent stories. In the 
contents of In Our Time, Hemingway places them as two different stories. He separates 
them with a short sketch or inter-chapter as he does with the others short stories of the 
collection.   
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 Eliot and Hemingway confronted the disparities between sensuous experiences 
and the intellectual premises that may control the tendency toward the primitive. But, 
while in Eliot’s “Prufrock” or Hemingway’s “Up in Michigan” this dissociation between 
the sensual and the intellectual prevents the individual from experiencing his inner life, 
the Sweeney poems and “The Battler” elevate the experience of reality to the level of 
consciousness that refers to sensuous experiences.3 In these works they look back to the 
origin of that flow of sensations that has dehumanized the experience of reality, as Eliot’s 
Sweeney points out when he is enclosed in a room, ignoring anything that may happen 
beyond those walls. He enjoys his sensual pleasures with no regret. In Hemingway’s 
story the three characters ostracized by society are also immersed in the satisfaction of 
their own sensual instincts. Eliot and Hemingway reflect on the selfish, lascivious, 
natural man defended by the romantic faith in man’s natural virtue.4 They paid attention 
to theories that value the individual over any other category. They also questioned the 
natural virtue of the individual and his pursuit of a sensuous flow of experience alien to 
the limitations imposed by rational constructs. In these works Eliot and Hemingway 
depict the consequences of a sensuous experience of reality that is incompatible with 
intellectual categories. They claim a reconsideration of the intrinsic interaction between 
individual and society. The Sweeney poems and “The Battler” locate Eliot and 
                                                
3 As I have extensively argued in Chapter One (see pp. 25-33), Eliot and Hemingway 
reflected on the fragmentation between two levels of consciousness; one referring to the 
intellectual categories deployed to arrange the outer world, and the other referring to the 
experience of the inner life.   
 
4 See, Beasley 59. In this chapter I allude to Rousseau’s romantic conception of the 
individual, but as part of Babbitt’s critique of Bergson and Emerson. In The Masters of 
Modern French Criticism Babbitt argues that Bergson gave “new form to the 
Rousseauistic strife between head and heart” (253). Similarly, Babbitt criticized “[t]he 
Rousseauistic side of Emerson” (305-06). 
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Hemingway within the parameters of thought intrinsic to the progression undertaken in 
the early twentieth century from the consideration of individual consciousness and 
psychology to social psychology.5  
 After the events of World War One, it was necessary to consider the correlation 
between individual claims and the survival of civilization. The interest in the centrality of 
the self evolved towards the consideration of collective experiences. This progression is 
exemplified in the theories of Freud who during this period of time “turned from the 
evolution of the individual psyche to the evolution of cultures: he needed a broader 
canvas than the individual psyche to explain what had gone wrong in modern times” 
(Torgovnick 198). However, when he argues in Civilization that “[w]e learn how to 
distinguish between the internal, which belongs to the ego, and the external, which comes 
from the outside” (6), he reflects on the necessity of communal life as part of the 
consideration of individual consciousness. When he affirms that “[t]he replacement of the 
power of the individual by that of the community is the decisive step towards 
civilization” (32), he effectively subordinates the individual consciousness to that of 
society as a whole. He distinguishes between “the development of the individual” and 
“the other process” he calls “‘cultural’” (76-77). Alternatively, Lévy-Bruhl reflected on a 
primitive state of mind alien to the differentiation between the individual and the 
community. The primitive feeling exists insofar as it is part of the feeling of the group, 
but the individual consciousness is not privileged over that of the group. This 
                                                
5 When I use the term social psychology I refer to Freud’s consideration of individual 
psychology always being related to a group. As Freud clarifies in Group Psychology: “In 
the individual’s mental life someone else is invariably involved, […], and from the very 
first individual psychology […] is at the same time a social psychology as well” (qtd. in 
Paul 268). 
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differentiation is central to an understanding of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s reflections on 
collective consciousness. In the next section I shall analyze Eliot’s and Hemingway’s 
questioning of the individual sensual instincts as part of their shared reflections on 
collective modes of experience.  
 
 
2. The dangerous allure of the primitive 
 
This section focuses on Eliot’s and Hemingway’s interest in the representation of 
characters involved in the pursuit of sensual experience. This allows a consideration of 
the extent to which these two authors were concerned with representing characters 
involved in sexual and violent actions. In his second volume of poetry, Poems (1920), 
Eliot introduced the figure of Sweeney to reflect on an individual experiencing bodily 
sensations.6 In the short story “The Battler” Hemingway also portrays the characters by 
their sensual impulses. Eliot and Hemingway represent in similar ways characters defined 
by their physicality. Sweeney and the three outcasts from “The Battler” relate to Eliot’s 
and Hemingway’s interest in calling attention to the emphasis upon sensual instincts at 
the expense of intellect as part of their shared reflection on the primitive.7  
                                                
6 Sweeney appears in three poems in Eliot’s second volume of poetry: “Mr. Eliot’s 
Sunday Morning Service,” “Sweeney Erect” and “Sweeney among the Nightingales.” 
This character is also named in the third part of The Waste Land and in the fragmentary 
play Sweeney Agonistes. In her article, Brooker makes a succinct list of the more relevant 
critics who have read this character by using alternative interpretations. For a compilation 
of essays about the Sweeney poems, see Roby. 
 
7 In criticism of both Eliot and Hemingway, different scholars have made their cases in 
relation to primitivism. For alternative considerations about the connections between 
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 The Sweeney poems represent Eliot’s progression from his earlier identification 
of the intellect as the agent that arrests the flow of sensuous experience to his latter 
reflection on an individual immersed in sensual impulses. As Cook argues in his 
comparison of Prufrock and Sweeney—that could also be applied to a more general 
correspondence between Eliot’s first and second volume of poetry— “[t]he two men may 
be regarded as two halves of a dissociated sensibility, the sensuous and the intellectual, 
each isolated from its natural partner” (44). Eliot explored the primitive as a result of his 
attempt to overcome the clash between the world of the intellect and the world of the 
senses. A parallel movement may be identified in Hemingway’s early works. In the short 
story “The Battler” Hemingway presents three characters immersed in the sensual 
experience of reality. Eliot and Hemingway evoked a primitive perception for which 
civilized men may feel a powerful nostalgia. 
 The desire of civilized man for a return to a primitive condition is as old as his 
civilized capacity for self-reflection.8 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
scholars of social sciences paid attention in their anthropological theories to the 
                                                                                                                                            
Eliot and Lévy-Bruhl see Harmon, Manganaro, and Menand and Schwartz. In his chapter 
“The Interpretation of the Primitive Ritual” Gray uses one of Eliot’s papers as a graduate 
student to clarify the poet’s interests in the primitive mentality in relation to myth, rituals 
and religious consciousness. In a similar way, Cowley calls attention to Hemingway’s use 
of myth and ritual to affirm that he possessed a “pre-Christian and prelogical mentality” 
(qtd. in Civello 1). Civello also explores the correlation between primitivism and 
archetypical rituals in “Big Two-Hearted River.” I agree with these critics on the extent 
to which Eliot and Hemingway paid attention to ritualistic patterns and myths. In Chapter 
Three I shall reflect on how these two authors consider rituals and the mythical method 
from similar, but distinctive, points of view. In this chapter I focus on their ambivalent 
consideration of the primitive. For alternative readings of Hemingway and primitivism, 
see Burnan, Meyers and del Gizzo. 
 
8 See Bell 1. 
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relationship between the primitive and the modern mind. Eliot was not ignorant of these 
studies and he was familiar with the work of Jane Harrison, Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl.9 
He integrated this knowledge in his reviews about contemporary artistic works to argue 
“that an understanding of primitive man is a prerequisite for understanding civilized 
man” (Brooker, Mimetic 131).10 Eliot assumed a bond between the modern and the 
primitive mind as he pointed out when he affirmed that Frazer’s “The Golden Bough can 
be read in two ways: as a collection of entertaining myths, or as a revelation of that 
vanished mind of which our mind is a continuation” (Rainey 189). Eliot refers to a 
vanished mind, but he underlines how “our mind is a continuation” of the primitive. Eliot 
assumes this continuity. He followed Frazer’s evolutionary point of view and his 
consideration of the primitive as connected to the modern man (Vickery 24-25).11  But 
not all anthropologists of that period embraced this approach in such a clear way.   
 Lévy-Bruhl defended the idea of a primitive mentality as pre-rational.12 By 
distinguishing the primitive from the modern he neglected the clear continuation between 
these two states of minds.  He argued that primitive men “may see with eyes like ours, 
but they do not perceive with the same minds” (HNT 31). Eliot was ambivalent about 
Lévy-Bruhl’s theories. As Crawford points out, Eliot questioned to the way in which the 
                                                
9 See Gordon 86-87. 
 
10 Brooker alludes to these reviews in his analysis of Eliot’s consideration of the artist as 
an essential link between the primitive and the modern (131-33).  
 
11 As Brooker explains, Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) and its hypothesis of 
the ‘missing link’ that connected present to past and contemporary humans to their 
remotest ancestors was a main influence on the anthropologists of the time (130). 
  
12 For a further analysis of the complexity of the different approaches to the study of the 
primitive in the early twentieth century, see Torgovnick.  
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French anthropologist drew the distinction between primitive and civilized states of mind 
too clearly (92). But, at the same time, Eliot felt attracted by Lévy-Bruhl’s explanations 
of the primitive mentality (98). When Eliot comments on Lévy-Bruhl’s account of the 
Boroboro tribe in Brazil, he affirms that “he [the Boroboro] is capable of a state of mind 
in which we cannot put ourselves” (Manganaro 99). He considered that “[this state of 
mind] plays much greater part in the daily life of the savage than in that of civilized man”  
(99).  In his reviews Eliot advocated the bond between the primitive and the modern 
questioned by Lévy-Bruhl. In his poetry, the clearness of this claim becomes more 
ambiguous. Via Lévy-Bruhl’s theories I propose that Eliot’s Sweeney poems focus on the 
necessity of restraining the tendency towards a primitive state of mind rather than on the 
missing bond between the primitive and modern minds.  
 In How Natives Think (1910), Lévy-Bruhl observes that “primitives perceive 
nothing in the same way as we do” (30).13 He rejected the assumption that primitive 
cultures were basically no different from the modern man and that “they must think 
rationally as we do” (xi).14 Lévy-Bruhl points out that, of course, there is more than one 
way for the mind to grasp the world. For Lévy-Bruhl’s primitive, the relation between an 
object and an individual is not based on objective perceptions, but on feelings: “[F]or the 
primitive, there is no question […] of intellectual operations, but of something 
apprehended as felt” (NPM 157-58). In the Sweeney poems Eliot cancels the intellectual 
operation of this character, but this character is far from experiencing a primitive state of 
                                                
13 See Jain 133.  
 
14 As Ruth L. Bunzel explains in her introduction to the English version of How Natives 
Think, Lévy-Bruhl thought that the predominant mode of thinking in nineteenth century 
anthropology was rationalistic.  
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mind. These poems contradict Eliot’s assertion of the continuation between the primitive 
and the civilized mind. 
 In “Sweeney Erect” and “Sweeney Among the Nightingales” Sweeney is in a 
brothel and his performance revolves around sex: “Gesture of orang-outang/ Rises from 
the sheets in steam” (25). He stresses his sensual impulses to depict how he satisfies them 
in the whorehouse. He is incapable of controlling his instincts and he copulates ignoring 
the screams of the woman: “he knows the female temperament” (25).15 His sexual 
activities turn violent. There is a chiasmatic relationship between sex and violence in 
Sweeney’s actions. Sex is violent in the room of the brothel and the violence is sexual: 
“Pushing the framework of the bed/And clawing at the pillow slip” (25). There is no real 
differentiation between one and the other because both of them respond to Sweeney’s 
sensual tendency. Significantly he shows no remorse for his actions. He does not have the 
ability to discern the consequences of his behavior. Sweeney does not distinguish 
between his sensual appetites and how he satisfies them. He cannot dissociate sex and 
violence and, therefore, his actions result in destruction.  
 In the room Sweeney sways like an animal: “Sweeney shifts from ham to 
ham/Stirring the water in his bath” (34). The manners of this character and his agitation 
are typical of an animal: “The sickle motion from the tights/[…]/Then straightens out 
from heel to hip” (25). Eliot underlines the animalistic behavior of Sweeney. There is no 
intellectual trace that makes him think about controlling those impulses. He does not 
                                                
15 For an analysis of misogyny in relation to Eliot’s early years, see Gordon. For a 
reading of this matter in relation to Eliot’s discourse, see MacDiarmid. From a different 
angle, Jacqueline Rose diagnoses “Eliot’s rejection of [Hamlet] as misogynist revulsion” 
(qtd. in MacDiarmid 67). See also Clark. 
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differentiate between sex and violence as both respond to the satisfaction of his sensual 
instincts. Sweeney has become an animal, but animalism and the primitive are not 
interchangeable. Sweeney responds to Eliot’s attraction to the primitive as opposed to the 
civilized, but this character is only a civilized man who happens to ignore any restrictions 
that may control the satisfaction of his sensual pleasures. Eliot argued in his reviews 
about “that vanished mind of which our mind is a continuation” (Rainey 189). There is no 
trace of such a mind in Sweeney. He does not experience a primitive perception of 
reality, but only a sensuous experience that ignores intellect. A similar limitation is found 
in Hemingway’s “The Battler.”  
 In this story Hemingway also explores the representation of individuals turning 
their backs on the intellect and immersing themselves in sensuous experience. In this 
story the characters’ actions turn on their physical condition. They are tired, hungry and 
thirsty and all their feelings are reduced to their sensual instincts connected to the 
necessity of satisfying their physical appetites: “‘When are we going to eat, Bugs?’” (IOT 
57). In this early adventure of Nick Adams, Hemingway develops the same pattern used 
by Eliot in the Sweeney poems to call attention to the animalistic condition of the 
individual. Particularly, Hemingway’s presentation of the ex-boxer Ad Francis resembles 
Eliot’s depiction of Sweeney in his poems. Firstly, Hemingway underlines the character’s 
animalistic features. Secondly, Ad’s actions respond to his sensual instincts to the extent 
that he cannot control this inclination.  
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 Once Nick has been bumped from the train he thinks, “They would never suck 
him in that way again” (53), and he keeps walking away from the tracks.16 He meets Ad 
Francis, a tramp living in the woods with his friend Bugs. Ad is an ex-boxer and 
Hemingway pays especial attention to his physical features: “[H]is face was misshapen. 
His nose was sunken, his eyes were slits, he had queer-shaped lips […] the man’s face 
was queerly formed and mutilated” (55). Hemingway offers a detailed description of his 
face: “[h]e had only one ear. It was thickened and tight against the side of his head” (55). 
Ad’s physiognomy is compared to regular human features: “Where the other ear should 
have been there was a stump” (55). This character is proud of his physical strength and 
his identity in based on it: “‘Do you know how I beat them?’ […] ‘My heart’s slow’” 
(56). The boxer’s physiognomy is the result of fighting in the rings and his identity relies 
on his animalistic behavior.  
 When the second tramp joins Nick and Ad in the woods, the three characters 
gather around a fire to eat: “‘Are you hungry, Nick’ […] ‘Hungry as hell’’” (57), but 
suddenly the boxer loses his temper and everything turns around violence. “‘Hit me,’ he 
moved his head. ‘Try and hit me’’” (59). They are in the woods and there is nothing to 
restrict the boxer’s violence. Nothing can stop his animalistic tendency. They are not in 
the ring and there are no rules. Therefore, “the negro […] tapped him across the base on 
the skull” (59). The only solution that the tramp finds to control the boxer’s violence is 
                                                
16 As Marx observes, by the mid-nineteenth century, the locomotive was becoming a 
national obsession in America. The invention of the steamboat had been quite exciting, 
but it was nothing compared to the railroad. It was the embodiment of the age and seen as 
an instrument of power, speed, noise, fire, iron, and smoke (191). It is worth noting how 
Hemingway uses railway tracks to settle the boundaries between civilization and nature, 
just as he does in other stories such as “Big Two-Hearted River: Part I.” Hemingway’s 
characters leave behind them the track of the locomotive as a symbolic gesture in their 
search of the primitive.  
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more violence: “I know how to do it. He won’t remember nothing of it. I have to do it to 
change him when he gets that way” (60). These two characters live away from society 
and their behaviour is based on the obedience of their own sensual impulses and their 
inability to control them. These characters are defined by their use of violence as a result 
of the impossibility of controlling these instincts. These characters ignore any 
“intellectual operations” (Lévy-Bruhl, NPM 158), but this does not imply an experience 
of a primitive state of mind. It is only a temporary withdrawal from any rational 
categorization of reality.  
 Eliot’s Sweeney poems and Hemingway’s “The Battler” are not a representation 
of a primitive state of mind. These works reflect on the ferocious ambivalence involved 
in acquiescing with the primitive tendency or sensual disposition of the individual. As 
Armstrong affirms, “to encounter the primitive is to time-travel, returning to earlier 
stages of human development of which ‘vestiges’ are buried within the psyche” (140). 
Eliot and Hemingway involve their characters in a journey towards encountering these 
vestiges. They release them from “modes of censorship imposed by civilization,” but 
Sweeney and the outcasts from “The Battler” end up immersed in the maelstrom of the 
reversion towards a “vitalist self at one with its sexuality and being” (140). Hemingway’s 
characters are isolated in the woods to the same extent that Sweeney is secluded from 
civilization in the room of the brothel. These works are still framed under the 
consideration of the civilization as the agent that corrupts the individual. They move their 
characters away from civilization; but at the same time, they contradict any positive 
valorization of the primitive as opposed to the civilized. They point to “fundamental 
assumptions that the primitivist, if indulged, can only lead to the destruction of the 
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civilized self and that such an eventuality is necessarily evil” (Bell, Primitivism 39). 
These works converge with Babbitt’s indictment of the anti-intellectual tendency of a 
positive valorization of the primitive.  
 In The Masters of Modern French Criticism (1912) Babbitt criticizes “primitivism 
[…] [because] [i]n the Rousseauistic fashion we are to advance by looking backward, we 
are to progress by reverting to origins; only in this way can we escape from the artificial 
and the imitative and recover the spontaneous and the original” (MFC 22).17 This critique 
of “the so-called anti-intellectualist movement” (vii) is relevant to my analysis for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, Babbitt criticizes “the glorification of impulse” as opposed “to the 
mechanizing of life” (RR 300). Secondly, Babbitt warns that the immersion in this flow 
of sensuous experiences implies the exaltation of the private self that is incompatible with 
anything beyond the individual himself. Babbitt identifies two main orders of intuition, 
“the sensual” and “the intellectual” (52) and he considers that the enthusiasm of the 
sensuous unavoidably leads to a dangerous consideration of personal experiences as the 
measure of all things. Eliot and Hemingway involved their characters in an attempt to 
revert to origin escaping from any artificial devices imposed by civilization: ‘Got a 
watch?’/‘No.’/‘Neither have I’” (IOT 56). They reflected on the intrinsic destructiveness 
of such attempts to claim the restoration of the unavoidable correlation between 
individual and society.  
 Once Sweeney has satisfied his appetites, he “addressed full length to shave/ 
Broadbottomed, pink from nape to base” (CPP 25). He stands to cut the “root of knots of 
hair” (25). He performs an action proper to a human rather than an animal. Eliot 
                                                
17 For a further consideration of Rousseau’s primitivism and his concept of the Noble 
Savage, see Murfin and Ray 370-71. 
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emphasizes the animalistic nature of Sweeney, but he also underlines that he is a human. 
By placing Sweeney in front of a mirror, Eliot presents a new aspect of him that was 
imperceptible amidst the maelstrom of his previous actions.18 As Brooker notes, 
“[l]ooking in the mirror, he sees the human face behind the knots of hair” (7). After the 
depiction of Sweeney contemplating his human nature, Eliot offers an insight into the 
behaviour of this character: “(The lengthened shadow of a man/Is history, said 
Emerson/Who had not seen the silhouette/Of Sweeney straddled in the sun.)” (CPP 27). 
Eliot refers to the American father of transcendentalism and his celebration of 
individualism. In the Sweeney poems Eliot depicts a man incapable of restraining his 
sensual inclination and he indirectly relates this to individualism.  
 Sweeney personifies Eliot’s reflection on the philosophies that praise “the private, 
self-supplied powers of the individual” (Babbitt, MFC 361).19 Sweeney represents the 
extent to which this centrality of self has degenerated into an individual concerned simply 
with fulfilling his sensual tendencies. As Babbitt warns, “[t]he worst that is likely to 
befall the man who plants himself indomitably upon his own instincts is that he will plant 
                                                
18 It is worth noting the similarities between Sweeney’s reflection in the mirror, his 
awareness of his surroundings for the first time in the poem, and Lacan’s mirror stage. 
“In the famous ‘Mirror stage’ article (1929) Lacan first directs his attention to the 
Imaginary, the elected domain of binary oppositions and of the ego […]. What matters 
here is the function of the image as our first mediator and our perpetual other” (Paccaud-
Huguet 281). Significantly, once Eliot places Sweeney in front of the mirror, the 
consideration of the social world and the meaning of the other Sweeney in the world 
outside the room emerge.  
 
19 Among others, Brooker writes of how “‘Sweeney Erect’ is above all an ironic 
commentary on Emerson’s view of human nature and history” (431); more generally, Lee 
Oser underlines how in his second volume of poetry Eliot advanced an argument in 
opposition to Emerson (58). For additional readings of Eliot’s allusions to Emerson, see 
Clendenning, Cook and Peake. 
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himself indomitably upon his own crudity” (MFC 361). Sweeney is the result of this 
“whole movement from Rousseau to Bergson […] filled with the glorification of instinct” 
(Babbitt, RR 147).20 He is a symbol of this glorification and its correlative behaviour. He 
neglects the possibility of “disciplining himself to some form of perfection set above his 
ordinary self” (23). Consequently, Sweeney is not only an individual pursuing the 
satisfaction of his own sensual instincts, but a vehicle for reflecting on the results of an 
individual ignoring any social bond that may restrict his primitive tendency within 
society. 
 The relevant aspect of Sweeney is how Eliot disdains the equivalence between 
nostalgia for a primitive state of mind and the subsequent rejection of civilization. This 
leads to the consideration of the necessity of cultivating the bonds between individual and 
society to restrain the tendency towards the primitive. Hemingway also explores this 
misleading equivalence, but in “The Battler” he points out a subtler consideration that is 
not at the core of Eliot’s Sweeney poems. Hemingway is aware of the dangerous allure of 
the primitive, but he focuses on the restrictions imposed on the individual by civilization 
to decipher the origin of such attraction. This can be better understood if Hemingway’s 
story is read along with Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents and its analysis of the 
paradox of civilization. 
 In the third chapter of Civilization Freud maintains that “[i]t is contended that 
much of the blame for our misery lies with what we call our civilization, and that we 
should be far happier if we were to abandon it and revert to primitive conditions” (24-25).  
Later in this work he refutes this claim, affirming instead that the “[p]rimitive man” is 
                                                
20 For a more detailed analysis of Babbitt’s critique of Rousseau and Bergson in relation 
to primitivism, see Crawford 61-62. 
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actually better off, because “his drives” cannot be “restricted” (51).21 In Civilization 
Freud moves from an early positive consideration of the primitive to a later call for the 
necessity of controlling the primitive tendency or aggressive instinct.22 Freud regards this 
instinct to defend civilization as a necessary asset. The primary role of civilization is to 
control this aggressive impulse, but this control inflicts suffering on the individual. Freud 
relates it to the “sense of guilt” (62) to identify its origin with the fear of authority and 
social values that “force[s] us to forgo the satisfaction of our drives” (62-63). It is 
necessary to control the primitive impulse, but “to subdue it, society has to place 
seemingly excessive and unreasonable demands on its members” (Deigh 290). 
Civilization results from the conflicting combination of the primitive and the civilized. 
The regulation of these forces implies the fundamental paradox of civilization. It protects 
the individual from the primitive urge, but at the same time, it is a source of suffering. 
One cannot be dissociated from the other.  
 Two characters from “The Battler” have suffered the consequences of going 
against the norms imposed by civilization. Bugs is “a negro” (IOT 57) who met Ad in 
jail: “I was in for cutting a man” (61). Ad, the ex boxer, married a woman and people 
thought she was his sister: “Of course they wasn’t brother and sister no more than a 
rabbit, but there was a lot of people didn’t like it either way” (61). Civilization censured 
                                                
21 As Torgovnick notes, “Freud’s map of the psyche placed the ego (the Ich, the I) at a 
point that mediates between civilizing super-ego and the ‘primitive’ libido (or id)” (17). 
Freud argues the necessity of constraining the id through the reinforcement of the 
demands of the superego (Civilization 78-79). 
 
22 As Church describes, Freud’s view of the nature and number of basic drives changes 
over time, but by Civilization and Its Discontents the crucial distinction has become that 
between “life-preserving and life-destroying instincts” (222). In Civilization Freud 
considers these life-destroying instincts as virtually primitive.   
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Ad’s relationship and he became crazy: “He was busting people all the time after she 
went away and they put him in jail” (61). Ad and Bugs could not control their 
aggressiveness, but civilization executed its procedures to restrain it. These two 
characters ran away to avoid the social prohibitions that restrict “the life-destroying 
instincts” (Church 222). They are isolated from civilization, but primitive drives and the 
necessity of controlling them are still at the core of their lives.  
 In their travelling around the country as outcasts Bugs has managed to create a life 
for his friend and himself. Everything goes smoothly when they are by themselves, but 
sometimes Ad turns violent if somebody from outside comes to their camp in the woods. 
As Bugs says: “I have to sort of keep him away from people” (62). Nick’s arrival makes 
Ad lose control over his temper and Bugs has “to thump him” because “it’s the only thing 
to do when he gets started” (62). Bugs’ admission that he has to keep Ad away from 
people shows that he has an ingrained sense of societal expectations and behaviour. He 
understands the necessity of controlling his friend’s violence as part of the requirement 
for social interaction. For Kyle, “in ‘The Battler’ when social contact is made, it results in 
violence and suffering: Nick suffers because of the breakman and Ad Francis because of 
Nick. Even when society is limited to only three members, as in ‘The Battler,’ violence—
being indigenous to society itself—erupts a second time for Nick” (297). Bugs accepts 
the use of violence to maintain such order. He has found a way of regulating social 
relations. Bugs questions civilization by living away from it; but at the same time, he 
validates his sense of the social when he recognizes the necessity of mechanisms to 
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maintain the relation with other people: “I don’t like to not be hospitable” (62).23 The 
lack of norms also threatens life in the camp. Ad’s societal sense implies control over the 
primitive urges of his friend. In “The Battler” Hemingway reflects on the aggressiveness 
intrinsic to the primitive drives to deal with the paradoxical nature of civilization. The 
analysis of this paradox points to Hemingway’s rejection of the nostalgic allure of the 
primitive, but also his acceptance of a distinctive civilized perspective that implies 
assumptions about its supremacy.24 
  Hemingway staged the confrontation between the primitive and the civilized. He 
recognized the necessity of negotiating the clash between these forces, but “The Battler” 
underlines an important aspect about Hemingway’s consideration of the civilized. In this 
story the “negro” defends an established sense of the social. Hemingway constructs the 
identity of the civilized as opposed to the primitive, but this identity is based on a 
distinctive assumption. As Strong affirms, “Bugs intervenes in the white-white conflict in 
order to preserve peace between the two men” (57). This peace implies the success of the 
                                                
23 Bugs symbolizes Hemingway’s reflection on the impossibility of returning to a 
primitive condition. As del Gizzo explains, during his childhood Hemingway was 
exposed to the primitivist rhetoric of the return to nature (497). But by the time 
Hemingway wrote these stories such positive valorization of “back to nature” was 
questioned, as Jean Toomer in “On Being an American” points out: “Back to nature, even 
if desirable, was no longer possible, because industry had taken nature unto itself. Even if 
he wanted to, a city person could not become a soil person by changing his locale and 
living on a farm or in the woods. … Those who sought to cure themselves by a return to 
more primitive conditions were either romantics or escapists” (qtd. in North, Dialectic 
167).  
 
24 Torgovnic makes clear that in Civilization Freud reflects on the categories of 
“female/male and primitive/civilized. He then allies himself with the ‘triumphant’ 
categories—civilized male” (203). Hemingway also allies himself with a privileged 
civilized position. It implies not only a male position, but also a racial supremacy.  
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civilized, but for Hemingway, the identity of the civilized is the white Western identity.25 
In the Indian stories Hemingway reflects further on this encounter between the primitive 
and the civilized from a privileged Western point of view.26   
 “Indian Camp” presents the Indian settlement separated from the town where the 
white men live. This spatial division implies the interaction between the primitive and the 
civilized at the same time as maintaining the distinctiveness of these two identities: 
“‘Where are we going, Dad?’ Nick asked. ‘Over to the Indian Camp. There is an Indian 
lady very sick’” (CSS 67). The white men go to the camp to help an Indian woman in 
labour. The civilized brings knowledge to the primitive. The same spatial division is at 
the core of “Ten Indians”: “‘I went for a walk up by the Indian camp’” (NAS 31). But in 
this story the Indians also cross the limits of their own territory: “The Indians were all in 
town getting drunk” (31). When civilized people pay a visit to the Indians, they are 
depicted as resourceful and capable of helping each other. Alternatively, when the 
Indians move into a domain of civilization, they are portrayed as drunks: “[They] passed 
nine drunken Indian along the road” (27). In these stories, space serves as a liminal 
terrain underlying the opposition between primitive and civilized. As DeFalco argues in 
relation to “Indian Camp,” the three characters move from “their own sophisticated and 
civilized world of the white man into the dark and primitive world of the [Indian] camp” 
                                                
 
25 By Western I mean the dominant Euro-American cultures. Particularly, in 
Hemingway’s stories, the white men that migrated from Europe represent the civilized. 
For a further study of colonial Americans in relation to Indians see Pearce. 
 
26 There is extensive criticism relating to race in Hemingway’s fiction: see Holcomb, 
Lewis and Strong. These critics develop an analysis of Hemingway’s treatment of race in 
relation to African-Americans, Africans and American Indians respectively. In my 
analysis, I refer to race in relation to Hemingway’s limited consideration of the primitive 
and the extent to which it implies assumptions of the civilized.  
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(qtd. in Strong 19).27 Hemingway presents the Indians as primitive and the white men as 
civilized. 
  These two stories resonate with the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
consideration of Indians as the uncivilized of America. As Benjamin Lincoln wrote in 
1792: “Civilized and uncivilized people cannot live in the same territory, or even in the 
same neighborhood. Civilization directs us to remove as fast as possible that natural 
growth from the lands which is absolutely essential for the food and hiding-place of those 
beasts of the forest” (qtd. in Pearce 68). In the Indian stories, Hemingway presents the 
delimitation between the forest and the city, between the primitive and the civilized. This 
spatial delimitation is a result of the territory defended more than one hundred years 
before the story was written. During this time, the “beats of the forest” have been 
secluded and isolated from the civilized, but they are still at the core of the identity of the 
white men as much as they were in the time of the colonization. It is remarkable how 
“Ten Indians” happens “[a]fter one Fourth of July” (NAS 27), the day of the celebration 
of the beginning of an independent American civilization. In Hemingway’s story, Indians 
had been ostracized from their way of life. The time when—as Benjamin Lincoln put it—
“[the Indians] will be either civilized or extinct” (qtd. in Pearce 69) has arrived. Of 
course, the result of this “either or” was not as pristine as Lincoln’s words suggested. The 
opposition between primitive and civilized is more complex as Hemingway pointed out 
in the Indian stories. As Strong states, we have not fully engaged with the Indian stories 
unless we come to terms with the way Nick’s and his father’s identity are constructed in 
relation to the Indian’s presence, and vice versa (“Screaming” 22). “The Doctor and the 
                                                
27 In her article, Strong makes a succinct list of the most relevant criticism that analyses 
Hemingway’s consideration of the Indians as primitives.  
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Doctor’s Wife” goes deeper into the complexities of this interaction. 
 In this story the Indian visits the white man. This time the latter asks for help from 
the former. The supremacy or dominance of the civilized over the primitive as depicted in 
“Indian Camp” and “Ten Indians” is challenged, but significantly, the power of the 
Indian in this story is used to defend the value of the civilized. The three Indians come 
from their camp down to the cottage. They cross the boundaries of the others: “They 
came in through the back gate out of the woods” (CSS 73). The fact that there is a gate 
implies ownership, a value that, as we should see Indians do not recognize. Doctor 
Adams needs the Indian to cut a log, but Dick, a “half-breed” (IOT 24), claims that 
Doctor Adams’s log is a stolen one: “‘Well, Doc,’ he said, ‘that’s a nice lot of timber 
you’ve stolen’” (24). The Doctor argues that it has no owner: “It’s driftwood” (23), but 
Dick points to the mark that clearly shows that it “‘belongs to White and McNally’” (24). 
The Indian challenges the civilized man by using the value of property; a value 
transmitted by the white man to the Indians.  
 In his tracing of American ideas about Indians, Pearce points to a group of 
Scottish philosophers that in the eighteenth century saw the savage as limited by the lack 
of private property and division of labour:  “Yet they need to be mature in rich, complex, 
civilized humanity. The primary means to this are private property and the division of 
labor, as these mark the end of human progress towards its goal of high civilization” 
(Pearce 85).28 In “The Doctor and the Doctor’s Wife” Hemingway presents the Indians as 
                                                
28 This group was formed by historians belonging to what has become known as the 
Scottish school of common sense and moral sentiment. See, Broadie. They adopted an 
historical method of analyzing social process. The main goal of these men, among them 
Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson and Lord Kames, was to construct a 
sociology of progress, “a theory which would make comprehensible at once social 
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advocates of private property. As Helstern affirms, “this story enacts the assimilation of 
the Indian into the white world” (69). The primitive has been civilized, but this story 
questions the white world portrayed in the other two Indian stories. 
 When Dick refers to Doctor Adams as ‘Doc’ he is diminishing, to a certain extent, 
his education and profession. By using this diminutive, he is undermining the doctor’s 
profession and its social recognition. Adams is most likely addressed publicly as ‘Doctor’ 
in his civilized world. Hemingway himself validates the civilized identity of the character 
by naming the story “The Doctor and the Doctor’s Wife”, emphasizing not once but 
twice the title of the character. Even the wife remains nameless, and her whole identity is 
subjected to her husband’s profession. He is purely defined as a Doctor, a profession 
highly valued and respected in the civilized world. This is precisely the reason why 
Doctor Adams threatens Dick: “If you call me Doc once again, I’ll knock your eye teeth 
down your throat” (25). The trigger for the Doctor’s violent and threatening reaction is 
purely based on Dick’s choice of words even though what has probably bothered the 
Doctor is the accusation of stealing.  Dick, however, is well aware of his physical 
superiority and that he is using the civilized law of private property and, therefore, he 
challenges the Doctor with the very same word that upset him in the first place: “[O]h, 
no, you won’t, Doc” (25).  
 Hemingway opposes the primitive force of the Indian character to the physical 
inferiority of the white man. But it cannot be ignored that Dick’s dominance is used by 
Hemingway to defend the civilized value of property. He disguises the primitive to 
                                                                                                                                            
stability and social growth” (Pearce 82). They equated social, technical and moral 
progress, since the progress of the individual was to be measured in the progress of the 
society which gave him his social being (83).  
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defend the civilized: “[M]any of the farmers around the lake believed he was really a 
white man” (IOT 24). In this story Hemingway makes the primitive adopt white ways: “It 
belongs to White” (24). As Helstern points out, “[t]he only hope for the Indian lay in 
incorporating tribal skills and values into white society” (63). Dick uses his physical 
strength and abilities as a warrior to defend a civilized norm. Doctor Adams recognizes 
the Indian’s powerful position and avoids direct confrontation: “The doctor chewed the 
beard on his lower lip and looked at Dick Boulton. Then he turned away and walked up 
the hill to the cottage” (IOT 25). Hemingway involves the primitive in this story not only 
to reinforce a civilized value, but also to put under consideration the limitedness or flaws 
of white identity.  
 Once the doctor is inside the cottage, his wife reminds him that “he who ruleth his 
spirit is greater than he that taketh a city” (IOT 25). These words do not offer Doctor 
Adams any comfort when he listens to them while “cleaning a shotgun” (26). His coping 
mechanism, his way of achieving some reassurance, is to clean a gun, an object that 
represents the force and authority that was used against native Americans and that the 
Doctor “was very fond of” (26). He is still angry due to his weakness, and again reverts 
to white logic to reassure his supremacy in relation to the Indians: “Dick owes me a lot of 
money for pulling his squaw through pneumonia and I guess he wanted a row so he 
wouldn’t have to take it out in work” (26). Doctor Adams tries to rationalize his 
humiliation from his civilized point of view, but it does not work. The confrontation 
between the white man and the Indian implies an assessment of the civilized. 
Hemingway’s consideration of the Indians as uncivilized is not fully understood if it is 
not considered as part of the configuration of the Western identity. As del Gizzo makes 
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clear, “[a]s the ‘other’ of the West, the primitive becomes an empty holding place that 
reflects Western desires and anxieties about its own culture and identity” (498). The 
question is the extent to which the civilized may fulfill such desires and prevent those 
anxieties.  
 Primitivism allows the civilized to inspect itself through an imaginary opposite 
(Bell 20). Hemingway and Eliot explored the dangerous allure of the primitive as 
opposed to the civilized. These two authors questioned this nostalgia for the primitive to 
reflect on civilization as a necessary force that may control this tendency. But this 
engagement with the primitive also led them to examine Western identity. Hemingway 
and Eliot adopted the modernist tactic of using a construct of the primitive as the perfect 
position from which to criticize and inspect the culture and society of the early twentieth 
century.29 This scrutiny led these two authors to claim collective modes of experience 
that they considered absent in modern civilization, as I shall analyze in the next section.   
 
 
3. Collective modes of experience  
 
This section focuses on Eliot’s and Hemingway’s interest in calling attention to the 
necessity of a common way of life to revitalize the bonds between individual and society. 
First, I shall analyze Hemingway’s “A Very Short Story” and “Mr. and Mrs. Elliot” along 
with Eliot’s reference to Sweeney in The Waste Land and Sweeney Agonistes as similar 
attempts to reflect on the absence of any common link among the members of society. In 
                                                
29 See del Gizzo 503. 
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addition, I shall analyze Eliot’s “Gerontion” and Hemingway’s “Big Two-Hearted River: 
Part II” to show the extent to which these two authors point out the need of recasting 
collective modes of experience. I will compare Freud’s “common feelings” (CD 33) to 
Lévy-Bruhl’s “feeling of participation” (NPM 61) to comprehend Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s shared progression towards collective experience. 
 In some of their earlier works Eliot and Hemingway looked at dysfunctional 
families to represent their concern with the lack of any common way of life in modern 
civilization. This consideration of family converges with Eliot’s reflections on this 
institution as one of the cornerstones for the stability of civilization. In Notes towards the 
Definition of Culture (1948) Eliot connects family to culture at the same time that he 
relates the survival of a meaningful way of life to the transmission of that culture:  
 If we agree that the primary vehicle for the transmission of culture is the   
 family, and if we agree that in a more highly civilized society there must   
 be different levels of culture, then it follows that to ensure the transmission  
 of the culture of these different levels there must be groups of families   
 persisting, from generation to generation, each in the same way of life. (NDC 48) 
 
Eliot stresses the correlation between family and civilization and connects the success of 
a communal life to the existence of a common culture. The differentiation between the 
terms civilization and culture is not a clear one. In the nineteenth century culture was 
sometimes still used as a synonym for civilization. Eliot himself affirms in the 
introduction to Notes that “[w]e do use one word, frequently enough, in a context where 
the other would do as well; […] and I do not think that this need cause embarrassment” 
(13). In the late nineteenth century, culture “came to mean ‘a whole way of life, material, 
intellectual, and spiritual’” (Williams, Culture 16). Matthew Arnold’s Culture and 
Anarchy was a seminal work on that matter in this period. In Notes Towards the 
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Definition of Culture, Eliot refers to this work to affirm that Arnold was “concerned 
primarily with the individual and the ‘perfection’ at which he should aim” (22). Eliot 
criticizes Arnold’s focus on the individual rather than perfection of society as a whole. 
This is precisely the direction adopted by Eliot when he affirms that “culture is ‘a way of 
life’ which includes ‘all the characteristic activities and interests of a people’” (Beasley 
105). For Eliot, culture prevents the dissociation between individual and society: “[T]he 
culture of the individual is dependent upon the culture of a group or class, and […] the 
culture of the group or class is dependent upon the culture of the whole society” (21). 
This common way of life is put at risk if family fails.    
  In “A Very Short Story” Hemingway presents the failed attempt of an American 
soldier to create a family. “After the armistice they agreed he should go home to get a job 
so they might be married […] It was understood he would not drink” (IOT 66). The 
soldier accepts these requirements, but his girlfriend falls in love with an Italian major 
and frustrates his plans. At the end of the story, the young American soldier “contracted 
gonorrhea from a sales girl in a loop department store while riding in a taxicab through 
Lincoln Park” (IOT 66). “A Very Short Story” is not simply a story about a young soldier 
having sex to overcome a failed relationship. It is mainly about the extent to which this 
frustrated marriage leads the young soldier to question the traditional social code of 
behaviour. Fiedler argues that “[i]n Hemingway the rejection of the sentimental happy 
ending of marriage involves the acceptance of the sentimental happy beginning of 
innocent and inconsequential sex, and camouflages the rejection of maturity and of 
fatherhood itself” (296). In “A Very Short Story,” however, sex has consequences. The 
main character is punished for transgressing the traditional social bond of sex and 
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marriage. The escape from such a bond leads to a destructive end: “gonorrhea” (66). Sex 
implies indirectly the rejection of fatherhood, but not as a rejection of maturity, but as a 
result of the impossibility of marriage. As Moddelmog suggests in relation to the 
marriage stories of In Our Time, in those stories sex is used to reflect on the unfulfilled 
individual expectation of the characters (603).30 In this story the frustrated expectations 
of the character implies a subtle critique of the social world that frames the story.  
 The main character wants “only to get a job and be married” (IOT 66). He is a 
young American soldier who grew up in a society where—as Theodore Roosevelt 
expressed it in “The Strenuous Life” (1899)—people “admire the man who embodies 
victorious effort” (1). He has been in the war and now he wants to fulfill his duty towards 
a family. He does not fear “work” or a “righteous war” as Roosevelt put it to define the 
threats of a healthy society. “A Very Short Story” suspends temporarily the chances of 
the young soldier succeeding in embodying the “victorious efforts” that the society in 
which he grew up demanded from a man. As Narbeshuber affirms in relation to 
Hemingway’s early stories, “family, fatherhood, and marriage, as well as other cultural 
myths and institutions, either fail altogether or are held in a state of suspension” (11). 
This suspension points to Hemingway’s awareness of the necessity of restoring the bond 
between individual and society. Hemingway disdains the values he engages with in this 
story. He considers them useless for performing the desired regeneration of a communal 
life.  
                                                
30 When Moddelmog alludes to the so-called marriage stories, she is referring to “Mr. and 
Mrs. Elliot,” “Cat in the Rain” and “Out of Season.” I would include “A Very Short 
Story” as part of the marriage stories as well.  
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 In the short story “Mr. and Mrs. Elliot” Hemingway puts again under suspension 
the mechanism of a traditional family.31 Hemingway depicts an unhealthy marriage, 
emphasizing the obnoxious side of constant sex in order to procreate: “[T]hey tried as 
often as Mrs. Elliot could stand it” (IOT 85). Hemingway pays special attention to the 
ailing nature of the woman: “Mrs. Elliot was quite sick. She was sick and when she was 
sick she was sick as Southern women are sick” (85).32 Sex is never an enjoyable 
experience and even during their wedding night “they were both disappointed” (86). The 
couple’s unfulfilled expectation of having a baby is not related at all to mutual sexual 
pleasure. It is only a necessary means to conceive; and hence, to fulfill the expectations 
of having children intrinsic to a traditional family. It is only when Mrs. Elliot’s friend 
arrives that she becomes “much brighter […] and they had many good cries together” 
(87). Hemingway is pointing to a sexual relationship between the woman and the friend, 
who “slept together in the big medieval bed. They had many a good cry together” and 
they were  “quite happy” (88). The marriage with her husband makes Mrs. Elliot 
constantly sick, but the arrival of her friend cures her and changes her attitude. The 
traditional marriage leaves her unsatisfied, but it is when “all their friends had gone off” 
(88) to a seaside resort and the three characters are not living within society anymore, that 
they can reach happiness by looking at an alternative to the traditional family: “In the 
evening they all sat at dinner together in the garden under a plane tree […] and they were 
                                                
31 Others references to frustrated marriage in Hemingway’s works are the impossible 
marriage of Jack and Lady Brett in The Sun Also Rises, the tragic end of A Farewell to 
Arms or the couples of “White Hills like Elephants” or “Cat in the Rain.”    
 
32 For a consideration of T.S. Eliot as the target of this parody see Curnutt (163, 169-70). 
This critic affirms that “‘Mr. and Mrs. Elliot’ mocks both Chard Powers Smith and T.S. 
Eliot” (170). 
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all quite happy” (88). Hemingway represents an alternative to the conventional family as 
a mode of questioning the extent to which the traditional bonds between individual and 
society provide the necessary framework for the development of a common way of life. 
The same concern may be identified in Eliot’s representation of family relationships in 
the second part of The Waste Land, “The Game of Chess.”  
 Lil has recently aborted her baby: “It’s them pills I took, to bring it off” (CPP 42). 
Lil does not want to have more babies: “She’s had five already, and nearly died of young 
George” (42). Alternatively, one of the nameless women in the tavern asks her: “What 
you get married for if you don’t want children?” (42). This woman does not conceive of 
stopping having babies once you are married. In addition, she assigns to Lil the role of 
submissive wife by warning her that she needs to give sex to her husband: “And if you 
don’t give it him, there’s others will” (41). Lil, however, revolts against this role by 
taking the decision to not have any more babies. Eliot juxtaposes two different modes of 
understanding a family. By pointing out these two alternative conceptions; he questions 
the mechanism of the traditional family itself. As Moddelmog clarifies, in the early 
twentieth century “the dominant conservative Victorian sexual definitions and codes no 
longer made sense to many people, and new forms of consciousness and identity 
developed” (Moddelmog, “Sex” 357). Eliot engaged with these new codes about sex and 
family in his poetry to reflect on the mechanism that guarantees the relationship amongst 
individuals within society. Sweeney’s last appearance in one of Eliot’s poems conforms 
to such engagement.  
 In the third section of The Waste Land Eliot refers again to Sweeney: “Sweeney to 
Mrs. Porter in the spring/[…]/They wash their feet in soda water” (CPP 45). This 
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character is one of the nine examples that Eliot presents in this poem “of the sterility and 
perversion of love and sex in human relationships outside marriage” (Hargrove162). In 
The Waste Land Sweeney is one of the characters living a sexual life beyond the 
traditional frame of the family. This lack of connection between sex and family does not 
simply imply a critique of this mode of practicing sex, but mainly a warning of a 
withered society that does not offer “any vehicle for the transmission of culture” (Eliot, 
NTDC 48). The connection between futile sex beyond family and the sterility of the 
character’s existence responds to Eliot’s concern about the lack of any bond among the 
members of society. As noted, Eliot considered family as “the primary vehicle for the 
transmission of culture” (48). By questioning the mechanism that provides the 
functioning of the family, he is questioning the possibility of culture itself. As Oser 
affirms in relation to Sweeney, “[t]he chief social corollary of Eliot’s aesthetic is that 
individualism had closed the door to a common culture” (64). In Sweeney Agonistes Eliot 
develops further this concern in order to reflect on an individual who not only has 
become conscious of this predicament, but also attempts to communicate it to others. 
 In 1924 Eliot recalled in relation to Sweeney Agonistes that he wanted to write a 
drama about modern life.33 As Hargrove explains, Sweeney “has an insight into the 
meaningless quality of modern existence […], an insight which he tries unsuccessfully to 
communicate to the others” (Hargrove 164). The question is why Sweeney fails in such 
attempt. Sweeney tells the story of a man murdering a girl. He is aware of the evil 
tendency of the individual and how he is connected to other people. He realizes that life 
                                                
33 See Hargrove 164. 
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is more than “[b]irth, and copulation, and death” (CPP 80), but he cannot convey this 
awareness to the other members of society.   
 In Sweeney Agonistes, Sweeney does not limit his experiences to his individual 
consciousness, and he unsuccessfully tries to relate them to a supra-individual 
consciousness. In The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism Eliot wrote that in Sweeney 
Agonistes he wanted to create a character whose “sensibility and intelligence” would be 
“on the plane of the most sensitive and intelligent members of the audience” (153-54). In 
this play Eliot distinguishes between the main character’s sensibility and the other 
participants in the drama, but by transferring this distinction to the public itself, he 
reflects on a similar inequality among the members of modern society. As Smith argues, 
“when Sweeney says ‘Death is life and life is death,’ there is no evidence whatever that 
he attaches to the words any meaning that the other characters miss or that the audience 
as a whole […] cannot grasp” (112-13). In this play Eliot explores this lack of meaning, 
but he does not point to Sweeney as responsible for it. Instead, he looks at society as a 
whole to find the reasons for this situation.  
 Eliot suggests that modern civilization has lost its ability to involve all the 
members of society in any communal experience. Even when at the very end of Sweeney 
Agonistes the chorus sings, they do not reflect on their experiences as a group, but they 
refer to someone’s else experience: “When you’re alone in the middle of the night and 
[…] perhaps you are dead” (CPP 84). In Sweeney Agonistes Eliot presents several 
members of modern society, and among them, only Sweeney seems to be aware of the 
fragmentation of this community: “But if you understand or if you don’t/That’s nothing 
to me nothing to you/We all gotta do what gotta do/[…]/We’re gona stay and we’re gona 
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go” (84). The only communality among all these characters is that each of them has his 
particular interests and purposes in life. Sweeney’s inability to communicate his insights 
is based on the impossibility of the members of society of conveying a collective 
experience. As Harmon explains in relation to Eliot’s interest in the primitive harmony of 
a whole community, “[w]ith the growth of so-called ‘civilization’ this state of mankind 
gives way to a very different state in which each member is divided in his own 
sensibilities and the community as a whole becomes fragmented into irregularly zoned 
obligation and chores” (800). This is the fragmentation Eliot explores in this play: “‘A 
quarrel. An estrangement’” (CPP 76). He dramatizes the dissociation between individual 
and society. Sweeney Agonistes is the result of Eliot’s attempt to call attention to the 
difference between a society understood as a cluster of individual consciousnesses or one 
understood as a collective consciousness. This distinction is symbolized in the contrast 
between Freud’s “common feeling” (CD 33) and Lévy-Bruhl’s primitive “feeling of 
participation” (NPM 61). I shall use these two concepts to analyze Eliot’s “Gerontion” 
and Hemingway’s “Big Two-Hearted River: Part II” in this context.34 
 In The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality Lévy-Bruhl’s explains that “[t]he 
consciousness which ‘primitive man’ has of his individuality, […], is enveloped in a 
complex where the predominant element is the feeling that the individual has of 
‘belonging’ to a group which is the true individuality and of which he is simply an 
                                                
34 Mayer illustrates how Eliot was aware of the work of contemporary anthropologists 
and social psychologists such as Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Frazer and Weston. In this 
section I focus exclusively on Lévy-Bruhl as I consider that his theories clearly 
differentiate between civilized individual consciousness and primitive collective 
consciousness. In the next chapter I shall use Frazer’s and Weston’s work to make clear 
Eliot’s and Hemingway’s use of myths and rituals as a result of their interest in collective 
experience.  
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element […] of the social body” (77). This feeling of participation differs from Freud’s 
consideration of a “common feeling” to guarantee “a majority […] stronger than any 
individual” (32). Lévy-Bruhl’s primitive experiences the collective feeling as a result of 
being a member of a group and not because “the majority” needs to be “stronger than any 
individual” (Freud, Civilization 32). In “Gerontion” Eliot reflects on the primitive 
“feeling of participation” (Lévy-Bruhl, NPM 61) to engage with “the question of what 
modern man […] [had] lost in the process of becoming civilized” (Manganaro 98).35 The 
old man in Eliot’s poem demands the restoration of the feeling of belonging to a social 
body beyond his own individuality. In “Big Two-Hearted River: Part II” Hemingway also 
makes an allusion to this feeling of participation intrinsic to primitive patterns of 
experience in order to overcome the character’s condition.  
 The thoughts of Gerontion and Nick Adams are the thoughts of damaged minds 
within a damaged culture. Some critics have read “Gerontion” as a symbol of modern 
civilization. For example John T. Mayer illustrates how “Eliot makes Gerontion a 
collective consciousness” (220) in the poet’s attempt to let the experience of the 
individual recap the experience of the world. Jewel Spears Brooker uses F.H. Bradley’s 
philosophy to read the poem as “the perfect metaphor for a ruined and dying civilization” 
(“Structure” 338). Gerontion and Nick Adams have suffered traumatic events in the 
modern world and they choose similar, but distinctive, attitudes to reflect on the 
crossroad in which they are trapped. The old Gerontion is limited by his physical 
condition: “I have lost my sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch” (CPP 23) and he focuses 
                                                
35 According to Jeffrey Meyers Hemingway also felt attracted by the primitive mentality 
and he believed “that the primitive past influenced the psychology of the present” (305). 
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on his “thoughts” to call for regeneration. Alternatively, the young Nick walks in the 
woods, fishes and camps to overcome his condition: “Nick crawled out under the 
mosquito netting stretched across the mouth of the tent, to look at the morning” (145). 
Nick performs physical activities while Gerontion reflects on the reasons for his situation. 
 In the first line of “Gerontion” the old man affirms: “Here I am, an old man in a 
dry month,/ Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain” (CPP 21). He aims to move beyond 
the landscape of destruction that he recalls: “Nor fought in the warm rain/ Nor Knee deep 
in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass” (21). Gerontion is waiting for the situation to change: 
“I would meet you upon this honestly” (22), but he relates an improvement of his 
condition to the eventual restoration of society’s condition: “‘We would see a sign!’” 
(21). Initially, Gerontion reflects on these circumstances from an individual perspective: 
“I an old man,/A dull head among windy spaces” (21). The old man stresses the troubled 
condition of his mind: “My house is a decayed house” (21); but by the end of the poem, 
he identifies his tortured consciousness with the consciousness of society. He makes his 
decayed house part of a communal group: “We have not reached conclusion, when 
I/Stiffen in a rented house” (22). Eliot relates the experiences of the old man to the 
experience of modern society as a whole. 
 Gerontion participates in the feelings of the group and his individual experiences 
are part of them: “Neither fear nor courage save us/ […]/Virtues/Are forced upon us by 
our impudent crimes” (CPP 22). He stresses the “crimes” they have performed together. 
Gerontion’s troubled consciousness is part of a damaged collective consciousness and he 
ponders the extent to which this situation may be different. He alludes to “the juvescence 
of the year” when “[c]ame Christ the tiger” (21). The old man is waiting for a new life 
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beyond the deteriorated state of civilization and he alludes to Christ as “the greatest of all 
signs of new life” (Williamson 109). As Brooker explains, “[a]ll of those ruined houses in 
windy spaces […] are suddenly placed in the context of the rejections of Christ” (326). 
After introducing the image of Christ, the third stanza alludes to the Christian 
communion: “To be eaten, to be divided, to be drunk” (CPP 22). In spite of this reference 
to the body of Christ to be shared in a Eucharist, in the next lines Eliot includes some 
elements that question the religious dimension of the ceremony: “Among whispers; By 
Mr. Silvero/With caressing hands […]/By Hakagawa, bowing among the Titians;/By 
Madame de Tornquist, in the dark room/Shifting the candles” (22). As Southam argues, 
these references point to hints of black magic (73). The presence of Christ in the 
sacrament of communion is reduced to “a corrupt eucharist ceremony” (Brooker 329).36  
 Modern society seems not to be aware of the meaning of this sign of new life. 
Eliot frames his hope of change within “depraved May” (CPP 21). He stresses the 
barrenness of this historical moment at the same time that he recalls the extent to which 
the situation will change eventually as always had occurred throughout history: “Think 
now/History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors/And issues, deceives with 
whispering ambitions” (22). The old man points to a new period: “The tiger springs in the 
new year” (22), but this new state of life will bring conflicting forces. As Jain explains, 
“‘spring’ is a pun, meaning that Christ the tiger both arises like a rejuvenating spring, 
giving new life, and pounces like a murderous beast” (93). Gerontion warns of these 
conflicting forces—“Us he devours”—to pay attention to the necessity of confronting 
“such a knowledge” (CPP 22); and therefore, to prepare the collective consciousness of 
                                                
36 Brooker develops further the analysis of this poem in relation to the Christian religion.  
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modern society to deal with such forces. Eliot uses “Gerontion” to reflect on the extent to 
which the true individuality of the old man’s “decayed house” depends on the situation of 
the social group he belongs to: “Tenants of the house”  (23). His identity is contingent on 
that of the group, as Lévy-Bruhl explains in relation to the primitive feeling of 
participation. The old man’s experiences cannot be dissociated from those of modern 
civilization, and Eliot points to the rituals of the Christian tradition which pursue 
collectively the restoration of the condition of this social body.37  
 “Gerontion” alludes to the Christian ritual of communion. He introduces 
fragments of the performance of this ritual, but at the same time, he doubts the extent to 
which the persons involved in such a performance are aware of the function or meaning 
of the ritual. Eliot presents a synthesis that questions the execution of rites in modern 
civilization, but he underlines their continuation. “Gerontion” refers to rituals and their 
intrinsic collective modes of experience as necessary to the restoration depicted in this 
poem. In “Big Two-Hearted River: Part II” Hemingway explores a comparable situation. 
In his fishing trip Nick returns to ritual patterns in his attempt to overcome his troubled 
condition. He performs these patterns, but they do not offer him the expected effect. He 
realizes the necessity of rejecting his isolation and returning to society to perform these 
patterns collectively.  
 In “Big Two-Hearted River: Part II” Nick wakes up in his camp with the intention 
of spending the day fishing. “The grass was wet on his hands as he came out. […]. There 
was the meadow, the river and the swamp” (IOT 145). The very first paragraph 
                                                
37 For other references to the Christian rituals in “Gerontion” see Mayer, Southam and 
Williamson. Eliot’s use of Christian rituals in his poetry and plays will be developed in 
the next two chapters. 
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establishes the movements Nick is going to perform during the day. Nick moves from the 
camp to the river. He tries later to enter the swamp to decide finally to avoid it before 
coming back to the camp. Nick’s movements are determined by the control he may exert 
over his activities in these three locations. As Benca notes, “Nick’s ritualistic and precise 
actions throughout the story reflect his need for reconstruction and order in his life” (66). 
All his actions follow a precise pattern after he leaves his tent. Nick methodically takes 
the grasshoppers for bait: “Nick picked them up, taking only the medium-sized brown 
ones” (IOT 145). He cooks his breakfast with precise measures: “one cup of flour, one 
cup of water” (146) and he tides up his camp before heading to the river: “It was a good 
camp” (147). Nick needs order and he finds it in the camp.  
  Nick hopes to experience the same feeling while fishing in the river. As Cirino 
explains, the issue that justifies the narrative of this story is “Nick’s tortured 
consciousness, his struggle to control it […] and the depiction of his failure when ‘he 
can’t shake it’” (117).  This control depends on Nick’s ability to succeed in the river. 
Nick is constantly concerned about his feelings and how his actions in the water depend 
exclusively on his ability to fish there: “With the core of the reel showing, his heart 
feeling stopped with the excitement” (150). The knowledge and domain of the technique 
helps him to control the trout. After catching one, he unhooks it to drop it back into the 
stream. The trout does not move, but Nick knows that “[h]e’s all right […]. He was only 
tired” (149). Alternatively, Nick becomes “a little sick” (150) after struggling with the 
trout for a while. He could not catch it. His equipment fails and he loses the trout. Nick’s 
mastery in the river is related to his performance and he can control it only to a certain 
extent.  
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 He is happy in the water until he recalls past memories of dead trout resulting 
from fishermen touching them with unwashed hands. This is the first time that he thinks 
about anything other than his own feelings. Then he affirms that he “did not like to fish 
with other men on the river. Unless they were of your party, they spoiled it” (IOT 149). 
This is a key moment in Nick’s fishing trip. On the one hand, he refers to the possibility 
of fishing with somebody else. On the other, this reference to “your party” along with his 
insistence on certain ways of acting in the river points to Nick’s understanding of fishing 
as a ritual with a code of behaviour that must be respected. As Baker explains, “the story 
is full of rituals” and all the “fishing is conducted according to [a] […] ritualistic code” 
(126). The fishing ritual offers Nick the comfort he was looking for when he moved away 
from civilization. He misses a big trout and he does not worry even when “[h]e had never 
seen so big a trout. There was a heaviness, a power not to be held” (150). Nick realizes 
that the ritual of fishing consists in dealing with such power: “He felt like a rock, too, 
before he started off. By God, he was a big one” (151), but “[h]e did not care about 
getting many trout” (152). In the river he relates his feelings to his interaction with the 
trout as a symbol of this uncontrollable power.  
 Nick equates his feelings in the river with his performance in the stream. In “Big 
Two-Hearted River: Part I” Hemingway points out the unification of Nick and the trout to 
decipher Nick’s feelings (see p. 63). Nick identifies the trout in the water with the 
experience of a state of mind in which there is no separation between objective 
perception and subjective feeling. In the second part of the story, Hemingway reflects 
further on the consonance between the water and Nick’s feelings to emphasize the extent 
to which Nick needs to control his feelings in the water through fishing technique. After 
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Nick affirms of the big trout that it has “a power not to be held” (IOT 150), he decides to 
leave the water because “[h]e did not want to rush his sensations any” (151). “He sat on 
the logs, smoking, drying in the sun, […]; slowly the feeling of disappointment left him” 
(151). Hemingway uses the water as a symbol of this stream of experience or 
psychological continuity with the world with no dissociation between object and subject, 
but he also prevents Nick from being immersed in this state of mind with no control. In 
the water, Nick explores  this feeling beyond the requirements of the modern world, but 
at the same time, he does not dare to immerse himself in this stream of experience 
without limitation.  
 Nick embraces the performance of archetypical movements of the ritual of 
fishing, but only under certain circumstances. “It was right now” (151). He has 
everything under control “with his rod lying out on the logs” (151). Nick arrives at the 
woods escaping from a world of chaos symbolized in the burned town at the very 
beginning of the first part of the story. Then he finds in the water a world of order, but he 
loses such order when the “river” narrows and goes “into a swamp” (154). “Nick did not 
want to go in there now” (155). Nick does not want to confront the chaos again. 
Hemingway points out through the ritual of fishing in the river the ambivalence of this 
primitive state of mind. On the one hand, Nick wishes to move beyond the chaos and 
violence of the modern world and he attempts to come back to a primitive condition 
through the ritual of fishing. On the other hand, he prevents himself from becoming 
immersed in such a condition.  
 Nick has moved from the camp to the river. In these two locations he enjoyed 
control over his actions. He knows that in the swamp he will lose this control. The swamp 
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is an unstable terrain and he prefers to avoid it: “He did not feel like going on into the 
swamp” (IOT 150). He knows that in the swamp he will not be able to control his feelings 
as he did in the camp and the river: “He felt a reaction against deep wading with the 
water deepening up under his armpits” (155).  There is an element in the swamp that he 
cannot manage. “The swamp is too apt a symbol for the world he does not want to face” 
(Korn 981). This is an experience he does not dare to face in such isolation. All the 
feelings he has experienced in the river depended on the patterns of fishing: “Nick felt 
awkward and professionally happy with all his equipment hanging from him” (IOT 147).  
In the river he has the possibility of following the whole ritual of fishing. Alternatively, 
in the swamp all the control that he has over his feelings will disappear.  
 Hemingway does not conclude the story with Nick immersed in the waters of the 
swamp. Nick feels unsafe in that terrain. As O’Brian notes, “[t]he swamp possesses 
uncertainties equal in danger and complexity to the violence of human civilization” (77). 
Whatever uncertainties forced Nick to run away from civilization are symbolized in the 
swamp. Nick is isolated in nature now, but he cannot control these uncertainties as he 
hoped when he arrived in the woods. Nick has tried to restore his condition by isolating 
himself in the woods. He has moved away from everything that could remind him of the 
trauma he experienced in civilization. The fishing ritual offers him some temporary relief, 
but when he realizes that he cannot perform this ritual in the swamp, he decides to 
“com[e] back to the camp” (IOT 156). As Kyle explains, “the symbols of the campfire 
and the swamp stand in contraposition to one another: the one representing clarity, order, 
safety—cosmos; the other representing obscurity, disorder, insecurity—chaos” (299). 
Nick opts for order and safety, but the extent to which this order is the result of the 
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performance of the ritual patterns of fishing cannot be ignored. The reason why Nick 
avoids entering into the swamp is not simply because it is dangerous, but mainly because 
this terrain does not allow the performance of the pattern that offers him such order.  
 Nick avoids fishing in the dangerous waters, but he does not renounce this ritual. 
He hopes that things will be different in the future. He decides to wait for conditions to 
change. This short story uses fishing as a source of healing that has connections with the 
use of this sport in The Sun Also Rises. But there is a key difference between these two 
works in that respect. In the early short story Nick performs fishing in isolation while 
Jake fishes with his friends in the river of Navarre. In the short story this activity does not 
finally offer Nick the experience he was looking for when he arrived in Seney, while the 
fishing performed as a group in the novel offers the main character a spiritual healing. (I 
shall explore further this point in Chapter Three, see pp. 142-43). In “Big Two-Hearted 
River: Part II” the young man—like the old Gerontion—confronts his situation. Firstly, 
he runs away from society in his attempt to regenerate himself. “Nick’s own loss of faith 
in civilization can be inferred from his determination to escape” (O’Brian 75). But, 
finally, he abandons this seclusion. In his fishing trip, Nick realizes the impossibility of 
facing any tragic adventure by himself in the wilderness of the swamp: “In the swamp 
fishing was a tragic adventure” (IOT 155). Nick points to fishing as the only mode of 
restoring his condition. As Civello explains, in this story Hemingway points toward 
modern man’s redemption through ritual patterns that are close to the rhythms of life 
(14). Nick, however, alludes to the uselessness of performing in isolation this ritual in the 
unsafe waters of the river: “He did not want to go down the stream any further today” 
(IOT 155). This ritual offers modern man’s redemption only to the extent that it is 
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executed in isolation. Nick Adams looks for ritual patterns to be performed collectively 
as the only mode of restoring the condition of modern civilization. Nick—like the old 
Gerontion—engages with the dichotomy between his individual experiences and these 
considered as part of a collective social body. Nick Adams is isolated in the woods. 
Gerontion is secluded in his old house, but both characters become aware of the 
unavoidable relationship between their own experiences and those of the social group 
they belong to.  
 Eliot and Hemingway used these two works as vehicles for exploring collective 
modes of experience. As Lévy-Bruhl explains in How Natives Think, the primitive modes 
of experience “are common to the members of a given social group; […]; they impress 
themselves upon its individual members, and awaken in them sentiments of respect, fear, 
adoration, and so on, according to the circumstances of the case. Their existence does not 
depend on the individual” (3). The experiences of the old Gerontion and Nick Adams do 
not make any sense if they are considered in isolation. Eliot and Hemingway pointed out 
ritualistic patterns that are intrinsic to primitive modes of experience. They focused on 
experiences that conform to rituals. As Cassirer explains in relation to primitive societies 
“[r]ites are not individual acts; they are always performed by a community […]. It is their 
principal effect that the men and women who are performing these rites lose every sense 
of their individuality. They are melted together; they act, think, and feel as a whole” 
(SMC 256). Eliot and Hemingway explored ritual as a mode of improving the 
deteriorated situation they depict in the old man’s internal monologue and Nick’s fishing 
trip. 
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 “Gerontion” and “Big Two-Hearted River: Part II” end with an allusion to a 
different future. Nick affirms that “[t]here were plenty of days coming when he could fish 
the swamp” (IOT 156). He trusts in the regeneration of the ritual of fishing to succeed in 
such an endeavour. Eliot suggests in the last line of his poem that the present condition of 
modern society is only a temporary situation: “Thoughts of a dry brain in a dry season” 
(23). He relates this new life to the coming of Christ. In later works Eliot and Hemingway 
immersed their characters in different rituals to involve society as a whole in modes of 
experience. Therefore, in the next chapter I shall consider the extent to which Eliot and 
Hemingway used myths to explore distinctive rituals as a result of their interest in such 
experiences.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Eliot’s and Hemingway’s reflections on modern civilization cannot be separated from 
their ambivalent exploration of the primitive. Eliot’s Sweeney poems and Hemingway’s 
“The Battler” are still part of their consideration of the clash between the world of the 
intellect and the world of the senses. But these works respond to the glorification of the 
sensual beyond any intellectual categorization of reality. These works represent Eliot’s 
and Hemingway’s interest in the primitive, but also the impossibility of experiencing it 
from a civilized state of mind. Sweeney and the three outcasts from “The Battler” 
symbolize the dehumanized individual who reflects exclusively on his private 
experiences and their reduction to the satisfaction of sensuous desires, ignoring the world 
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beyond impulses. These works point out the consequences of ignoring any intellectual 
restrictions imposed by civilization. Eliot and Hemingway realized that civilization 
results from the conflicting combination of the primitive and the civilized.  
 Primitivism is the projection by the civilized sensibility of an inverted image of 
the self. “Primitivism is almost as old, it may be supposed, as civilization; both terms, of 
course, being relational. As a literary convention primitivism allows the civilized to 
inspect, or to indulge, itself through an imaginary opposite” (Bell, Metaphysics 20).  
Eliot’s and Hemingway’s conflicting involvement with such images resulted not only in 
the realization of the necessity of controlling the sensuous tendency of the individual, but 
also in their consideration of collective modes of experience. This reflection led them to 
consider the necessity of cultivating the bonds between individual and society. They 
reflected on collective consciousness as opposed to the restrictiveness of the individual 
consciousness dominant in modern civilization. Then, they again paid attention to the 
primitive to reflect on this flaw of Western identity. Eliot and Hemingway looked at 
primitive modes of feelings intrinsic to ritual patterns of experience to restore the 
necessary bonds between individual and society. In the next chapter I shall analyze 
Eliot’s The Waste Land and Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises as two related, but 
distinctive attempts to achieve collective modes of experience.  
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Chapter Three 
The Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises 
 
  
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on Eliot’s and Hemingway’s interests in a “mythical-religious 
feeling of community” (Cassirer, PSF 175). This phrase from Cassirer’s analysis of 
“mythical feeling” (PSF 175) summarizes Eliot’s and Hemingway’s interest in the 
feeling of the individual “insofar as it takes place as a result of being a member of a 
community”  (175). It also encapsulates a use of myths to explore collective experiences 
connected to religion. My use of “religion” is influenced by William James’ 
consideration of the topic in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). William 
James confronts the study of religion as a state of mind, more or less ignoring its 
institutions: “There is a state of mind, known to religious men, but to no others, in which 
the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close 
our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God” (47). I shall 
elucidate the correlation between myth and religion by using Frazer’s analysis of myth 
and ritual resulting from a belief in gods. 
  Whereas I concluded in Chapter Two that Eliot and Hemingway drew attention to 
collective modes of experience intrinsic to ritual patterns of experience, in this chapter I 
shall analyze the distinctive rituals they explored as a result of their common interest in 
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religious feelings and the extent to which these shaped their commitment to social 
revitalization.1 Eliot’s The Waste Land and Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises celebrate 
the chaos of modern culture and compel its reevaluation. They use myths and rituals to 
frame this endeavour. I argue that Eliot and Hemingway were influenced by the “myth 
and ritual theory” (Segal 37) deployed by Frazer’s The Golden Bough and Weston’s 
From Ritual to Romance. This theory connects myths to rituals. “[It] maintains that 
myths and rituals operate together” (37). 2 In this context I shall consider the “mythical 
method” (Eliot, SP 177) along with Bradley’s “absolute order” (Eliot, KE 90) as broadly 
equivalent concepts based on a unity of feeling. As Cassirer notes, “[t]he real substratum 
of myth is not a substratum of thought but of feeling. […] [T]heir coherence depends […] 
upon unity of feeling” (EOM 81). Eliot and Hemingway were engaged in the pursuit of a 
unifying sense of ‘feeling’ as a way of transcending the disorder of experience. When I 
use the term unity of feelings I use it in relation to Bradley’s theory of experience as 
interpreted by Eliot in Knowledge and Experience. He affirms “that the only independent 
reality is immediate experience or feeling” (KE 30). As I have argued in Chapters One 
(see pp.60-66) and Two (see pp. 74-92), both Eliot and Hemingway felt attracted by this 
state of mind, but moved beyond the destructiveness intrinsic to such a tendency. Even 
though we cannot reach immediate experience, “[w]e are led to the conception of an all-
inclusive experience outside of which nothing shall fall” (31). As Levenson notes in 
                                                
1 Williams argues that “[s]ociety is now clear in two main senses: as our most general 
term for the body of institutions and relationships within which a relatively large group of 
people live; and as our most abstract term for the condition in which such institutions and 
relationships are formed” (Keywords 291). In this chapter I use this term in its more 
abstract sense. In Chapter Four I shall reflect on society understood as a “body of 
institutions” (291) as a result of the condition of society I analyze in this chapter.   
  
2 For an overview of alternative theories of myth and ritual, see Coupe and Seagal.  
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relation to Bradley’s concept of the absolute, “[i]t is simply the final synthesis of all 
diversity, the supra-rational state past the reach of common sense which integrates and 
transcends contradiction” (178). This all inclusive experience or “Absolute order” 
appears in moments of meaningful perception that Eliot calls “felt whole[s]” (155). I shall 
consider the extent to which Eliot and Hemingway applied the insights of Bradley’s 
theory of experience to reflections on modern society and the extent to which this world 
of absolute order can be experienced collectively. My intention is to explore how these 
two authors shared the quest for this “mythical-religious feeling of community” (Cassirer, 
PSF 175) through the performance of rituals tied to distinctive myths.  
 In Death in the Afternoon Hemingway provides a clue about the correlation 
between ritual and feeling in bullfighting. Reflecting on bloody spectacle of the horses 
bleeding to death in the ring, he affirms that: 
 [T]he tragedy of the bullfight is so well ordered and so strongly disciplined by 
 ritual that a person feeling the whole tragedy cannot separate the minor comic-
 tragedy of the horse so as to feel it emotionally. If they sense the meaning and end 
 of the whole thing even when they know nothing about it, feel that this thing they 
 do not  understand is going on, the business of the horses is nothing more than an 
 incident. If they get no feeling of the whole tragedy naturally they will  
 react emotionally to the most picturesque incident. (8-9) 
 
If the spectator engages in the tragedy of the bullfight, the anecdotal episode of the horse 
will not evoke in him any emotion. Alternatively, if the spectator does not share the ritual 
experience of the whole thing, he will inevitably react emotionally; his experience will 
not be part of the whole feeling of the bullfight. As Babington notes, the context of this 
statement “is his defense of bullfighting, which—as ritual—must not, he believes, be 
viewed fragmentarily” (91). Hemingway underlines that ritual patterns offer the 
individual the experience of the unity of feeling intrinsic to the ritual itself. In The Clark 
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Lectures (1926) Eliot also alludes to an experience that makes the individual subsume his 
feeling under an experience organized by ritual. “[T]he method and the goal seem to me 
essentially the same as with Aquinas and Dante: the divine contemplation, and the 
development and subsumption of emotion and feeling through intellect into the vision of 
God” (103-104). There is a significant resemblance between Hemingway’s and Eliot’s 
ideas in that they both consider the individual emotions and feelings to be part of a more 
inclusive experience. 
 Aspects of the discussion of the difference between emotion and feeling are key to 
exploring the relationship between feeling and communal experience in the works of 
Eliot and Hemingway. The difference between these two terms is not a clear one as 
several critics have already pointed out. A.G. George underlines how ‘Feeling’ and 
‘Emotion’ are words that frequently appear either together or separately in Eliot’s 
criticism (48). Lewis Freed observes that “Eliot, like Bradley, does not distinguish 
between feeling and emotion except where the context requires it” (8). S. H. Clark goes 
beyond this lack of clarity and contends that “the relation between ‘emotion’ and 
‘feeling’ must remain […] permanently insoluble” (190). I agree to a certain extent with 
all these critics about the problematic differentiation between emotion and feeling. 
However, I consider that when Eliot and Hemingway talk about emotion they are 
reflecting on a fragmented experience of the self, as I have extensively argued in Chapter 
One in relation to their aesthetic formulas, the “objective correlative” (Eliot, SP 48) and 
the “real thing” (Hemingway, DIA 2). Alternatively, they relate feeling to ritual; and 
hence, to a communal experience. Eliot and Hemingway both point to rituals as a 
guarantor of such collective experience, but there is a key difference between these two 
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considerations of rituals. Eliot indirectly alludes to Christian rituals to achieve the divine 
contemplation of God. As Brooker notes, Eliot used Christian ritual as an underlying 
structural metaphor in some of his early poems (MS 130). Hemingway alternatively 
reflects on the ritual of bullfighting to experience the unity of feeling intrinsic to the 
tragedy performed in the bullring. In both cases, individual experience cannot be 
dissociated from the feeling experienced collectively through the performance of a ritual. 
In The Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises, Eliot and Hemingway respectively reflect on 
the experience of rituals and they frame them within similar myths. A question arises 
about the extent to which these approaches to myth and ritual relate to Eliot’s concern 
with the spiritual and the divine and Hemingway’s involvement with a physical level of 
experience.    
 First, I want to consider Eliot’s and Hemingway’s reflections on a disordered 
experience framed within the decayed urban landscape they depict in their respective 
works. I plan to examine “The Burial of the Dead” and Book One of The Sun Also Rises 
to show how Eliot and Hemingway attempt to unify the incoherent experience of reality 
that they portray. Second, I shall focus on the extent to which Eliot’s and Hemingway’s 
use of the myth of the Fisher King along with allusions to ancient ceremonies led them to 
explore different rituals. I shall consider the similarities and differences between some 
Christian rituals and the pagan ritual of bullfighting to clarify the extent to which Eliot 
focuses on the spiritual and the divine and Hemingway on the physical realm of life. This 
difference disposed Eliot to move beyond the boundaries of the material world and 
Hemingway to remain trapped in the physical level of reality in their pursuit of a unifying 
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sense of feeling. In addition, I shall analyze the extent to which this feature led Eliot to 
pursue religious feelings relating to Christianity and Hemingway to neglect them.  
 
 
2. The experience of an absolute order 
 
The Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises focus on the disordered experience of reality 
framed within a distinctive urban world. These works present a disoriented crowd 
wandering around cities. They reflect on this situation as a temporary circumstance to be 
overcome through the pursuit of a “world of absolute order” (Eliot, KE 90). Eliot and 
Hemingway recruit mythical figures in their attempt to reach such order. Eliot’s analysis 
of F.H. Bradley’s theory of experience and “the mythical method” (Eliot, SP 117) offers 
an enriching understanding of The Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises as two relatable 
attempts to transcend the disorder of experience.   
 In Knowledge and Experience Eliot analyzes the three levels of Bradley’s theory 
of experience. First, he defines “immediate experience” (31) as prior to any temporal or 
spatial category. Then, he differentiates between the other two levels to clarify their 
correlation:   
 There is a real world, if you like, which is full of contradiction, and it is our 
 attempt to organize this world which gives the belief in a completely organized 
 world, and hypothesis which we proceed to treat as an actuality—whence the 
 question how and how far come into contact with this world of absolute order. 
 (90) 
 
According to Eliot’s interpretation of Bradley, we oscillate between two experiences of 
reality: the disordered “real world […] full of contradiction” and “a completely organized 
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world” (90). The question is to what extent we experience this world of “absolute order” 
(90).3 In “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” (1923), Eliot casts some light on how this issue is at 
the core of The Waste Land and its use of myth. In “Ulysses” Eliot praises Joyce’s use of 
“the mythical method” as a “way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a 
significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary 
history” (SP 177). Eliot stresses the fragmentary nature of the experience of the modern 
world to point out Joyce’s ability to arrange all that disconnection within the framework 
of “the mythical method” (177). Eliot considers the world full of contradictions, as 
referred to in his analysis of Bradley’s second level of experience. He also points out the 
correlation between the use of the mythical method as a way of organizing the experience 
of this “real world” (KE 90) and the belief in a world of absolute order. In The Waste 
Land Eliot uses the figure of Tiresias in his attempt to reflect on the extent to which 
modern society can experience that world of absolute order. Hemingway confronts 
similar issues in The Sun Also Rises through the character of Jake. 
 The first section of The Waste Land, “The Burial of the Dead,” depicts a broken 
landscape comprising “dull roots,”  “branches,” “dry stone,” and “stony rubbish” that 
symbolizes a “dead land” (CPP 37) where the “dead tree gives no shelter” (38). This 
barren landscape leads to an “[u]nreal city” where “[a] crowd flowed over London 
Bridge” (39).  Eliot portrays a modern metropolis, inhabited by a sick crowd: “so many/I 
had not thought death had undone so many” (39). The first book of The Sun Also Rises 
also presents a collage of bars and restaurants with the only common link being Jake as 
he wanders through them.  All the characters move around the city, disoriented, from bar 
                                                
3 See Levina 5-8.  
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to bar: “I am sick of Paris, and I am sick of the Quarter” (SAR 19). They are souls that are 
lost in the maelstrom of their own lives, but they still try unsuccessfully to find a retreat 
from their chaotic selves: “Don’t you ever get the feeling that all your life is going by and 
you’re not taking advantage of it” (SAR 19). The Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises 
present individuals whose futile lives are represented by a sterile terrain.  But Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s characters do not experience the isolation of, say, Prufrock, Gerontion or 
Nick Adams in the earlier works. Hemingway’s and Eliot’s characters are part of a 
community however problematic: “Everybody’s sick. I’m sick too” (Hemingway, SAR 
23).  Eliot and Hemingway allude to an incoherent experience of reality, but it is no 
longer a question of isolated individuals, but a common problem faced by a group of 
people. “He’s quite one of us” (40). In fact, both authors stress it by referring to a crowd 
moving around their cities. Eliot focuses on the crowd of London Bridge and Hemingway 
points to the crowd of urban Paris: “We went out to the Café Napolitain to have an 
aperitif and watch the evening crowd on the Boulevard” (SAR 21).  Both Eliot and 
Hemingway portray the chaos of a barren urban land in which modern society is trapped. 
 In “The Burial of the Dead” Eliot represents a mass of unknown people who move 
around the city with no apparent purpose: “And each man fixed his eyes before his 
feet./Flowed up the hill and down King William Street,/To where Saint Mary Woolnoth 
kept the hours/With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine” (CPP 39). Amongst this 
mass of strange people, however, Eliot points to Stetson—“one I knew” (39)–to ask him: 
“‘That corpse you planted last year in your garden,/‘Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom 
this year?’” (39). Eliot questions the chances of anything growing in such a place. The 
crowd crossing London Bridge in their way to the City is trapped in a sterile land where 
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nothing blooms: “‘Are you alive, or not […]’?” (41). As Williams affirms, “[s]truggle, 
indifference, loss of purpose, loss of meaning […] have found, in the City, a habitation 
and a name” (239). Eliot is quite specific in depicting that habitation where the unknown 
citizens live and act: “[U]p Queen Victoria Street./O City city, […]/Beside a public bar in 
Lower Thames Street” (45). Eliot names the streets and the places, but all these 
“unknown” walkers wandering around the city have no name. When he refers to London 
he presents a clearly defined inferno inhabited by an unspecific crowd.4 As Crawford 
argues, Eliot depicts an urban sight “to communicate a sense of horror” (47). Eliot 
connects this with the very distinctive sounds that conform to such a landscape. He 
focuses on “the sound of horns and motors” and the noisy atmosphere of “the Cannon 
Street Hotel” and “the Metropole” (43). In the poem Eliot stresses the correlation 
between the new motor engines and modern urban life.5 He links the rhythms of the 
inhabitants of the city to the urban inferno they experience. The modern crowd is “the 
human engine” (CPP 43) of the waste land. 
 Hemingway also depicts urban landscapes in The Sun Also Rises. He begins and 
ends the novel in Paris and Madrid respectively. Jake Barnes seems to be moderately 
happy with his life in Paris: “I like this town” (SAR 18), but he is surrounded by a crowd 
of people who wander around aimlessly trying to find some meaning to their lives: 
                                                
4 Eliot refers twice to Dante’s Inferno in the notes of the poem. Eliot rephrases the lines 
55-57 from Inferno iii where Dante talks about his reaction “to seeing the vast crowd of 
unhappy spirits” (Southam 151). 
 
5 As Thacker explains, Eliot related “modernity to transport when, in 1921, he likened the 
music of Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring to the ‘the scream of the motor-horn, the rattle 
of machinery, the grind of wheels, the beating of iron and the steel, the roar of the 
underground railway, and the other barbaric noises of modern life’” (8). 
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“Nothing happens to me” (20). Hemingway involves this modern crowd guided by Jake 
in a common search for a purpose. Hemingway juxtaposes in this pursuit urban modern 
life with life before motor engines:  Jake is “sat [sic]at a table […] watching it get dark 
and the electric signs come on, and the red and green stop-and-go traffic-signal, and the 
crowd going by, and the horse-cab clippety-clopping along at the edge of the solid taxi 
traffic, and the poules [prostitutes] going by, singly and in pairs, looking for the evening 
meal” (22).6 Hemingway considers in this Parisian scene the “solid taxi traffic” in 
contraposition to the “the horse-cab” (22). He reflects on the clash between the 
requirements of the new urban life and an old life alien to such modernization.  
 Jake and his friends move away from Paris. In their trip to Pamplona they use 
train and cars—“[t]he cab stopped in front of the hotel” (95)—but Hemingway focuses 
during the trip on landscapes with no sign of modern urban life: “After a while we came 
out of the mountains and there were trees along both sides of the road, and a stream and 
ripe fields of grain” (99).  He refers to an “old castle” and when the group arrives at their 
destination, he focuses on the “walls of the city” (99) to make clear the boundaries 
between where “the mountains” are and the “town on the other side of the plateau” (99). 
It is within the boundaries of these medieval walls that Jake and his friend have an 
experience beyond the requirements of modern urban life. But the celebration of the 
ancient festival of San Fermin ends and Hemingway comes back to a city and the novel 
ends in a taxicab among the traffic of Madrid: “Ahead was a mounted policeman in khaki 
directing the traffic” (251). In The Sun Also Rises Hemingway, as Eliot does in The 
Waste Land, frames the experience of his characters in an urban space. As Williams 
                                                
6 Stoneback clarifies how “[t]raffic lights were a curiosity everywhere in the 1920s” (31). 
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states, “the city is not only […] a form of modern life; it is a physical embodiment of a 
decisive modern consciousness” (239). Eliot and Hemingway consider the machinery of 
modern life to reflect on a troubled modern consciousness and attempt to reverse this 
situation.  
  “The Burial of the Dead” presents a fragmented collection of voices and bits of 
incoherent experience: “A heap of broken images, where the sun beats” (CPP 38). As the 
poet clarifies in the notes at the end of the poem, these lines refer to Ezekiel and how he 
was told to preach about the coming of the Messiah to a rebellious, unbelieving people.7 
This Biblical allusion relates to the inhabitants of modern civilization and the second 
coming of Christ: “Son of man” (38), who came to resolve the situation of the desolated 
land; but, at the same time, he questions the success of this “coming” by stressing the 
inability of the rebellious inhabitants to listen to the Messiah. After this event, the poem 
introduces “hyacinths” as a symbol of the resurrected god of fertility rites.8 But, again, 
this sign turns out to be useless: “—Yet when we came back, late, from the Hyacinth 
garden,/ […], I was neither/ Living nor dead, and I knew nothing,/Looking into the heart 
of light, the silence” (38). In these lines Eliot refers to the experience of the “I” as part of 
the “we” (38).  They try to listen, they look for a sign to improve their situation, but they 
only find “silence” (38). Eliot twice repeats this pattern of alluding to withered symbols 
to recreate the situation he depicts in the “The Burial of the Dead.” After that, he 
introduces the figure of Madame Sosostris as some sort of random solution to the 
                                                
7 See Southam 142.  
 
8 See Southam 146. 
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situation. The “famous clairvoyante” arrives as a modern healer who “[i]s known to be 
the wisest woman in Europe” (38). She offers to all these voices some kind of assistance.9 
 By introducing in the very first section of The Waste Land a figure such as 
Madame Sosostris, Eliot offers a clue to understanding one of the main claims of the 
poem. The “crowds of people, walking round in a ring” (CPP 39) need a figure that 
unites them and their disconnected experiences. As Brooker and Bentley explain in their 
analysis of the poem, the figure of the clairvoyant is a contemporary debasement of the 
seers and oracles of myth, of which the Sibyl of Cumae and Tiresias are the most 
immediate examples (77). In the first section of the poem, Eliot presents a panorama of 
futility and chaos. Then he introduces the figure of Madame Sosostris as a way of 
attempting to resolve the situation. Madame Sosostris with her “wicked pack of cards” 
(CPP 38) seems to be a temporary clairvoyante that unifies the incoherent experience of 
modern society. 
  In The Sun Also Rises Hemingway introduces in Book One a corresponding 
figure. The character of the Count provides a temporary point of reference for Jake’s and 
Brett’s wandering around Paris. He offers them rides with his “chauffeur with livery” 
(41). He drives them from restaurant to restaurant: “Wants to drive us out to dinner to-
morrow night” (41) and he is the only link amongst all their aimless movements: “‘Where 
did you go with him?’ ‘Oh, everywhere. He just brought me here now” (SAR 40). The 
Count is a rich man and his money buys luxurious things such as champagne and cigars: 
“‘Yes, bring it [the wine] in,’ […]. ‘Like to try a real American cigar?’” (64). He 
provides them with fleeting comfort to the same extent that Madame Sosostris with her 
                                                
9 For a broadly similar perspective on this figure, see Vickery 252.  
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“bad cold” (CPP 38) offers counsel to “the crowds of people” (39) by telling them the 
fortune of “the Wheel” (38). However, Eliot points out the fake orientation that this 
character may offer by underlining that she does not “find/ The Hanged Man” (39) in her 
pack of cards.10 The symbol of the hanged man represents the god killed so that his 
resurrection can restore the fertility of the land and its people (Sotham 151). By alluding 
to the absence of this card in the pack, Eliot points to the impossibility of regeneration. 
Hemingway also depicts the assistance offered by the Count by making Brett stress the 
fact that he is like the rest of the characters: “[h]e’s one of us, though” (SAR 40). Both 
Eliot and Hemingway present early in their respective works a figure that brings some 
sort of guidance, but it is only transitory and ultimately useless.  
 In the first section of the poem Eliot describes a mass of people wandering around 
an urban land incapable of moving beyond those circumstances. Hemingway also 
presents a group of disoriented souls that only find comfort in bars and alcohol. Eliot and 
Hemingway frame this state of affairs as a passing situation. The very first line of The 
Waste Land identifies the moment in which the poem begins as “the cruelest month” 
(CPP 37). This line highlights the condition of the land, but it also implies the temporary 
nature of the situation as it may change with the coming of the new season. Hemingway, 
likewise, focuses in the early chapters of the novel on the troubled lives of the characters 
to stress the barren condition of modern society: “We would probably have gone on and 
discussed the war and agreed that it was in reality a calamity for civilization” (SAR 25). 
Hemingway similarly involves the element of seasons as a symbol of progression. In 
                                                
10 As Eliot explains in the notes of the poem, he does not refer to the Hanged Man of the 
Tarot lore, but “to the Hanged God of Frazer” (CPP 51). 
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Chapter One he recalls “[t]hat winter Robert Cohn went to America” (16). Then he 
moves in Chapter Two to a “warm spring night” (22) before finishing the novel with a 
hot summer night: “You could feel the heat outside through the window” (249). As 
Adams affirms, The Sun Also Rises embodies the feeling Hemingway shared with Eliot 
that Western civilization was dying (126). Eliot and Hemingway reflect on this feeling as 
a temporary state to set the rest of their respective works as an attempt to resolve such a 
situation. It is necessary to take into account this disordered experience to understand the 
project of Eliot and Hemingway in the rest of these two works.  
 In Knowledge and Experience Eliot reflected on the same modes of perceiving 
reality that he explores in The Waste Land. According to his analysis of Bradley’s theory 
of experience, “[t]he life of a soul does not consist in the contemplation of one consistent 
world, but in the painful task of unifying” different levels of experience or “discordant 
viewpoints” to experience a higher point of view “which shall somehow include and 
transmute them” (147-48). In this reflection on Bradley, Eliot ponders the possibility of a 
higher point of view that would allow the self to transmute the disorder of experience into 
a more inclusive experience or world of “absolute order” (KE 90). As Bradley holds in 
Appearance and Reality, “this Absolute is experience, […]; it is a whole superior to and 
embracing incomplete forms of life. This whole must be immediate like feeling, but not, 
like feeling, immediate at a level below distinction and relation. The Absolute is 
immediate as holding and transcending these differences” (213). So the experience of this 
undivided whole is not “the immediate experience” (Eliot, KE 31) which is previous to 
any intellectual distinction. As Schwartz notes, “[i]n contrast to the fragmented world of 
appearances, Bradley presents his notion of the Absolute, which synthesizes immediate 
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experience and conceptual thought into an inclusive whole […]. The Absolute is 
experience, the undivided whole of immediate experience raised to a level that includes 
but transcends the fragmentary formulations of the intellect” (33-34). The absolute order 
or unity of feeling transcends the fragmentary formulations of the intellect. As Levina 
contends, “[t]he Absolute is the destination point of ‘our journey,’ known as ‘complete 
experience,’ while immediate experience is its origin, defined by ‘mere’ immediacy” (9). 
In The Waste Land Eliot reflects on the extent to which it is possible to experience this 
absolute order. The mythical figure of Tiresias offers an important clue to an 
understanding of this journey. 
 In the notes on The Waste Land, Eliot writes how Tiresias “although a mere 
spectator and not indeed a ‘character,’ is yet the most important personage in the poem, 
uniting all the rest” (CPP 52). The question is why the position enjoyed by Tiresias 
converts her in the most important figure of the poem. Tiresias appears in “The Fire 
Sermon” as part of the scene where the agent’s clerk and the apathetic typist have sexual 
intercourse. These two characters are involved in urban life and seem to be trapped in the 
meaningless automatism of modern civilization: “At the violet hour, when the eyes and 
back/Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits/Like a taxi throbbing 
waiting” (CPP 43). Tiresias is not an active part of this scene; but, as a witness, she has 
the ability to contemplate the character’s actions: “Perceived the scene, and foretold the 
rest-/I too awaited the expected guest” (CPP 44). Tiresias has the faculty of discerning 
the problematic experience of these two characters as she is used to walking “among the 
lowest of the dead” (44). Tiresias observes this “[u]nreal city/Under the brown fog of a 
winter noon” (43) where people behave at their core with a mechanical rhythm: “She 
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smooths her hair with automatic hand,/And puts a record on the gramophone” (44). 
Tiresias is part of the life of this metropolis, but at the same time, he is beyond this 
experience. The mythical figure is on two planes of experience at the same time: “I 
Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives” (43).11 As Levina illustrates, with 
the physical limitations of human reality erased, both of sex and temporality, the horizon 
of Tiresias is limitless; she has been removed from the sensuous perception of reality 
(130). Tiresias is a symbol of the reality that the inhabitants of the waste land cannot 
experience. They are not able to leave this incoherent level of experience that Tiresias 
observes from her privileged point of view. These characters are “apathetic, both morally 
and emotionally—human machines” (Williamson 142).  As Brooker and Bentley argue, 
the characters in “The Fire Sermon” “have no sense of what is lost or denied to them” 
(127). The only unity or communality between the characters of the poem is that they do 
not have access to this “world of absolute order” (KE 90) that Eliot symbolizes in 
Tiresias. They ignore its existence. They are trapped in the “real world […] full of 
contradictions” (90) and they do not even ponder the possibility of such absolute 
experience.   
 Hemingway explores in The Sun Also Rises a figure that can instructively be 
compared with Tiresias. Jake Barnes enjoys a privileged position from the outset of the 
novel. He witnesses the problems of all his friends. Through the whole novel he is a 
                                                
11 Tiresias is a mythical figure that has the characteristic of being a woman as well as a 
man. She is blind, but she enjoys the power of prophecy and long life. Thus, this figure 
has a duality of experience. For a further elucidation of this figure, see Southam 172-73 
and Williamson 141-42. I use the pronoun “he” to refer to Tiresias under the influence of 
Rainey’s practice in his annotations to The Waste Land: “Since he had experienced the 
body in both sexes, he was asked by Jove and Juno to settle a dispute concerning whether 
men or women had greater pleasure in making love” (107).  
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passive observer of Brett’s sexual adventures. In the legend of Tiresias, this figure gets 
her powers after seeing two snakes copulating in the forest and hitting them twice. 
Similarly, Jake witnesses some of Brett’s sexual encounters, and part of his importance in 
the novel somehow arises from his privileged (Tiresias-like) observation of Brett. First 
with Robert Cohn, and later with the bullfighter Romero, Jake is there to see the fall of 
his friend as Tiresias is with the typist in the scene of “The Fire Sermon.” Jake is a 
spectator who contemplates the lives of the rest of the characters. He seems to have a 
wisdom that makes the others listen to his advice: “If you went there the way you feel 
now it would be exactly the same” (SAR 19). But Jake is less important or empowered 
than Tiresias: “Undressing, I looked at myself in the mirror of the big armoire beside the 
bed. That was a typically French way to furnish a room. Practical, too, I suppose. Of all 
the ways to be wounded” (38). Reflected in the mirror, Jake contemplates himself as 
another element of the room. He has the capacity to observe his own problems as Tiresias 
does with the typist and the clerk, but Jake is incapable of mending this situation. He 
cannot transmute his condition in the same way that the typist and the clerk cannot move 
beyond their automatism. Jake is wounded.12 He can see it reflected in the mirror, but this 
                                                
12 The nature of this wound has received a great deal of attention. In his commentary 
Stoneback refers to the most relevant commentaries and dissects the possible clues in the 
novel about Jake’s wound (64-67). Fiedler argues that “Hemingway tells us that it is ‘the 
War’ which has afflicted Jake with the absurd wound […], but ‘the War’ is merely a 
convenient tag for the failure of values and faith” (322). I agree with Fiedler insofar as 
Jake’s wound is important in any understanding of his experiences in the novel, but I 
consider the physical nature of the wound a key to deciphering Jake’s actions. 
Hemingway hinted at this in an interview in the The Paris Review when the interviewer 
suggested that Jake was “emasculated precisely as a steer”” (Plimpton 230). Hemingway 
affirmed that “[a]ctually he had been wounded in quite a different way and his testicles 
were intact and not damaged. Thus he was capable of all normal feelings as a man but 
incapable of consummating them. The important distinction is that his wound was 
physical and not psychological and that he was not emasculated” (230). In a letter to the 
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vision does not offer him the possibility of moving beyond his condition. Unlike Tiresias 
Jake cannot occupy two levels of experience simultaneously. He is as trapped within the 
relational level of experience as the clerk and the typist are in The Waste Land, but there 
is an important aspect that differentiates these characters. Jake is aware of his wound 
while Eliot’s characters are unaware of their condition.    
 Eliot and Hemingway present spectators that contemplate the other characters. 
Tiresias enjoys a privileged point of view beyond the limitations of the levels of 
experience in which the typist and the clerk are trapped. Jake Barnes is a victim of the 
very same problems he contemplates as a privileged observer.13 He witnesses the chaotic 
lives of the other characters, but at the same time he is wounded. This state makes him 
pursue a remedy to heal his condition. 
 “The Fire Sermon” depicts the mechanical intercourse of the typist with the young 
clerk: “The meal is ended, she is bored in caresses/[…]/Exploring hands encounter no 
defence/[…]/ Bestows one final patronizing kiss” (CPP 44). In this scene the actions of 
the characters become a meaningless succession of physical gestures that lead towards 
boredom and indifference. In The Sun Also Rises Hemingway pays attention to a similar 
                                                                                                                                            
editor Thomas Bledsoe, Hemingway illustrates in relation to Jake’s wound how “[i]t 
came from a personal experience in that when I had been wounded at one time there had 
been an infection from pieces of wool cloth being driven into the scrotum. Because of 
this I got to know other kids who had genito urinary wounds and I wondered what a 
man’s life would have been like that if his penis had been lost and his testicles and 
spermatic cord remained intact. I had known a boy that had happened to. So I took him 
and made him into a foreign correspondent in Paris and, inventing, tried to find out what 
his problems would be when he was in love with someone who was in love with him and 
there was nothing that they could do about it” (SL 745). In the next section I shall reflect 
on the extent to which the physical nature of Jake’s wound shapes the rituals he explores. 
  
13 Joost and Brown compare Jake’s castration to Tiresias’s blindness “to the extent that it 
provides him with the same kind of ‘second sight’ that enables both the seer and the 
reporter to see beyond the hollow existence of their fellows in the Waste Land” (432).   
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use of a mechanistic action, but with rather different implications. In the relationship 
between Jake and Brett, spirituality becomes fruitless as a result of the repetitive 
declarations of spiritual love performed by Jake. At the end of Book One, he declares 
repeatedly his love to Brett to compensate for his inability to offer sex: “‘Couldn’t we 
live together, Brett? Couldn’t we just live together? […]‘Couldn’t we go off in the 
country for a while?’ […]‘You know I love you’” (SAR 62). Brett responds similarly and 
her words are as futile as those pronounced by Jake: “‘It wouldn’t be any good. I’ll go if 
you like. But I couldn’t live quietly in the country. Not with my true love.’ […]‘Isn’t it 
rotten? There isn’t any use my telling you I love you’” (62). These mutual declarations of 
spiritual love are a hollow set of words to the same extent that the typist’s sexual actions 
are an automatic pointless repetition of physical gestures. These characters are trapped in 
the real world full of confusions as Eliot explains it in relation to Bradley’s second level 
of experience. They somehow attempt to move beyond this level of experience by 
physical and spiritual mechanical acts respectively. Eliot and Hemingway reflect on the 
impossibility of overcoming such situations, but while the poet explores it from the 
physical perspective, the writer of fiction explores it from a spiritual one.  
 Both Eliot and Hemingway present their characters trapped in a “real world […] 
full of contradictions” “which”, as Eliot explains in relation to Bradley’s Absolute,          
“gives the belief in a completely organized world” (KE 90). When Eliot affirms that 
Tiresias “is the substance of the poem” (CPP 52), he points out that the mythical 
structure offered by this figure is the only way of being in contact with such a “world of 
absolute order” (Eliot, KE 90). As Coupe notes, “The Waste Land is really about the need 
for order” (Myth 34-35). This is precisely what Eliot and Hemingway found in the 
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mythical elements of the Fisher King and the Grail legend. These two authors use these 
myths to involve their characters in a journey toward a “world of absolute order” (Eliot, 
KE 90). As Smith argues in relation to The Waste Land, this poem summarizes the Grail 
legend, not precisely in the usual disposition but retaining the principal incidents and 
adapting them to a modern setting (T. S. Eliot’s Poetry and Plays 70). It is necessary then to 
take into account the disordered experience Eliot and Hemingway depict in the first parts 
of The Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises respectively to understand their use of 
mythical paradigms as part of an attempt to offer remedies.   
 
 
3. Myth and ritual 
 
In the introductory paragraph to the endnotes of The Waste Land, Eliot alludes to two 
works. He explains that “[n]ot only the title, but the plan, and a good deal of the 
incidental symbolism of the poem were suggested by Miss Jessie L. Weston’s book on 
the Grail legend” (CPP 50). Eliot also recognizes the influence of Frazer’s The Golden 
Bough: “I have used specially the two volumes Adonis, Attis, Osiris. Anyone who is 
acquainted with these works will immediately recognize in the poem certain references to 
vegetation ceremonies” (50). As Coupe explains, “The Waste Land is […] a story; and 
the tale it tells is a deliberate fusing and updating of two other stories—that of the dying 
and reviving god (Frazer), and that of the quest for the Grail (Weston)” (Myth 31). In The 
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Sun Also Rises Hemingway also makes use of the same mythical elements.14 These myths 
imply distinctive rituals. The analysis of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s use of those myths 
along with their correlative rituals will offer a better understanding of The Waste Land 
and The Sun Also Rises as two related, but distinctive attempts at achieving a unifying 
sense of feeling, experienced collectively. 
 Frazer’s analysis of the ancient vegetation ceremonies of dying and reviving gods 
conforms to “the myth-ritualist theory” (Segal, Myth 61). According to this theory myth 
does not operate by itself but works along with a ritual. Frazer distinguishes between two 
different versions of this theory. In the first, myth tells the life of the god of vegetation 
and ritual enacts the myth describing his death. The ritual runs on the basis of the magical 
law of similarity, according to which the imitation of an action causes it to happen (Segal, 
Myth 65). In the second version of this theory, the king embodies the god. The health of 
the land depends on the health of the god and ultimately on that of the king. In this 
theory, the religious element is the belief in gods who directly affect nature. The magical 
element is the belief in the power to control gods through the performance of rituals. 
                                                
14 Many critics have analyzed the common use of the myth of the Fisher King in The 
Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises. Richard P. Adams makes a direct connection 
between these two works and argues that Hemingway borrowed a number of the 
techniques used by Eliot in The Waste Land (123). Malcolm Cowley underlines how 
Hemingway’s first novel “deals in different terms with the same legend that T.S. Eliot 
was not so much presenting as concealing in The Waste Land” (qtd. in Adams 123). Alan 
Lupack and Barbara Tepa Lupak explain how Hemingway was fascinated with the story 
of the wounded Fisher King whose health is tied to the fertility of the land (156). For 
similar perspectives, see Baker, Joost and Brown, and Flora. In his reading of the novel, 
Stoneback also refers to the myth of the Fisher King and reads Jake as this mythical 
figure. He affirms that the influence of Eliot’s poem on Hemingway’s novel is pervasive, 
but he warns against simplistic considerations of the common use of similar myths and 
vegetations rites (57). I move beyond this common terrain of ideas to point out the extent 
to which Eliot’s and Hemingway’s use of the mythic paradigm disposed them to explore 
different rituals, eventually leading them to engage with experiences of opposing nature. 
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Frazer sees the ritualistic enactment of the myth of the death and rebirth of the god of 
vegetation as the heart of this version of the myth and ritual theory.15 “Human survival 
depends on the vegetation, which must be continually revived” (Segal, Theorizing 50). 
The communal performance of the dying and reviving god ceremonies affects the 
condition of the land.  
 Weston engages with Frazer’s second version of the myth-ritualist theory. In 
From Ritual to Romance she argues that the medieval myth of the Fisher King and the 
avatar of the Grail are connected to ancient vegetation rites of dying and reviving gods. 
But, while Frazer focused on the correlation between the welfare of the community and 
the killing of the king, Weston related the renewal of the community to the improvement 
of the king’s health.16 Weston notes that the king and the land are bounded. The condition 
of the land depends on the condition of the king, and the restoration of his health relies on 
the retrieval of the grail through the performance of rituals: “The Grail romances repose 
eventually, not on the poet’s imagination, but upon the ruins of an august and ancient 
ritual, a ritual which once claimed to be the accredited guardian of the deepest secrets of 
Life” (133).17 As Coupe argues, for Weston “it is matter of whether the quester, our 
                                                
15 Frazer divides all culture into three stages of magic, religion, and science. In The 
Golden Bough he focuses on the intermediate stage of religion and science. This is a 
stage of magic and religion combined. “Only in this in-between stage is myth-ritualism to 
be found, for only here do myths and rituals work together” (Segal, Theorizing 39). For a 
further explanation of Frazer three stages of culture, see Vickery and Coupe.  
 
16 Weston connects the Grail king to Adonis and Attis, the former gored to death in the 
groin and the latter driven to self-castration (Segal, Theorizing 54). In The Sun Also Rises 
the nature of Jake’s wound is sexual, but this feature is not explored in Eliot’s poem.  
  
17 For Levina, Weston’s thesis—that the Grail romances derive directly from ritual 
practices—is the only axis of coherence in the book’s discourse (111-12). 
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unnamed protagonist, can reaffirm the sacred link with the Grail and so cure the Fisher 
King, in a land which does not even know itself to be waste” (32). Eliot’s The Waste 
Land and Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises present a quester involved in the pattern of 
renewal inherent to the search of the grail. Their common involvement with this pattern 
results in an engagement with its intrinsic rituals. 
 According to Weston, “[t]here is a general consensus of evidence to the effect that 
the main object of the Quest is the restoration to health and vigour of a king suffering 
from infirmity” (18). Eliot and Hemingway identify the quester of the Grail with the 
Fisher King as he wanders around a barren territory to find the cure for his sickness in 
order to restore the condition of the land. This movement is shaped by two key events 
borrowed from the Grail story. First, Eliot and Hemingway involve their questers in an 
attempt at purification that is symbolized by immersion in the waters, connected to the 
ancient rite of death by water.  Second, they face the opportunity to heal their conditions 
in the final stage of the journey. Eliot adopts the episode of the Chapel Perilous from the 
Grail legend.18 Hemingway also sets at the end of the novel a scene that symbolically 
could be compared to Eliot’s use of the Chapel Perilous. Eliot and Hemingway develop 
in The Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises respectively a pattern of reviving god, a 
central rite of the Grail legend. This common pattern results in distinctive conclusions 
about the renewal of the health of the quester; and hence, that of the Fisher King. In The 
Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises, Eliot and Hemingway present respectively the 
quester suffering from distinctive illnesses. The different nature of these wounds 
                                                
18 I have decided to use the term Chapel Perilous which first appeared in Thomas 
Malory’s Le Morte d’Arthur rather than Perilous Chapel used by Weston in From Ritual 
to Romance. The first term is more widely accepted and commonly used.  
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conditions the final outcomes in the renewal of the health of the Fisher King and the 
correlative restoration of the land.   
 After his futile declaration of spiritual love to Brett, Hemingway involves Jake in 
the quest of healing his condition. After the scene of the typist and the clerk in “The Fire 
Sermon” Eliot also develops a pattern of renewal related to the pursuit of the Grail.19 The 
importance of these scenes is the direction in which Eliot and Hemingway lead their 
questers. After the scene witnessed by Tiresias, The Waste Land turns into a failed 
sequence of purification, in which a spiritual regeneration is unsuccessfully pursued: 
drowning in water in the fourth section of the poem, walking through the desert in the 
last. In The Sun Also Rises Jake too is involved in a failed regeneration. In that common 
movement, Eliot’s and Hemingway’s questers are imbricated in a pattern of symbolic 
purification and unsuccessful regeneration; a pattern that significantly is conditioned by 
the distinctiveness of their portrayal of the disorder depicted in the earlier parts of these 
two works. The key to understanding the importance of this symbolism is to bear in mind 
from which source of life—physical or spiritual—these characters have initially 
experienced their disordered experience. The character’s perspective implies an 
engagement in distinctive rituals connected to the ancient myth of a dying and reviving 
god. In Eliot’s case this movement is from the physical to the spiritual realm of life and 
he will allude to spiritual rituals connected to Christianity. Hemingway alternatively 
develops a movement from the spiritual to the physical to explore the ritual of 
bullfighting 
                                                
19 In line 293 Eliot hints at Dante’s Purgatory (CPP 53). As I have previously noted in 
the first part of the poem, Eliot refers to Dante’s Inferno, so there is a progression from 
the inferno of the desolated land in “The Burial of the Dead” to an attempt to overcome 
this situation, as initiated in “The Fire Sermon.” 
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4. The immersion in the waters  
 
At the end of “The Fire Sermon” the quester is in the city of Carthage: “To Carthage then 
I came” (CPP 46) . In the notes on the poem, Eliot relates this line to St. Augustine’s 
Confessions: “‘to Carthage then I came, where a cauldron of unholy loves sang all about 
mine ears’” (CPP 53). Eliot locates the quester in a place where lust is at the centre of 
every experience, as Eliot suggests by alluding to Confessions. This movement in the 
poem leads one to consider that the essential step towards curing the infirmity of the 
Fisher King is to overcome the flesh and lust symbolized in that city: “Burning burning 
burning/O lord Thou pluckest me out/O lord Thou pluckest/burning” (CPP 46). Brooks 
and Bentley write that “The Buddha and Saint Augustine preach a similar message: 
Salvation involves overcoming the lusts of the flesh” (123). As Stephenson argues, 
beyond the burning comes a weariness with things of the world and bodily experience 
(qtd. in Southam 180). In “The Fire Sermon” Eliot encloses the quester in the sensuous 
perception of reality to allude to the necessity of moving beyond this situation in which 
he is imprisoned. The city of lust, Carthage, is the point of departure in the final attempt 
to heal his condition. As Weston makes clear in relation to the ritual intrinsic to the quest 
of the Grail, it is a necessary step for reaching the higher or spiritual regeneration: “[T]he 
Mystery ritual [of the Grail] comprised a double initiation, the Lower, into the mysteries 
of generation, i.e., of physical Life; the higher, into the Spiritual Divine Life, where man 
is made one with God” (130). The quester’s steps through the physical are part of the 
final stage of the journey that should lead to the higher initiation or spiritual life: “[T]he 
test for the primary initiation, that into the sources of physical life, would probably 
 141 
consist in a contact with the horrors of the physical death, and […] the tradition of the 
Perilous Chapel […] was a reminiscence of the test for this lower initiation” (130). After 
the city of Carthage, in the last section of the poem Eliot leaves the quester to wander 
through the desert in extreme physical conditions: “Dead mountain mouth of carious 
teeth that cannot spit/Here one can neither stand not lie not sit/There is not even silence in 
the mountains” (CPP 47). But before this final trip, Eliot represents in “Death by Water” 
a ritual of purification that implies this primary initiation into the lower or physical life to 
be the mandatory step towards the final search for the grail. In the last two stanzas of 
“The Fire Sermon” and the section “Death by Water,” Eliot sets out not only the steps 
that should be taken by the quester in his search for the Grail, but he also relates the Grail 
with this moment “where man is made one with God” (Weston 130). 
 In the fourth part of The Waste Land Eliot uses water as the controlling symbol of 
the scene: “the deep sea swell/[…]/A current under the sea/[…]/Entering the whirlpool” 
(CPP 46). If this symbol is read together with the last line of the previous section: 
“burning” (46), it seems that Eliot wants to underline that the lust of “The Fire Sermon” 
is extinguished by the water of “Death by Water.” Eliot uses the rite of dying in the water 
borrowed from the myth of Adonis to represent the symbolic death of the sensual as the 
necessary previous step to the final reviving of the god. Eliot points out that this section 
is the beginning of the pursuit of the spiritual beyond the physical. As Brooker and 
Bentley argue, “[d]eath, in his sources, particularly in Frazer, Weston, and the Bible, is 
the prerequisite for life, and in all three, death by water is a central ritual in physical and 
spiritual rebirth. […] [D]eath is an end which is a beginning” (160). The importance of 
this section is not only that it is a symbol of a possible rebirth, but also the way in which 
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it depends on the performance of a ritual. As Weston contends, the main purpose of the 
ritual of the freeing of the waters was to obtain wellbeing and the fertility of the land 
(21). The desired outcome symbolized by death in the waters cannot be separated from 
the ritual itself. As Vickery argues, “this sacrificial death is a purging of that which is old, 
corrupt, or sterile in the individual so that he may emerge with a new life” (263).20 The 
water ritual is the prerequisite for a spiritual rebirth. Eliot sets this ritual just before 
engaging the quester in the last stage of the journey towards the search for the “Spiritual 
Divine Life” (Weston 130) symbolized in the Grail. 
 Hemingway also explores in The Sun Also Rises a ritual controlled by water as the 
previous step to the final pursuit of regeneration. But significantly, this pattern 
appropriated from the Grail story has different connotations if it is compared to the one 
from “Death by Water.” Eliot points to the overcoming of the physical to reach the 
spiritual. The symbolic death of Eliot’s ritual of the water implies a purging of all 
sensuality and corruption related to lust and the physical. Hemingway alternatively 
identifies the old, corrupt or sterile with the spiritual. Hemingway points to the 
overcoming of the spiritual to reach the physical. After the symbolic bath in the waters, 
Hemingway takes a turn absent in Eliot’s poem. Hemingway explores a pagan festival as 
an inseparable element of the ritual that should restore the condition of Jake as the 
symbolic quester of The Sun Also Rises. The engagement of Jake in this ritual of renewal 
conditions the outcome of his regeneration.   
 After Jake Barnes’s fruitless declaration of love in Paris, he embarks on a trip to 
Spain with his friends. Brett is part of the expedition. Jake tries to keep away from her, 
                                                
20 Vickery contends that “this purgative and purificatory process is carried out in “The 
Fire Sermon” and “Death by Water” (263).  
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but unavoidably he has to witness her relations with Robert Cohn and the bullfighter 
Romero. Once Jake arrives in Pamplona, the first place he visits is the cathedral:  
 I knelt and started to pray and prayed for everybody I thought of […].[W]hile I 
 was praying for myself I found I was getting sleepy, so I prayed that the bullfights 
 would be good, and that it would be a fine fiesta, and that we would get some 
 fishing. (102)  
 
As Eliot does with his quester in the city of Carthage, Hemingway leads Jake to a new 
place where he should take a first step in his journey to cure his condition. Eliot points 
out the necessity of moving beyond lust and the physical, but Jake’s wound does not 
allow such step. Physical forms of lust are not available to Jake on account of his wound 
and therefore he attempts his renewal differently. When Jake is in the cathedral he 
realizes the uselessness of praying: “[A]ll the time I was kneeling with my forehead on 
the wood in front of me, and was thinking of myself as praying, I was a little ashamed, 
and regretted that I was such a rotten Catholic” (103). After this realization, his thoughts 
turn to fishing, bullfighting and the fiesta, all physical activities. As Nahal argues, it is 
not possible to “think of a scene in the novel where the physical action stands out as a 
major piece of narration” (29). In this scene in the cathedral, Hemingway presents his 
quester in a place devoted to performing spiritual activities to the same extent that Eliot 
presents his quester trapped in the city of Carthage, a place governed by lust and physical 
pleasures. In the temple of Pamplona, Jake wishes to feel “religious” (SAR 103), but he 
realizes that there is “nothing […] [he] could do about it” (103). He decides to move 
beyond his corrupt and sterile spiritual condition to pursue a renewal through the 
physical. Jake undertakes the reverse path set up by Eliot in the city of Carthage. Jake is 
conscious of this movement away from the spiritual and he decides to immerse himself in 
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rites of renewal based on purely physical activities. He leaves the cathedral to embark on 
a symbolic immersion in the waters as a ritual of purification. 
 After the episode of the cathedral, Jake goes with his friends on a fishing trip to 
the mountains. They spend the time drinking: “The wine was icy cold and tasted faintly 
rusty” (SAR 126), enjoying walking in the woods: “It was a long walk and the country 
was very fine” (123), and fishing. During this trip Jake focuses on the performance of 
physical activities and he tends to ignore what troubled him earlier in the novel: “‘Were 
you ever in love with her [Brett]?’/’Sure’/ […]/ ‘Oh, hell! Bill said. ‘I’m sorry, fella’/ 
‘It’s all right,’ I said. ‘I don’t give a damn any more’’” (128). He talks about his 
impossible love story with Brett as something from the past. He similarly dismisses his 
doubts about being a rotten Catholic and affirms that he has no idea what being a 
Catholic means: “I don’t know” (129). He prefers to focus on fishing. He tries to 
overcome what troubles him at a spiritual level through the performance of physical 
activities and, at the end of the trip to the mountains of Navarre, Jake goes through a 
symbolic immersion in the waters: “We found a stream with a pool deep enough to swim 
in” (130). As Fiedler suggests in reference to the fishing trip of The Sun Also Rises, “[i]t 
is in the trout stream of Burguete that Jake and Bill immerse themselves and are made 
whole again and clean” (331).21 Hemingway—like Eliot—uses in his novel the ritual of 
the water as a possible rebirth and he meaningfully places this scene just before the 
festival of renewal in Pamplona that Jake takes part in. As Vickery explains regarding the 
                                                
21 Interestingly, this critic affirms that the stream of Burguete “links back to the rivers of 
Hemingway’s youth, the rivers of upper Michigan, whose mythical source is the 
Mississippi of Tom Sawyer” (331). The important aspect of this scene is the symbolic 
“rebirth” performed through the immersion in the waters that is a constant in American 
literature, as it is argued by this critic (330-332).  
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ritual of death by water in the ancient rites of vegetations, “[t]he day after the god’s 
revival was devoted to public celebration of the event, a festival of joy […]. Every man 
might say and do what he pleased. People went about the streets in disguise” (Vickery 
55). But, before coming back to Pamplona for the festival, Jake and his friends pay a 
meaningful visit to a sacred place.  
 After sending a telegraph to make the final arrangements for San Fermin, Jake, 
along with Bill and Harris, goes to the monastery of Roncesvalles. Even though “[i]t’s [a] 
remarkable place” (SAR 133), Bill and Harris agree that they are “not much on those sort 
of places” (133). Bill even compares the experience of visiting the place with fishing: “It 
isn’t the same as fishing, though, is it?” (133). This important scene is placed right after 
the symbolic immersion of Jake in the waters and just before his arrival at the fiesta. The 
sacred place is not simply a stop in Jake’s journey, but an important moment in which he 
has the option of choosing one path in his quest, but decides to take another. 
Roncesvalles, with its Pilgrim’s Inn and his Royal Hospital, is on the route of the 
pilgrimage to Compostela which “is associated with a […] rigorous quest for Spiritual 
renewal” (Stoneback 150, 193).22 But when Jake is with his friends “in the old chapel of 
the monastery” (133), he decides to go to the pub to talk about fishing before going to 
Pamplona for the fiesta.  
                                                
22 Stoneback refers to the “pervasive pilgrimage imagery in the novel” to differentiate 
between the pilgrimage to Santiago and the pilgrimage to Lourdes, both mentioned in the 
novel (150). The latter is focused on a physical healing and pilgrims arrive there by train 
or buses. Alternatively, Compostela is associated with a crusading medieval spirit and the 
pilgrims go there on foot. Although Stoneback affirms that Jake is a pilgrim (150), it may 
be observed that Jake in fact travels to Pamplona by train, bus and car and ignores the 
route to Santiago.  
 
 146 
 In the monastery of Roncesvalles Jake has the option of engaging with a religious 
ritual related to spiritual renewal. Instead, he decides to go to San Fermin to immerse 
himself in a festival connected to a Dionysian ritual. As Idema III argues, in The Sun Also 
Rises religion no longer functions for Jake: “[T]rout fishing and bullfighting provide Jake 
Barnes […] the peace he does not find in the church” (161).23 The question is what the 
rites of the festival offer him that sacred religious rites do not. Jake overlooks the 
possibility of religious pilgrimage to pursue the restoration of his wound, but this does 
not imply that he rejects such quest. Jake simply does not find in religion an effective 
mode: “[T]he praying had not been much of a success” (212). Instead, he decides to 
pursue his aim through the experience of a Dionysian ritual. After the scene in the 
monastery, the quester focuses on San Fermin and the largely pagan ritual of bullfighting.  
  
 
5. Pagan and Christian rituals on the way to the Chapel Perilous 
 
After their common use of immersion in the waters, connected to the ancient rite of death 
by water, Eliot and Hemingway lead their questers to the final stage of their journeys, in 
which they face the outcomes of their endeavours. Eliot uses the element of the Chapel 
Perilous from the Grail legend in which the quester will face “strange and threatening 
voices” (Weston 125). Hemingway places a scene at the end of Jake’s Spanish trip that 
                                                
23 See Helbig for critics on Hemingway and religion (105). For many critics, 
Hemingway’s religious life plays a key role in the analysis of his works. See Nickel. In 
this chapter I do not analyze the confluence between Hemingway’s personal beliefs and 
the religious experiences of their characters.  Although I do not question the influence of 
Hemingway’s beliefs in the creation of his characters, I am not interested in using a 
biographical approach in my analysis.  
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can instructively be compared to the episode of Eliot’s Chapel Perilous. On their way 
towards this final adventure in their voyages, Eliot’s and Hemingway’s questers become 
involved in distinctive rituals as a result of the nature of their respective wounds. In this 
section I shall analyze the correlation between Jake’s engagement with the pagan ritual of 
bullfighting and Eliot’s allusion to Christian rituals, and the alternative outcomes for the 
healing of the quester.24  
 When Jake returns to his hotel in Pamplona, he shakes hands with the owner and 
suddenly everything is about bullfighting: “He smiled again. He always smiled as though 
bull-fighting were a very special secret between the two of us” (SAR 136). This encounter 
presents bullfighting as a mysterious ritual in which these two characters have previously 
been involved, but this ritual cannot be considered apart from San Fermin in this novel. 
Since Jake and his friends arrived in Pamplona, “[t]he town was getting ready for the 
fiesta” (153).25 It is within the framework of this festival that bullfighting achieves 
meaning for Jake. In the narration of the events in Pamplona, Hemingway confronts the 
                                                
24 My use of the term pagan is based on two of the entries from the OED definition: “A 
person not subscribing to any major or recognized religion, […], esp. considered as 
savage, uncivilized etc” and “[a] follower of a […] nature-worshipping religion.”   
 
25 Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises almost had a different title. The book was published 
under the title Fiesta in Great Britain and it has been subsequently known there as such; 
meanwhile in the United States it has always been published under the title The Sun Also 
Rises. Other options considered by Hemingway were Two Lie Together and even For in 
Much Wisdom Is Much Grief and He that Increases Knowledge Increases Sorrow – a line 
that like The Sun Also Rises comes from Ecclesiastes. The latest edition of this novel 
published in July 2014 shows the evidence for these alternatives based on Hemingway’s 
early notes and manuscripts of the novel. Josephs, insightfully, analyses the change of 
title in terms of the dichotomy between pagan and sacred rituals. He clarifies that the 
word fiesta in English has connotations of festivity while in Spanish the word has a sense 
of religious celebration, such as the one celebrated in honour of San Fermin (166). In 
Spain, the book has always been published as Fiesta, maintaining the religious 
connotation of the word.  
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connections between bullfighting and religion. As he illustrates in Death in the 
Afternoon, bullfights usually occur in religious fiestas in honour of various saints (Kroupi 
115). Bullfights happen along with sacred religious ceremonies during the fiesta: “San 
Fermin is also a religious festival” (SAR 156), but Jake only gets involved in the pagan 
dimension of San Fermin. 
 “At noon of Sunday, the 6th of July, the fiesta exploded. […] The peasants were in 
the outlying wine-shops” (SAR 156). Jake’s first impression of the festival is that it is 
wine oriented: “Now on the day of the starting of the Fiesta of San Fermin they 
[peasants] had been in the wine-shops of the narrow streets of the town since early 
morning” (156).  The development of the action at the beginning of the fiesta turns 
around wine. Jake buys leather wine-bottles: “‘I’ll go get a couple’” (159) and interacts 
with the locals because of alcohol: “[O]ne of the men at the table looked up, brought out 
a bottle from inside his smock, and handed it to me” (162). Jake’s perception of San 
Fermin connects this festival to the Dionysian rituals of dying and reviving gods. As 
Frazer illustrates in relation to these ancient rites: 
 The god Dionysus or Bacchus is best known to us as a personification of wine 
 and of the exhilaration produced by the juice of the grape. His ecstatic worship, 
 characterized by wild dances, thrilling music, and tipsy excess, appears to have 
 originated among the rude tribes of Thrace, who were notoriously addicted to 
 drunkenness (386). 
 
In a similar way to the rites to honour this god, Jake and his friends spend the first hours 
of the festival drinking, as worshippers used to do in the Dionysian festivals: “‘What a lot 
we’ve drunk’” (SAR 163). Jake also focuses on dances reminiscent of those of the ancient 
festivals: “Down the street came dancers. The street was solid with dancers, all men. 
They were all dancing in time behind their own fifers and drummers” (158). In addition, 
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Jake’s narration also connects San Fermin to Dionysian rites when he pays attention to 
the worshippers of the festival. As Frazer clarifies, “Dionysus was conceived as a deity of 
agriculture and […] corn” (387). According to Jake’s report, in San Fermin the crowd 
involved in the dancing and drinking are mostly peasants, as he notes when remarking 
that in the first hours of the day “[m]oney still had a definitive value in hours worked and 
bushels of grain sold” (SAR 156). Jake’s account of the fiesta points to a pagan ritual 
connected to Dionysus, but Jake also explores the religious ceremonies that take place at 
the same time as all this alcoholic excess: “That afternoon was the big religious 
procession. San Fermin was translated from one church to another” (158-59). The 
episode of the festival in The Sun Also Rises reflects meaningfully on the double 
dimension of the fiesta. San Fermin is a pagan, but also a sacred festival. Jake and his 
friends become involved in the pagan rituals, but they do not participate to the same 
extent in the religious ceremonies related to Christianity.  
 They do not take part in the Christian dimension of the festival: “In the procession 
were all the dignitaries, civil and religious. We could not see them because the crowd was 
too great” (SAR 159). Jake depicts the religious element of San Fermin, but he and his 
friends do not engage in it. They try to enter the church, but cannot: “We started inside 
and there was a smell of incense and people filling back into the church, but Brett was 
stopped just inside the door because she had no hat, so we went out again” (159).  After 
this frustrated attempt at involvement in the sacred ceremonies of the festival, they go 
back to join the dancers and drinkers. From now on, San Fermin is just a pagan festival 
for Jake. He and his friends do not pay respect to the saint in the religious ceremony, but 
suddenly find themselves in a symbolic act of adoration. “They took Bill and me by the 
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arms and put us in the circle” (159). Brett also wants to be part of it, but “[t]hey wanted 
her as an image to dance around” (159). The same crowd that escorted the saint in the 
streets of Pamplona a while ago surrounds Brett and she becomes an object of veneration. 
As Fiedler argues, “Brett is surrounded by a group of riau-riau dancers, who desert a 
religious procession to follow her, set her up as a rival to Saint Fermin” (298). But Jake 
refuses to worship her and he does not engage in the dancing: “They were all chanting” 
(SAR 159). Jake does not see Brett as the people from Pamplona do. As Kataria argues in 
his reading of Brett as a priestess of love, “Pamplona dancers recognize in Brett […] a 
woman who can connect them to the generative power of the masculine” (47). On the 
contrary, Jake sees in her a symbol of his impossibility of connecting to such power. The 
worshippers keep paying respect to Brett as a symbolic image of fertility: “They had 
Brett seated on a winecask” (SAR 159) and Jake leaves the place.  
 When Jake returns to the back room of the bar, “[e]verybody has his arms on 
everybody else’s shoulders, and they were all singing” (SAR 161). All these people refuse 
to go to the mass in the church. They alternatively take part in a ritual that resembles the 
Eucharist that is happening in the church. Hemingway reflects again on the Dionysian 
and Christian dimensions of the ritualistic festival of San Fermin. As Weston argues, “we 
can show that between […] [the ancient] Mystery cults and Christianity there existed at 
one time a close and intimate union, such a union as of itself involved the practical 
assimilation of the central rite, in each case a ‘Eucharistic’ Feast, in which the 
worshippers partook of the Food and Life from the sacred vessels” (7). In the scene in the 
bar after being expelled from church, Hemingway presents a symbolic Eucharistic feast 
where people eat from a vessel: “Everybody had his arms on everybody else’s shoulders, 
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and they were all singing. Mike was sitting at a tabled with several men in their shirt-
sleeves, eating from a bowl of tuna fish, chopped onions and vinegar. They were all 
drinking wine and mopping the oil and vinegar with pieces of bread” (SAR 161). 
Communal dining and wine drinking was an integral part of Dionysian rites as much as it 
is an essential element of the Christian Eucharist and its eating of the bread and drinking 
of the wine. The Sun Also Rises presents a pagan and a Christian communal Eucharistic 
feast taking place simultaneously just a couple of streets from each other. Meaningfully 
Jake and his friends engage with the pagan ceremony. This scene underlines the 
dissociation between Christian and pagan rituals in this novel. Bullfighting should be 
understood as part of this dissociation in that it is also the dichotomy Jake struggles with 
in the Spanish trip to restore his condition.  
 Soon after his arrival at Pamplona, he dismisses the possibility of Christian 
religion succeeding in such a purpose and turns instead to Dionysian ritual. “In The Sun 
Also Rises, bullfighting represents a continuation of the cult of Dionysus” (Kataria 49). 
This mythical figure was a bull and Dionysian rites turned around the killing of the bull 
to revive this god. As Frazer explains in relation to the death of Dionysus, “[f]inally, in 
the form of a bull, he was cut to pieces by the murderous knives of his enemies” (388). In 
this novel bullfighting cannot be considered apart from its Dionysian connotation. The 
pagan nature of the ritual of bullfighting cannot be dismissed, as the historical attitude of 
the Spanish Catholic Church towards this ritual shows. As Filinich explains, “the church 
tried in different historical moments to ban bullfighting. It was considered a pagan cult 
and the catholic hierarchs forbade their believers to attend them” (112).26 In Pamplona 
                                                
26 My translation. 
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Jake sees in this pagan ritual the possibility of experiencing what he could not experience 
in the church—something that could help him overcome his condition.  
 Jake has a real afición.27 He has the necessary passion and knowledge to 
appreciate bullfighting as Montoya recognizes: “He always smiled as though there were 
something lewd about the secret to outsiders, but that it was something that we 
understood. It would not do to expose it to people who would not understand” (SAR 136). 
Jake is part of a community who share a passion for the ritual of the bullfighting. As 
Stoneback argues, this is one of the critical scenes in the novel, “confirming the bond 
between Jake and Montoya, rooted in love of bullfighting” (229). Jake experiences and 
understands the value of the feeling intrinsic to bullfights: “We often talked about bulls 
and bull-fighters. I had stopped at the Montoya for several years. We never talked for 
very long at a time. It was simply the pleasure of discovering what we each felt” (SAR 
135). This bond is to certain degree a homosocial activity and it implies the displacement 
of sexuality no longer functionally available to Jake. As Strychacz affirms, Jake tries to 
consolidate his shaky sense of masculinity by aligning himself with Pedro Romero and 
the rituals of bullfighting (283). Jake is looking for feelings that he does not have access 
to because of his wound. The question is the extent to which bullfights are a debased or 
temporary substitute for the feelings Jake cannot experience. 
 Jake engages in the ritual of bullfighting as a spectator. He has the necessary 
knowledge to be part of it. As Mitchell argues, bullfighting “requires a highly 
sophisticated understanding of animal behaviour, adherence to very specific norms and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
27 Afición is “[w]hat the aficionado has—passion, knowledge, dedication to the entire 
fiesta [of the bullfights]” (McCormick 28). 
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procedures, and a fair degree of nerve in carrying them out” (396). Jake has an 
understanding of all these requirements. He is fully aware of the procedures as he shows 
when he explains to Brett the real experience that bullfighters should transmit to the 
spectators: “[S]ince the death of Joselito all the bull-fighters had been developing a 
technique that simulated this appearance of danger in order to give a fake emotional 
feeling” (SAR 172). Jake “has this sense of the tragedy and ritual of the fight” 
(Hemingway, DIA 9) and he is able to identify a good performance in the ring. Jake sees 
in Pablo Romero a bullfighter who transmits this feeling: “Romero’s bull-fighting gave 
real emotion, because he kept the absolute purity of line in his movements and always 
quietly and calmly let the horns pass him close each time” (SAR 171). Jake recognizes in 
Romero a real matador, but there is a meaningful difference between his consideration of 
him before and after Romero falls in love with Brett. It is necessary to reflect on this 
difference to decipher the extent to which the ritual of bullfighting offers Jake the 
experience he looks for when he arrives at Pamplona for the fiesta.   
 The day of the first fight, Jake watches Romero and affirms that he is “a real one. 
There had not been a real one for a long time” (SAR 168). Jake enjoys Romero’s fight and 
he describes how “[o]utside of the ring, after the bull-fight was over, you could not move 
in the crowd […]. We had that disturbed emotional feeling that always comes after a bull-
fight, and the feeling of elation that comes after a good bull-fight” (168). Jake hints at the 
communal dimension of the ritual of bullfighting in which the performance of the 
matador is carried out in front of a crowd that experience this communal feeling. As 
McCormick argues, this ritual derives from “the universal impulse to re-enact, to repeat 
through representation, a vivid emotion or successful action […]. Ritual, then, is a 
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stylized acting out of something fully and emotionally desired by the community” (17-
18). The first day in the ring of Pamplona Romero offers Jake this vivid emotion as a 
member of the crowd.  
 In Death in the Afternoon Hemingway clarifies further the nature of this 
“emotional feeling” (SAR 168). Hemingway underlines that the spectators are always 
waiting for: 
  the faena [the fight] that takes a man out of himself and makes him feel immortal 
 while it is proceeding, that gives him an ecstasy, that is, while momentarily, as 
 profound as any religious ecstasy; moving all the people in the ring together 
 and increasing in emotional intensity as it proceeds, carrying the bullfighter 
 with it, he playing the crowd through the bull and being moved as it responds 
 in a growing ecstasy of ordered, formal, passionate, increasing disregard for 
 death. (DIA 206-07)  
 
Hemingway points to the feeling of being “out of himself” as the cornerstone of this 
ritual. At the same time he underlines the “ordered and formal” (207) nature of this 
experience. Hemingway identifies the communal ritual of bullfight with a feeling that 
transcends the disorder of experience. He pays attention to this ritual as a mode of 
experiencing the unity of feeling or “world of absolute order” (Eliot, KE 90) that is 
beyond all the contradictions and disorder of experience. Hemingway relates this feeling 
to the “disregard of death” (207). As Bergamín argues, “by an apparent act of play, when 
the bullfighter kills the bull, he is telling us that it is possible to kill death itself” (qtd. in 
Filinich 105).28 Vickery points to this feature when he explains Frazer’s analysis of the 
ancient rituals framed by the killing of the bull in which the worshipper gets into closer 
communication with the dying god: “[T]he initiate was baptismally drenched in the blood 
of a bull, after which he was regarded ‘as one who had been born again to eternal life’” 
                                                
28 My translation. 
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(64). As Josephs affirms, “Hemingway clearly understood […] that toreo was at the still 
center of sacred time, and that it was still at the center of sacred time, still part of the 
eternal present” (165).29 In his account of bullfighting, Hemingway equates disorder with 
mortality and order with immortality. The fight with the bull symbolizes a fight with 
death and the sacrifice brings to the community a unifying sense of feeling that 
transcends the contradiction between “the real world” (Eliot, KE 90) and “eternal life” 
(Vickery 64). Or—to use Bradley’s terms—the community experiences the “Absolute” 
that “is a whole superior to and embracing incomplete forms of life” (AR 213). 
Hemingway considers this momentary feeling of “absolute order” as profound “as any 
religious ecstasy” (DIA 207) and he conditions it to the performance of the sacrifice as 
happens in the Dionysian ritual. As Kroupi argues, “bullfighting in Hemingway is not a 
substitute for religion, but rather a mirror, a way to understand the religious process that 
takes place within each individual, consciously or not” (114). Romero’s fight provides 
Jake with a real emotion similar to any “religious ecstasy” (Hemingway, DIA 207) that 
somehow restores all disorder of experience he experiences outside of the ring throughout 
the entire novel. Jake is a worshipper and he focuses exclusively on this feeling 
experienced in this communal ritual. In the first fight Jake experiences a “mythical-
religious feeling of community” (Cassirer, PSF 175) that remedies all the contradictions 
of his experience of reality. This changes during the development of the events of San 
Fermin.  
                                                
29 Josephs uses Eliade’s concept of “sacred time” to argue that Elisade seems to be 
writing about bullfighting when she explains that in myths “the sacrifice, in full 
ceremonial action, abandons the profane world of mortals and introduces himself into the 
divine world of the immortals” (158-58). 
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 The second day things are different and Brett falls in love with the young matador 
as Mike predicts: “‘I believe, you know, that she’s falling in love with this bull-fighter 
chap’” (172). After that, Jake does not fully engage in the worship of Romero’s physical 
performance in the ring. In the first fight, Jake identified himself with Romero and the 
ritualistic sacrifice of the bull because it offered him a feeling that otherwise Jake could 
not experience. Once Jake knows about the relationship between Brett and Romero, he 
cannot dissociate Romero’s performance in the ring from Romero’s sexual performance 
with Brett. The ritual and the sexual are simultaneously in play in Jake’s account of 
Romero’s behaviour in the ring:  
 He loved bull-fighting, and I think he loved the bulls, and I think he loved Brett. 
 […]. Never once did he look up. He made it stronger that way, and did it for 
 himself, too, as well as for her. Because he did not look up to ask if it pleased he 
 did it all for himself inside, and it strengthened him, and yet he did it for her, too. 
 (SAR 220) 
  
 Jake merges Romero’s abilities as a bullfighter and his relationship with Brett. Romero 
is in love with her as Jake is, but the former can culminate this spiritual love with a 
physical performance that the latter cannot. Jake cannot ignore that Brett is in love with 
Romero: “I’m mad about the Romero boy. I’m in love with him, I think. […]. I can’t help 
it. I’m a goner. It’s tearing me all up inside” (187). In Pamplona, Jake pays attention to 
bullfighting as an attempt to overcome his physical wound and the impossibility of 
having sex with Brett. Once Jake cannot dissociate Romero’s physical activity in the ring 
from his sexual activity with Brett, the “real emotion” of the pagan ritual of bullfighting 
is no longer available to him.  
 The last fight ends and Romero culminates the sacrifice in a skilful way: “Then 
without taking a step forward, he became one with the bull” (SAR 224). The ritual is over 
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and Romero “leaned up against the barrera and gave the ear [of the bull] to Brett” (224). 
Romero executed the sacrifice of the bull in honour of Brett. As Kataria notes, “Romero 
thus meets Brett with the vitality and potent masculinity of a bull, the gravity and 
splendour of Dionysus” (52). Jake witnesses this event and the ritual becomes a reminder 
of his own incapability of performing in physical terms as Romero does. After the last 
fight of the festival, Jake does not experience the excitement and the “feeling of elation” 
(SAR 168) of the first day: “Bill was tired after the bull-fight. So was I” (225). In 
Pamplona, Jake has tried to remedy his condition, but the pagan ritual of bullfighting only 
offers him a temporary unifying sense of feeling that transcends the disorder of his 
experience due to his wound. The Dionysian ritual of bullfighting provides Jake only a 
debased renewal of his injured state. At the end of the festival the bullfighter only 
reminds him of his own inability to consummate his spiritual love for Brett as Romero 
does. 
 At the beginning of The Sun Also Rises Jake affirms that “[n]obody ever lives 
their life all the way up except bull-fighters” (SAR 18). This relates to his injured state 
because it is precisely what he cannot experience throughout his entire journey. Even 
before the beginning of the Spanish trip he aims to experience what bullfighters as 
Romero do. In Pamplona he immerses in the ritual of bullfighting as a member of the 
crowd and he experiences the unifying communal feeling intrinsic to Dionysian ritual. 
Initially Jake sees in bullfighting a ritual experience that for him implies the displacement 
of sexuality no longer available for him, but this changes when he cannot dissociate 
Romero’s actions in the ring from his own incapability to perform sexually with Brett. 
When she tells Jake about her relationship with Romero, she affirms: “‘I feel altogether 
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changed,’ […]. ‘You’ve no idea, Jake’” (211). She is right. Jake has no idea about this 
feeling because he cannot experience it; neither in the ring, nor in bed. The nature of 
Jake’s wound is physical and he attempts to overcome this condition by engaging in the 
distinctive physical ceremonies of the festival. He drinks, eats, dances and watches the 
bullfights, but he cannot fully consummate the initiation in the ritual to Dionysus. Neither 
is he drenched with the blood of the bull nor does he practice sex as the worshippers did 
in the culmination of the ritual that implied the reviving of the god in the ancient myth of 
Dionysus.  
 “In the morning it was all over. The fiesta was finished” (SAR 232). Jake is unsure 
about what he has experienced by engaging in the pagan festival: “The things that 
happened could only have happened during a fiesta. Everything became quite unreal 
finally and it seemed as though nothing could have any consequences. It seemed out of 
place to think of consequences during the fiesta” (158). The pilgrimage to Pamplona has 
no effects, but this is in itself a consequence for Jake. He cannot remedy his condition 
and Brett has run away with Romero. In his Spanish trip, the Dionysian ritual of San 
Fermin only brings Jake a temporary experience of the desired renewal of his condition. 
Jake could not live the “life all the way up” (18). The pagan ritual did not offer Jake the 
desired healing. Similarly, Christianity is no longer an option to remedy Jake’s state as he 
recognizes at the end of the novel: “‘Some people have God,’ I said. ‘Quite a lot’” (249). 
Jake is not one of them.30 Jake does not experience “a world of absolute order” (Eliot, KE 
90) as he aimed for when he left behind his Paris life, full of contradiction and disorder.  
                                                
30 For an alternative reading of these words, see Vopat. 
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 After the festival, Jake continues his trip and finally arrives alone in San 
Sebastian. The second day he has “coffee and the papers in bed” (241) before going to 
the beach for a bath. Some critics have read this symbolic immersion in the waters as a 
moment of recovery after the festival of Pamplona.31 However, the end of the novel 
dismantles any consideration of Jake’s renewal in his Spanish trip. When Jake comes 
back to the hotel from the beach he receives a telegram from Brett. She is in Madrid and 
needs his help. Jake decides to go there, but before leaving he writes a telegram “and 
sign[s] the wire with love. That was it all right” (243). Jake decides to help Brett even 
though he could leave her in Madrid. He decides to take the train to comfort her. When 
Jake arrives, he has to deal with the very same problem that he has faced throughout the 
entire Spanish trip. In his conversation with Brett in the Madrid hotel after leaving the 
young bullfighter, Jakes confronts the fact that he will never be with Brett: “I went to the 
bed and put my arms around her. She kissed me, and while she kissed me I could feel she 
was thinking of something else” (245). He is still in love with her and he is still wounded. 
 At the end of The Sun Also Rises the quester is not able to find the cure for the 
health of the Fisher King. Sitting in a cab, in physical contact with Brett, Jake remains 
hopelessly in the same situation that he was in Paris before endeavouring to find a 
remedy for his infirmity: “Brett moved close to me. We sat against each other. I put my 
arm around her and she rested against me comfortably” (SAR 251). In the last scene of 
the novel, Hemingway leads Jake to confront the outcomes of his quest. Hemingway sets 
                                                
31 Lewis argues that Jake makes almost a ritual of baptism from this symbolic bath in the 
beach after the disappointing end of the partly pagan fiesta of Pamplona (qtd. in 
Stoneback 281). Stoneback reads this scene as a secular variation on the theme of 
baptism to state that “Jake’s swimming serves as a culmination of the novel’s pattern of 
bathing imagery and as fulfillment of his need for a deep bath” (281). For further 
commentaries on this scene, see Daiker.  
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at the end of the narration, organized around events borrowed from the Grail legend, a 
scene that instructively may be compared to the episode of the Chapel Perilous. As 
Weston illustrates, once the quester arrives at the Chapel “a voice makes lamentations 
loud and dire” (Weston 125). Jake has to listen to Brett’s lamentations: “‘Oh, Jake,’ Brett 
said, ‘we could have had such a damned good time together’” (251). Jake has to deal with 
Brett’s words as the final statement of his inability to heal his condition: “‘Yes,’ I said. 
‘Isn’t it pretty to think so?’” (251). In The Sun Also Rises the quester does not find the 
cure to rejuvenate the health of the Fisher King and undertake the renewal of the land.  
 In the last stanza of The Waste Land Eliot also depicts the Fisher King facing his 
failed attempt to revert his condition: “Fishing, with the arid plain behind me?/Shall I at 
least set my lands in order?” (CPP 50). The king is still ill and he contemplates his 
decayed country. But Eliot includes the presence of a spiritual figure to reflect on the 
impossibility for the quester to find the cure to heal the king and remedy the situation of 
the land: “When I count, there are only you and I together/ But when I look ahead up the 
white road/There is always another one walking beside you” (48). 32 The quester walks 
along with a spiritual presence on his way to the Chapel Perilous: “Who is the third who 
walks always beside you?” (48). Eliot sets a non-physical element in the road toward the 
key moment in the Chapel Perilous. He relates the success of the quester’s goal to the 
eventual experience of this spiritual element, but this element is only an illusion.33 Eliot 
                                                
32 In the final notes of the poem, Eliot clarifies how “[i]n the first part of Part V three 
themes are employed: the journey to Emmaus, the approach to the Chapel Perilous […] 
and the present decay of eastern Europe” (CPP 53). 
 
33 “The following lines were stimulated by the account of one of the Antarctic 
expeditions […]: it was related that the party of explorers, at the extremity of their 
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refers to the road to Emmaus and the resurrection appearances of Christ after his 
crucifixion, but Christ is not in the final steps of the quester’s journey: “He who was 
living is now dead” (47). There is no reviving of the god.  
 The presence of Christ on the way to the chapel is only a false impression. As 
Vickery argues, Eliot alludes to Christ and the Christian ritual of crucifixion connected to 
the episode of the garden of Gethsemane (264-65). Eliot points to this ritual of sacrifice: 
“After the frosty silence in the gardens/After the agony in stony places/The shouting and 
the crying/Prison and palace and reverberation” (CPP 47). But, at the same time, Eliot 
underlines its unsuccessful performance: “We who were living are now dying/With a 
little patience/ Here is no water but only rock” (47). Eliot relates the stony landscape of a 
country where people are “dying” (47) to the failed attempt at reviving Christ that “now 
is dead” (47).  Eliot deploys a frustrated pattern connected to the ancient rites of dying 
and reviving god, but as happens in The Sun Also Rises, it does not lead to the desired 
outcome of renewal. The people from the stony country cannot experience the 
resurrection of Christ.   
 “What the Thunder Said” presents the failed attempt of the quester to reverse the 
situation of the land. As soon as he arrives at his destination he has to face how “[t]here is 
the empty chapel, only the wind’s home” (CPP 49). The trip of the quester comes to an 
end. He has to confront the outcomes of his endeavour and he is only left with the hollow 
sounds of the thunder. Like Jake in the final scene of The Sun Also Rises, Eliot’s quester 
has to acknowledge the “voice [that] makes lamentations loud and dire” (Weston 125) 
                                                                                                                                            
strength, had the constant delusion that there was one more member than could be 
counted” (CPP 54). 
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borrowed from the episode of the Chapel Perilous. These sounds are the final statement 
of the impossibility for him to achieve the renewal.   
 The sounds of thunder promise an experience connected to the higher or spiritual 
source of life. As Eliot clarifies in the notes to the poem, the references to the three “DA” 
(CPP 49) sounds are related to the fable of the Thunder found in a section of the 
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. In this passage, God introduces three sets of messages with 
the syllable DA. Unfortunately these words are useless sounds for the quester as he 
cannot answer the questions posted by the thunder. Instead, he can only react physically 
to those sounds: “DA/Datta: what have we given?/My friend, blood shaking my heart” 
(CPP 49). Those sounds do not have the desired effect on the quester and he cannot 
achieve restoration and spiritual rebirth (Smith 93).34 In Eliot’s poem the voice in the 
chapel reminds the quester of his inability to experience this moment “where man is 
made one with God” (Weston 130). Eliot points to a unifying sense of feeling connected 
to the spiritual rather than the physical, as also happens in Hemingway’s novel.  
 Eliot ends The Waste Land with an image that underlines the disorder of 
experience. This image reminds us of the fragmented land he depicts in the first part of 
the poem. Like Hemingway in The Sun Also Rises, Eliot finishes this work with a similar 
confusion to that depicted in the first sections of the poem. The end of The Waste Land 
shows the Fisher King witnessing a fragmented experience of reality that he has not been 
able to reverse: “These fragments I have shored against my ruins” (CPP 50). After that, 
Eliot confronts the disarray of this image with the harmony of  “Shantih shantih shantih” 
                                                
34 In his notes, Eliot relates this line to the chapter on the Fisher King in Weston’s book 
on the Grail legend (CPP 54). 
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(50). By using this word in the very last sentence, Eliot reflects on a transcendent 
perspective that will only be achieved through a spiritual exercise, as he notes when 
explaining that Shantih means “‘The peace which passeth understanding’” (CPP 54). 
This transcendent perspective is—using Bradley’s terms—“the Absolute” or the 
experience of a feeling that transcends “all differences of incomplete forms of life” (AR 
213). Eliot aims for this feeling and relates this experience to the reviving of Christ. 
 According to “What the Thunder Said” the only way of overcoming the situation 
Eliot confronts in The Waste Land is through a spiritual experience. He claims to move 
beyond the boundaries of the material world to “come into contact with this world of 
absolute order” (Eliot, KE 90). Alternatively, Hemingway ends The Sun Also Rises with 
Jake concerned with a physical experience of reality that he hopes will overcome the 
disorder of his experience. In their later works, Eliot and Hemingway developed further 
the conclusions they outline in The Waste Land and The Sun Also Rises. In the next 
section I shall analyze how Eliot’s “The Hollow Men” and Hemingway’s A Farewell to 
Arms relate to the distinctive paths they point out in their reflections on a unifying sense 
of feeling as a way of transcending the disorder of experience.  
 
 
6. After the empty chapel 
 
In “The Hollow Men” (1925) Eliot reflects on a rotten spiritual condition as he does in 
The Waste Land; but, whereas in the earlier poem Eliot dwelt on the condition of society 
through the individual figure of the Fisher King, in this poem he looks at a cluster of 
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individuals: “We are the hollow men/We are the stuffed men/Leaning together” (CPP 
56). Their experience of reality is meaningless: “Alas! Our dried voices, when/We 
whisper together/ Are quiet and meaningless” (56).35 Eliot represents the meaningless of 
that common world of experience while at the same time alluding to the kingdom of God: 
“For Thine is the kingdom” (CPP 59).36 Eliot depicts two worlds, the “here” and the 
“there” (57-58). In the former the “empty men” inhabit “the dead land” and they can only 
hope “[o]f death’s twilight kingdom” (58). In the latter the men can face the “other 
Kingdom” (57). Eliot opposes the material world to the world of the divine.  
 The poet depicts the hollow men “in this valley of dying stars/In this hollow 
valley” (CPP 58); but, at the same time, he points to the “lost kingdoms” where the lost 
unity of the “Multifoliate rose” may be contemplated beyond the “deliberate disguises” 
(57) of the material world. As Kwan-Terry explains, in this poem “[p]ersonal experience 
remains entrapped in immediate actualities and desires, unable to see beyond them, or 
seeing them unable to authenticate any felt sense of order” (133). In “The Hollow Men” 
Eliot seeks to lead the individual to the experience of some sort of order or unity. As 
Bradley explains in Essays on Truth and Reality when reflecting on the very same 
confrontation explored by Eliot in this poem, in the world of objects it is necessary “to 
understand, to make good ideally our lost unity” (ETR 313). When Eliot introduces the 
image of the rose, he alludes to the experience of this unity; but, in the world of the 
hollow men “pertual start’ and ‘multifoliate rose’ are nothing but images. Whereas some 
                                                
35 As Williamson notes this part indicates a church service (156). Eliot presents the 
secular ritual of the service as a meaningless action performed mechanically.  
 
36 For Jain, this line refers to the Lord’s Prayer, taught by Jesus to his disciples. “The 
three important elements in it are praise, petition, and a yearning for the coming of the 
kingdom of God” (209).  
 165 
dare to look to the “last of meeting places” to be the image they contemplate and 
experience that unity, Eliot depicts modern men as unable to experience the state of 
consciousness symbolized by ‘the multifoliate rose’: “Head piece filled with straw” (CPP 
56). Eliot stresses the necessity of making this lost unity an ideal to be experienced 
amidst desolation. Eliot defends a religious experience related to this ideal order as the 
only possible escape from the “Shadow” (58) in which the hollow men are trapped in the 
material world.  
 Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms shares with Eliot’s “The Hollow Men” the 
consideration of a rotten world. At the very end of the novel Catherine confesses to 
Frederic before dying in childbirth: “I’m all broken. They’ve broken me. I know it now” 
(323), and he has to accept that: “‘Everybody is that way’” (323). While the poet refers to 
the ideal of the lost kingdom to overcome this situation, Hemingway focuses on the 
material world. In A Farewell to Arms Frederic Henry cannot experience God. As Idema 
explains, “this novel depicts the horrors of loss and separation, and abandonment, horrors 
that are intensified by the feeling of God’s absence” (157). Frederic dismisses religion 
when among the landscapes of destruction originated by war: “I had expected to become 
devout myself but it has not come” (FTA 263). When the priest of the battalion 
encourages Frederic to love God: “You should love Him” (72), he answers that he 
doesn’t “love much” (72). The priest disagrees with him: “‘Yes’ he said. ‘You do.’ […] 
‘When you love you wish to do things for. You wish to sacrifice for. You wish to serve’” 
(72). But Frederic does not have anything to do for. He is a deserter.   
 Frederic does not believe in anything anymore. Frederic has deserted from the war 
as a result of his disillusionment with the values he thought he was fighting for. He does 
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not believe in any ideal represented by an abstract word he cannot experience: “I was 
always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice” (FTA 184). Frederic 
engaged in the war thinking of those ideals, but he has heard those words so many times 
amidst the horrors of the war that they do not mean anything to him: “We had heard 
them, sometimes standing in the rain almost out of earshot, so that only the shouted 
words came through, and had read them, on proclamations that were slapped up by 
billposters over other proclamations, now for a long time” (185). He is tired of fighting 
for those ideals. These words are only another set of proclamations as “meaningless” as 
the voices of the hollow men in Eliot’s poem: “Abstract words such as glory, honor, 
courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of 
roads, and the names of the rivers” (185). Frederic confronts the abstract with the 
physical. He refuses to live his life according to such an abstract hollow set of ideals.  
 Once Frederic realizes the meaninglessness of his acts in the war, he renounces it. 
He is not a hero as he insists: “‘Did you do any heroic act?’ ‘No,’ […]. ‘I was blown up 
while we were eating cheese’” (FTA 63). Once Frederic loses faith in the thing he fought 
for, he focuses on his relationship with Catherine: “‘My life used to be full of 
everything,’ I said. ‘Now if you aren’t with me I haven’t a thing in the world’” (257). As 
Spanier argues, it is necessary to find meaning “in a world where the traditional 
structures—morality, religion, patriotism—have proven hollow and empty, even 
‘obscene’” (134). Frederic deserts after his awareness of this lack of meaning in his life.  
His love for Catherine gives sense to it: “‘You’re my religion. You’re all I’got’” (FTA 
116). 
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 Frederic cannot find any value in life apart from his love for Catherine as he 
recognizes when the Count asks him,“‘[w]hat do you value most?’” (FTA 262) and he 
answers: “‘Someone I love’” (262). When she dies, Frederic’s life does not make much 
sense. He loses everything and his existence lacks any purpose. Apart from her, life is 
senseless for the main character and Hemingway finishes the novel with Frederic looking 
directly into the hollowness of a futile experience of reality: “‘There is nothing to say’” 
(332). Even though Frederic values life itself—“‘‘[b]ecause it is all I have’” (262)—, 
once Catherine is gone, he does not know how to live it. Without his love for her, 
Frederic has no one “to do things for,” no one “to sacrifice for” (72) as the priest of the 
battalion argues in relation to love for God.  
 In A Farewell to Arms Hemingway is concerned with how to live in the material 
world, ignoring anything beyond it. “You died. You did not know what it was about. You 
never had time to learn. They threw you in and told you the rules and the first time they 
caught you off base they killed you” (327). This reflection at the very end of the novel 
clearly shows Hemingway’s concern with the regeneration of experience to achieve a 
reality that is meaningful. As Owens-Murphy notes, Frederic and Catherine live in a 
world where the traditional sources of meaning are no longer effective and they attempt 
to forge this situation wherever they can (97). But they focus on the realm of the physical 
and how to live in the material world.  
 Frederic is constantly concerned with doing the right thing, first, in the war as a 
soldier and later in his relationship with Catherine. But when he does not have things to 
live for, his life lacks meaning. Frederic is interested in how to act in this world, 
neglecting any consideration beyond it. He relates his behaviour in this world to the 
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meaning of his existence. But Frederic finishes the novel without finding any ideal 
according to which to act meaningfully.37 As Rudy states, Hemingway wrote A Farewell 
to Arms to evoke and provoke an experience, not to defend any position (86). This 
experience points to the necessity of having a code of behaviour to develop a meaningful 
existence. In his later works Hemingway develop further this feature to focus on moral 
experiences, as I shall explore in the next chapter.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
My analysis of Eliot’s The Waste Land and Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises concludes 
in four main points that I consider crucial to an understanding of the interest of these two 
authors in a “mythical-religious feeling of community” (Cassirer, PSF 175). First, Eliot 
and Hemingway represent a disorder of experience in a distinctive urban world. They 
consider this situation as a temporary circumstance to be overcome through the pursuit of 
a “world of absolute order” (Eliot, KE 90). Second, this led them to look towards 
mythical figures in their attempt to reach such order. They use the myth of the Fisher 
King along with some elements of the ancient myth of the dying and reviving god. In 
addition, they explore the rites tied to those myths. Third, while Eliot focuses on 
                                                
37 Some critics have related this code of behaviour to morals in order to understand 
Frederic’s experiences in this novel. Lewis affirms that Hemingway reveals the 
ambiguity of the important moral questions in this novel (158), Martin suggests that this 
novel deals with the problems of ethics and moral values under modern conditions (168) 
and Rudy affirms that morality is more relevant than any theodicy and ideology to 
capture the sense of the novel (76).  
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Christian rituals, Hemingway’s is on the pagan ritual of bullfighting. The engagement 
with Christian rituals disposes the poet to move beyond the boundaries of the material 
world. Alternatively, the writer of fiction remains trapped in the physical level of reality 
in the aim of a unifying sense of feeling as a way of transcending the disorder of 
experience. Finally, Eliot points to religious experiences as a mode of overcoming the 
condition of the inhabitants of the waste land. Alternatively, Hemingway looks at an 
experience resulting from the individual’s behaviour in the material world. In the next 
chapter, I shall analyze the extent to which the different nature of these experiences 
conditions Eliot’s and Hemingway’s approaches towards the social world
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Chapter Four 
Towards Social Cohesion: Eliot’s Religion and Hemingway’s 
Politics 
  
  
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter’s concern is with religious faith and political ideology in the work of Eliot 
and Hemingway.1 Whereas the previous chapter examined the extent to which Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s attraction to a unifying sense of feeling led the former to consider religious 
experiences and the latter to reflect on experiences resulting from the individual’s 
behaviour in the material world, in this chapter I shall focus on how these experiences 
trigger Eliot’s interest in religious feelings and Hemingway’s interest in moral feelings. 
Reber depicts the difficulty of isolating precise usages for the term feeling, but he notes 
that “[i]n the most general, feeling refers to ‘experiencing,’ ‘sensing’ or having a 
conscious process” (272). In previous chapters I used the term feeling according to 
Bradley’s concept of immediate feeling as the state that transcends the contradictions of 
                                                
1 In this chapter the use of the word ideology is based on the OED’s entry that defines its 
meaning as “[a] systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, economics, or 
society and forming the basis of action or policy; a set of beliefs governing conduct” 
(OED). I am specifically interested in the analysis of the correlation between the social 
conduct of Hemingway’s characters and the political ideas confronted by the author in his 
work. To know more about the evolution of the different meanings of the word ideology, 
see Raymond Williams’ Keywords 153-55.          
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the material world. In this chapter I conceptualize this term within Eliot’s reflections on 
religious feelings as a conscious experience in which the individual is in communion with 
God. Alternatively, I pay attention to the term feeling in relation to Hemingway within 
the framework of physical experiences that make the individual experience certain 
feelings that Hemingway qualified as moral. Particularly, Hemingway conditions the 
experience of these feelings to a physical conduct performed out of a sense of duty. First, 
I want to explore the nature of these feelings within the framework of the distinctive 
experiences considered by Eliot and Hemingway. Second, I want to focus on the extent to 
which these feelings imply the interrelation between the individual and society. Finally, I 
shall analyze this relationship considering Eliot’s religious faith and Hemingway’s 
political ideology and their respective propositions for social cohesion.2 
 Under the influence of Bradley, Eliot considered that “[f]rom first to last, Reality 
is experience” (KE 165) and he reflected on feelings as the access to this reality. Eliot 
explains that “[w]e come to interpret our own experience as the attention to a world of 
objects, as we feel obscurely an identity between the experiences of other centres and our 
own. And it is this identity which gradually shapes itself into the external world. […] 
Thus in adjusting our behaviour to that of others and in cooperating with them we come 
to intend an identical world” (KE 143). The external world cannot be dissociated from the 
individual that experiences it. This experience and its intrinsic feelings conform to “this 
identical world” (Eliot, KE 143), collectively developed.   
                                                
2 In the previous chapter I used the word society in its most abstract sense, referring to the 
conditions in which institutions are formed. In this chapter I reflect on society in relation 
to a specific “body of institutions and relationships within which […] a group of people 
live” (Williams, Keywords 291). Particularly, I analyze the correlation between the 
different institutions Eliot and Hemingway considered to guarantee social cohesion and 
the distinctive ways of feeling shared by the members of that society.  
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 In The Idea of a Christian Society (1939) Eliot engages with this premise about 
the “identical world” (Eliot, KE 143). Eliot affirms that “[i]t is only in a society with a 
religious basis […] that you can get the proper harmony and tension, for the individual or 
for the community” (ICS 68). Eliot reflects on the same idea he argued more than twenty 
years before in relation to Bradley’s theory of experience, but he looks into religion as 
guarantor of this “identical world” (KE 143) that maintains a communal experience of 
reality. Eliot’s engagement with religious feelings in his later poetry cannot be separated 
from his theoretical reflections on the experience of reality. For Brooker, “[o]n a purely 
intellectual level, Bradley’s idealism is a scheme that works, a scheme that in 
fundamental ways is consistent with the religious scheme Eliot accepted in 1927” 
(Mastery 136).3 In the poetry Eliot wrote after that year, Bradley’s “Absolute” (AR 213) 
is a fundamental element of this “identical world” (KE 143) that Eliot conceived as a 
Christian society. Eliot adopted the Christian God as the ideal that transcends all the 
contradictions of the material world as Bradley argued in relation to the “Absolute” 
(213). In his later poetry Eliot engaged with Bradley’s appeal “to make good ideally our 
lost unity” (ETR 313), but he identified this ideal unity with the divine Christ. It is 
necessary to take it into account to gain an understanding of his later exploration of 
religious feelings along with his considerations of society. One cannot be understood 
without the other. To decipher this correlation I will consider Eliot’s concept of 
“tradition” (SP 38) within this context as far as it is also concerned with the assumption 
of an ideal unity.   
                                                
3 In 1927 Eliot became a member of the Church of England. For one detailed explanation 
of this event and its importance in Eliot’s life and work, see Gordon.  
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 Eliot did most of his reflecting on tradition in his essay “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” (1919) and in After Strange Gods (1934).4 In the former, Eliot focuses 
on developing a definition of a literary tradition. In the latter, along with this matter, he 
also offers important hints about the correlation between tradition and society. He 
explains that tradition deals with “what in the past is worth preserving and what should 
be rejected; and what conditions, within our power to bring about, would foster the 
society that we desire” (ASG 19). In these essays, Eliot frames his analysis of tradition 
within two key features. First, he argues that tradition cannot be something static, but 
rather it should be in a dynamic movement from the past to the present. He warns about 
the danger of “associat[ing] tradition with the immovable” (ASG 18). Second, he reflects 
on tradition as “a way of feeling” (29) intrinsic to a community. As Fabricius elucidates, 
Eliot argued that “any member of a living civilization is subject to a complicated network 
of influences that operate on the individual’s mind […] in accordance to a specific 
cultural pattern developed by the chain of previous generations” (74). Individual feelings 
are ways of feeling developed in the past, but still working in the present because, as 
Eliot argues, “the truth [is] that not our feelings, but the pattern which we may make of 
those feelings, is the centre of value” (qtd. in Bush 82). The survival of this continuous 
pattern depends on the maintenance of a tradition executed generation after generation. In 
his later poetry Eliot focuses on religious feelings as part of a tradition that brings the 
experience of the divine as the cornerstone of an “identical world” (KE 143) that makes 
the experience of reality meaningful. He “believe[s] that a right tradition for us must be 
also a Christian tradition” (ASG 21) and it is necessary to take this into account to read 
                                                
4 After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy is a compilation of three conferences 
that Eliot delivered in Virginia in 1933. 
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his later poetry, focused on religious feelings, as part of Eliot’s reflections on society.   
 Hemingway also looked at tradition, but he focused on the tradition of 
bullfighting. After A Farewell to Arms Hemingway showed in his work the necessity of 
finding a new ideal according to which the individual may act in the material world. He 
found in bullfighting such an ideal. In a letter Hemingway wrote to Edward J. O’Brian, 
he asks him: “Do you remember me talking one thing…about the necessity for finding 
some people that by their actual physical conduct gave you a real feeling of admiration 
[…]? Well I have got a hold of it in bullfighting” (qtd. in Josephs 153). The performance 
of the bullfighters in the ring offers Hemingway a feeling of admiration that he related to 
morals in Death in the Afternoon:  
 So far, about morals, I know that what is moral is what you feel good after and 
 what is immoral is what you feel bad after and judged by these moral standards, 
 […], the bullfight is very moral to me because I feel very fine while it is going on 
 and have the feeling of life and death and mortality and immortality, and after it is 
 over I feel very sad but very fine. (4)  
 
The bullfighter performs in the ring regardless of the outcome for his life. Hemingway 
finds this behaviour appealing and it makes him experience a feeling that he relates to 
such behaviour. The real value that Hemingway finds in the tradition of bullfighting rests 
on the fight executed by the individual in the ring no matter what may happen to his life. 
Death is not important for the matador. He is only focused on carrying out the physical 
fight. The bullfighter acts for the sake of the performance itself. The matador’s duty is 
towards this performance, nothing else. The bullfighter has an ideal to act for and 
Hemingway found this “very moral” (4). Colvert contends that Hemingway attempted to 
reconstruct a value system on a new principle based on action; he sought to find a new 
morality in action (376). The tradition of bullfighting gave Hemingway the ideal he was 
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looking for to act in the material world. He borrowed from this tradition the consideration 
of an action performed out of a sense of duty as the ideal for his morality. Hemingway 
related the accomplishment of a duty through physical conduct to the experience of moral 
feelings. The understanding of these feelings is highly relevant to Hemingway’s later 
reflections on a soldier’s performance in war and his duty toward a political ideology. 
 My intention in this chapter is to demonstrate how Eliot’s interest in religious 
feelings and Hemingway’s concern with moral feelings conditioned their respective 
propositions for social cohesion. In the first section I identify how Eliot focuses on the 
Christian tradition as mode of guaranteeing a “way of feeling” that he discerns within the 
feelings experienced by the individual in the pursuit of the ideal order of the divine. I 
analyze the Ariel Poems and Ash-Wednesday (1930) along with the play The Family 
Reunion (1939) to reflect on the extent to which individual religious feelings bring about 
a common way of feeling shared by a community. In section two, I reflect on how 
Hemingway wrote about the tradition of bullfighting. I analyze “The Capital of the 
World” and “The Undefeated” to show Hemingway’s interest in moral feelings intrinsic 
to actions performed by the individual out of a sense of duty. In addition, I read To Have 
and Have Not alongside the Kantian concept of “moral action” (Warburton 41) to reflect 
on Hemingway’s concern with a community in which there is no common moral sense of 
duty apart from self-interest relating to economical survival. In the last section I analyze 
Hemingway’s The Fifth Column and For Whom the Bell Tolls, alongside Eliot’s Murder 
in the Cathedral. These works share a concern with the dyad formed by the individual 
and society, under the conception of an ideal whole that conditions the actions of that 
individual within society. 
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2. Eliot, religious feelings and the Christian tradition 
 
Eliot’s reflections on “tradition” show a concern with a “way of feeling” (ASG 29) that is 
in constant reference to the past and to the present. This “awareness of the past” (SP 39) 
in the present makes the individual experience merge into a way of feeling that, 
according to Eliot, should have “a unity of religious background” (ASG 18). Therefore, 
this section focuses on the Ariel Poems and Ash-Wednesday (1930) along with the play 
The Family Reunion (1939) to analyze the correlation between Eliot’s concern with 
religious feelings and his reflections on tradition.5 The study of this relationship will 
clarify the extent to which Eliot’s interest in these feelings cannot be properly understood 
without taking into account his engagement with the Christian tradition.  
 After the frustrated attempt at spiritual restoration depicted in The Waste Land and 
“The Hollow Men,” Eliot’s poetry moves towards the experience of religious feelings. In 
the previous poems the absence of these feelings was a result of the impossibility of 
overcoming the disorder of experience of the material world. In these later poems, Eliot 
engages with experiences beyond these limitations to confront the difficulties involved in 
such a process. In “Marina” Eliot talks about “[l]iving to live in a world of time beyond 
me; let me/Resign my life for this life” (73).6 In Ash-Wednesday Eliot explores the 
                                                
5 The Ariel Poems are composed of “Journey of the Magi” (1927), “A Song for Simeon” 
(1928), “Animula” (1929) and “Marina” (1930). For the publication history of both the 
Ariel Poems and Ash-Wednesday, see Southam.  
 
6 Many critics have read Eliot’s work in relation to Christianity, especially the poems he 
wrote after 1927. My point of departure is connected to the critics Matthiessen, Moody or 
Grover Smith. I read the Ariel Poems and Ash-Wednesday as an introduction to Eliot’s 
exploration of the feelings connected to the love for God. As Moody argues, the lyric 
force of these poems “arises from the same need to conform love to the Word” (132). I 
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struggles involved in the renunciation of a material world where “time is always time” 
and “place is always and only place” (CPP 66), but this exploration of self-transcendence 
or pursuit of an ideal order cannot be dissociated from Eliot’s embracing of the Christian 
tradition.  
 In “Tradition” Eliot demands from a poet “a continual surrender of himself as he 
is at the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a 
continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality” (SP 40). A poet must 
undertake such a process to reach this something “more valuable” that Eliot identifies 
with a literary tradition. The need to overcome individual consciousness conforms to the 
sphere of a tradition, and in this sphere the poet is subsumed under a more important 
“whole” (38). It allows the leap in which that “something […] more valuable” (SP 40) 
becomes a conscious experience in the individual mind, but also as part of a common 
experience. Eliot’s concept of tradition—and its constant interaction between past and 
present—implies an “ideal order” (SP 38) in which individual experience is 
simultaneously part of a collective experience. As Eliot affirms in relation to tradition, 
“the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his 
                                                                                                                                            
engage this line of argumentation with Eliot’s reflection on “tradition” (SP 38). Childs 
also develops, in broadly similar terms, this correlation; but I make a case for Eliot’s 
interest in religious feelings as the key element in a distinctive Christian tradition, and the 
extent to which it requires an elite of members that make it a conscious experience within 
society. Eliot’s new commitment to Christianity was clear after the publication of The 
Waste Land. He became interested in the salvation of his soul, but he was equally 
concerned about the fate of a society moving towards secularism (Cooper, Introduction 
26). This concern and his membership of the Church of England made him aware of the 
Christian duty to defend his faith. This change of attitude led him to explore not only in 
his poetry, but especially in his plays, the commitment to communicate the Christian 
faith. His embracing of the Christian tradition made him write as a practising Christian. 
For a full account of how this took form in his plays, see Jones.   
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bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and 
within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and 
composes a simultaneous order” (SP 38). In the Ariel Poems Eliot also suggests the 
constant interaction between past and present in the aim for an ideal order that is beyond 
the self. Similarly, Eliot claims for a “surrender” of the personal to reach “something 
more valuable” (CPP 38), but this time, the “ideal order” is the divine intrinsic to the 
Christian tradition.   
 The title “Journey of the Magi” refers to the biblical story of the three wise men 
travelling to meet the newborn Jesus. Eliot depicts a journey towards a new beginning or 
“Birth” (CPP 69). This pilgrimage arrives at an end and the wise men face the fact that 
“[t]here was a Birth, certainly” (69). However, one of the three men seems not to be sure 
about how to handle such a realization. “We returned to our places, these kingdoms,/But 
no longer at ease here, in the old dispensation” (69). As Grover Smith maintains, “[t]he 
speaker has reached the end of one world, but despite his acceptance of the revelation as 
valid, he cannot gaze into a world beyond his own” (124).  The poem claims for the 
restoration of Christianity, symbolized in the poem as a new birth, but Eliot also alludes 
to the difficulties of the journey within a landscapes of “cities hostile and the towns 
unfriendly/[…]/A hard time we had of it” (CPP 68). The poem emphasizes how it was 
“[j]ust the worst time of the year/For a journey, and such a long journey” (68). In the first 
of the Ariel Poems Eliot reflects on the Christian tradition as a continuous process in 
which the necessary correlation between past and present results from the pursuit of the 
“ideal order” (SP 38) symbolized in the divine Christ. The wise men represent the 
continuous pilgrimage towards such an ideal, but this journey is a collective experience, 
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as Eliot points out in “A Song for Simeon.”  
 In the second of The Ariel Poems Eliot refers to the maintenance of Christianity as 
a communal task that should be undertaken from generation to generation. Eliot notes 
that “according” to Christ’s word “[t]hey shall praise Thee and suffer in every 
generation” (CPP 70), but Simenon remains excluded from this task even though he is 
aware of it. He decides that “not for me the martyrdom, the ecstasy of thought and 
prayer” (70). As Kwan-Terry states, “Simenon does not connect with the congregation of 
believers” (133). Eliot uses Simenon to stress the struggles involved in such an 
enterprise. The suffering is intrinsic to the conquering of the divine, as Eliot underlines in 
“Animula” when he refers to “[t]he pain of living” (CPP 71). The characters in this poem 
are distressed because they are only concerned with “power” and “fortune” (71). They are 
exclusively focused on the mundane. Eliot suggests that they need to move beyond this 
situation to rejoin in the journey towards the new “birth” (71). They need to abandon “the 
drug of dreams” (71). They should engage in this pilgrimage in order to leave the 
“Shadow of its own shadows” (71). Eliot ends the poem by pointing to Christ who will 
“[p]ray for us now and at the hour of our birth” (71). According to the poem Christ is the 
only possibility to enable us to leave such a scene of agony. The divine is at the core of 
the experience of reality explored in these poems, but not all the characters are aware of it 
to the same extent. These poems conform to Eliot’s reflection on the renewal of the 
Christian tradition and the need to make it a conscious experience for the whole 
community, as he claimed in Ash-Wednesday.   
 In After Strange Gods Eliot writes that “a tradition is rather a way of feeling and 
acting which characterizes a group throughout generations; and that it must largely be, or 
 180 
that many of the elements in it must be, unconscious” (29). In “The Function of 
Criticism” (1923) Eliot affirms that “[b]etween the true artists of any time there is […] an 
unconscious community,” but he also points out that with “a conscious attempt” this 
community can be brought about consciously (SP 68-69). Eliot suggests that to a certain 
extent tradition remains at an unconscious level, but eventually it is necessary to make it 
a conscious experience. In Ash-Wednesday Eliot undertakes a conscious attempt to 
experience religious feelings buried in the unconscious of a community. He aims to 
“[make] this unknowing half conscious, unknown, my own” (CPP 72). As he wrote in 
“The Social Function of Poetry” (1943), “[t]he trouble of the modern age is not merely 
the inability to believe certain things about God and man which our forefathers believed, 
but the inability to feel towards God and man as they did” (qtd. in Smidt 173). In Ash-
Wednesday Eliot strives for a conscious experience of religious feelings towards God, but 
within the framework of the Christian tradition.  
 In a letter written in 1930—the same year of the publication of Ash-Wednesday—
Eliot offers to his confessor an explanation of the aims he pursues in this poem. These 
lines accurately clarify the sort of feelings the poet was working with at that time: 
  Between the usual subjects of poetry and ‘devotional’ verse there is a very 
 important field still very unexplored by modern poets—the experience of a man in 
 search of God, and trying to explain to himself his intenser human feelings in 
 terms of the divine goal. I have tried to do something of that in ‘Ash-Wednesday.’ 
 (qtd. in Bush 131) 
 
In this attempt to clarify the value of the poem, Eliot underlines how the search for the 
divine simultaneously encloses individual feeling and God: “Because I cannot hope to 
turn again/Consequently I rejoice, having to construct something/Upon which to 
rejoice/And pray to God to have mercy upon us” (CPP 60-61). The nature of the feelings 
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that Eliot explores is an intense experience that emerges in “the time of tension between 
dying and birth” (66). God is the goal of the individual love that goes beyond the 
boundaries of the experience of the self. Only in the pursuit of those feelings can the self 
be in connection with something that is beyond the limitation of his own individual 
experience. The religious feelings explored by Eliot in Ash-Wednesday imply the 
transcendence of the individual consciousness to the same extent that the pursuit of the 
ideal order of tradition leads the individual towards something more valuable that is 
beyond himself. In addition, Eliot equates the aim of this ideal order with the experience 
of religious feelings, but always as part of a collective experience shared by the group: 
“Our peace in his Will” (CPP 67).  Eliot’s reflections on religious feelings as the means 
by which the spiritual condition of society can be restored are inseparable from his 
understanding of tradition as the guarantor of a distinctive way of feeling. 
 The very title of Ash-Wednesday converges the Christian tradition with the 
religious feelings he was interested in. It refers to a period in which a whole body of 
people enacts in a religious observance to experience the awakening of these “intenser 
feelings” resulting from “the search of God” (qtd. in Bush 131). Ash Wednesday is the 
first day of Lent in which the Christian community repents their sins to be prepared for 
the resurrection of Christ. Eliot symbolizes in this poem the time of “wavering between 
the profit and the loss” (CPP 66) to reflect deeply on this collusion. He “rejoice[s] that 
things are as they are” and he “renounce[s] the blessed face” (60); but he also hopes to 
learn “not to mock ourselves with falsehood” (67). Eliot attempts to make conscious this 
sense of the divine that should be rediscovered during Lent amongst the temptations of 
the material world.  
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 Eliot succeeds to the extent to which he neglects “the man’s scope” (CPP 60) and 
decides to “pray to God” (61), but some of the members of the community fail because 
they do not engage with these religious feelings. For them the “Word is unspoken, 
unheard” (64). As Matthiessen argues, in the closing of the poem the individual “is 
momentarily forgetful of the penance of humility appointed for Ash Wednesday; for he 
has been lured back to the human realm of desire” (Achievement 64). Ash-Wednesday 
engages with the struggles involved in the experience of the divine, but it also underlines 
the extent to which the experience of this process will “[t]each us to care and not to care” 
and “come unto Thee” (67). Eliot pays attention to the process of awakening the 
experience of religious feelings that remained buried in the unconscious of the 
community exclusively concerned with the experience of the mundane. Eliot points to the 
necessity of making conscious the religious feelings experienced by a man in search of 
God, but as part of the whole body of a community.  
 In The Family Reunion (1939) Eliot deals again with the clash between the love of 
God and the unawareness of the divine. In addition, he explores Harry’s attempt to make 
conscious the divine love to his oblivious family. In a meeting at the family house, Eliot 
juxtaposes the members of the family who remain blind to anything beyond the material 
world with Harry’s awareness of a world beyond it. Eliot reflects on the extent to which 
the members of this family “have lost […] [their] way in the dark” (CPP 291), and on 
how far Harry fails in his effort to revert the situation.  
 The matriarchal Amy defends the tradition of the physical or worldly place of 
Wishwood as the ideal that gives meaning to reality: 
 I do not want the clock to stop in the dark. 
 If you want to know why I never leave Wishwood 
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 That is the reason. I keep Wishwood alive 
 To keep the family alive, to keep them together, 
 To keep me alive, and I live to keep them. (CPP 227) 
 
She identifies the tradition of the family with the maintenance of the house and she 
focuses on it as the only mode of keeping the family together. Alternatively, her son 
Harry looks beyond these limits to heal the problematic condition of the family and his 
personal guilt for the death of his wife.7 They seem to be under what Harry calls “[t]he 
shadow of something behind our meager childhood” (273). As Agatha claims, the story 
of the family is about “sin and expiation” (275), and Eliot explores two different modes 
to reach the expiation of the sins intrinsic to the family. Amy expects to strengthen the 
family’s worldly domain as a mode of expiation, but her son aims for a spiritual 
reunification of all the members of the family (Carol H. Smith 121). Harry has “[t]hat 
apprehension deeper than all  sense,/[…]/From another world. I know it, I know it!” 
(CPP 252). He aims to move beyond the world of his family “[t]o whom nothing has 
happened, at most a continual impact/Of external events” (234). Harry equates the 
mundane world of the family house with the unimportant and he reproaches them: 
“[w]hat […] [they] call the normal/Is merely the unreal” (235). He recognizes that he 
“was like that in a way”, but he “has just recovered sanity” (236).   
 Harry leaves the “very restricted area” (291) of the family house. He is ready to 
look beyond such a limited world to pursue the divine as a mode of achieving “expiation” 
(275). In this play Eliot portrays “the plight of the individual who perceives the order of 
God but, forced to exist in the natural world, must somehow come to terms with both 
                                                
7 For an interpretation of the play in relation to the possible analogy between Harry’s 
guilt, his father’s sin and original sin, see Smith.  
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realms” (Carol H. Smith 31). Harry is aware of the separation between the world of the 
family house and the divine.  He has experienced feelings intrinsic to the contemplation 
of such a chasm: “I felt, at first, that sense of separation,/Of isolation unredeemable, 
irrevocable—/It’s eternal, or gives a knowledge of eternity,/Because it feels eternal” 
(CPP 272). For Brooks, “[t]he experience of the abyss does, as Harry has said, give ‘a 
knowledge of eternity’” (89). In the play he is the only one who has a conscious 
experience of the eternal and he seeks to make his family part of this experience.  
 Harry is the consciousness of his family; as Amy states, “you are the 
consciousness of your unhappy family,/Its bird sent flying through the purgation flame./ 
Indeed it is possible, You may learn hereafter,/[…]/To resolve the enchantment under 
which we suffer” (CPP 275). Maybe it is possible to reverse this situation, but Harry’s 
voice is unheard and the family remains alien to such a possibility. Harry claims that “the 
ways of divine love take precedence over the ways of human love” (Carol H. Smith 130). 
Harry renounces his love for Mary and he abandons the family house. Harry finally 
crosses “the frontier/Beyond which safety and danger have a different meaning./And he 
cannot return. That is his privilege” (CPP 284). Harry’s departure implies the rejection of 
a tradition based on the mundane world of the family house. He tries to make the other 
members of the family part of this “privilege” (284) beyond the limitations of the actual 
life of the house, but he fails.  
 The Family Reunion depicts an attempt to revive the ideal order of the divine 
buried in the unconscious of Harry’s family. As Cooper affirms, “Harry […] is one of 
those supreme temperaments through which the divine makes itself known in the world” 
(Ideology 93), but this time Harry cannot make it a conscious experience for the others. 
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Eliot finishes the play hoping that they will rejoin in “the pilgrimage /Of expiation” so 
“[m]ay they rest in peace” (CPP 293). The end of this play aims for a future where the 
divine will be rescued from the unconscious of this symbolic community that remained 
attached to the tradition of Wishwood. In other works, Eliot explored further this idea 
pointed out in The Family Reunion about a privileged member of the community trying to 
make “come to consciousness” (CPP 275) this “knowledge of eternity” that “feels 
eternal” (272). In addition, he explored the extent to which distinctive social structures 
should guarantee the success of such an enterprise, as I shall analyze in the fourth section 
in relation to the play Murder in the Cathedral and the character of Becket.  
 
 
3. Hemingway, tradition and moral feelings 
 
Eliot and Hemingway deal with different traditions. While Eliot focused on the Christian 
tradition to reflect on religious feelings, Hemingway looked at the tradition of 
bullfighting. In the previous chapter I reflected on bullfighting as a pagan ritual, related 
by Hemingway to communal feelings that transcend the disorder of experience (see pp. 
150-56). I explained how Hemingway analyzed this ritual as a mode of experiencing 
unity of feeling, or a “world of absolute order” (Eliot, KE 90) beyond all the 
contradictions and disorder of experience. In this section, I pay attention to the tradition 
of bullfighting to clarify Hemingway’s considerations of this feeling as “moral” (DIA 4). 
I also analyze the extent to which Hemingway conditioned the experience of these 
feelings to the execution of the matador within the parameters of the bullfighting 
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tradition. Like Eliot, Hemingway considered tradition as something dynamic that 
constantly refers to the past and to the present. He also identified in this tradition a 
distinctive way of feeling that he qualified as “moral” (DIA 4). Therefore, this section 
analyzes the short stories “The Capital of the World” and “The Undefeated” to decipher 
Hemingway’s pondering of “bullfighting” within the framework of morality. To do so, I 
shall consider Kant’s concern with “moral value” (Audi 403), and his reflections on 
acting for “the fulfillment of duty” (403), to clarify Hemingway’s consideration of the 
matador’s sense of duty towards bullfighting. In addition, I shall analyze To Have and 
Have Not to reflect on the extent to which Hemingway depicts in this novel a society 
lacking any common moral sense.  
 In “The Capital of the World” Hemingway presents a poor young man named 
Paco who works in the cheap hotel Luarca. “There were from eight to a dozen other 
people who lived at the Luarca and ate in the dining room, but for Paco […] the only 
ones who really existed were the bullfighters” (CSS 29). Paco admires them even though 
they are only “second-rate matadors” (29) who really struggle to survive as bullfighters. 
Paco is charmed by their way of acting. Wolff underlines that a matador always acts 
according to his profession because “being a bullfighter is above your own being” (my 
translation, 147). The matador behaves out of a sense of duty towards this profession and 
the tradition it represents.8 Paco appreciates this value and he aims to be a bullfighter, but 
he only understands this endeavour to a certain extent.  
                                                
8 See Wolff 147-49.  
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 In his remarks about Antonio Ordóñez, the matador in The Dangerous Summer 
(1985), Hemingway offers an insightful account of the elements he values most in a 
bullfighter: 
  The first time I saw Antonio Ordóñez I saw that he could make all the classic 
 passes without faking, that he knew bulls, that he could kill well if he wished to, 
 and that he was a genius with the cape. I could see he had the three great 
 requisites for a matador: courage, skill in his profession and grace in the presence 
 of the danger of death.9 (18)  
 
Hemingway identifies in this matador the three great requisites for classical bullfighting. 
Antonio Ordóñez is not afraid of fighting “within hooking range of the horn” (18) 
because he is not afraid of “the danger of death” (18). In this account Hemingway names 
first the courage and then the dominance of the technique, but the former is useless 
without the latter. Only the achievement of a “technical perfection” (17) will offer the 
matador grace in the “presence of death” (18). According to Hemingway, Antonio 
Ordóñez enjoys these three key qualities. In “The Capital of the World” Hemingway 
reflects on them to frame Paco’s actions in the mock bullfighting in the dining room of 
the pension. 
 Paco has courage. In the cheap hotel Paco confronts his fears, just as a matador 
does in a real bullring. “No, he would not be afraid. Others, yes. Not he. He knew he 
would not be afraid. Even if he ever was afraid he knew that he could do it anyway” (35). 
Paco is aware that courage is the main characteristic of a bullfighter and, in the mock 
bullfight at the Luarca, he acts according to this requisite intrinsic to a real matador. He 
                                                
9 The Dangerous Summer is a posthumous work about the rivalry in the rings between the 
two Spanish bullfighters, Antonio Ordóñez and Luis Miguel Dominguín, over the 
summer of 1959. This work “started out as a commission for Life magazine” (TDS 9). It 
was published almost twenty five years after Hemingway finished it and it was edited 
from a seventy five thousand words manuscript (9).   
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constantly repeats that he is not afraid of death. Even when the other waiter holds a chair 
with two knives knotted to the legs of a chair to perform as a bull, Paso repeats to 
himself: “I’m not afraid” (CSS 35). He is careless of the danger of death and his 
performance conforms to the first of “the three great requisites for a matador” 
(Hemingway, DS 18). He has the first one, but Hemingway also examines the second 
requisite to reflect on the importance of technical skills to a bullfighter.  
 Even though it is an imaginary fight, Paco focuses on mastering the technique and 
craft of the matador in front of a visualized animal. “Standing slim and straight he made 
four more perfect passes, smooth, elegant and graceful” (CSS 34). Paco understands the 
importance of the execution and he mimics the gestures and the movements to the best of 
his ability. “He had done it too many times in his imagination” (25). The movements are 
easy with “an imaginary bull” (34) and then the other waiter, Enrique, challenges him: 
“‘The knives are the horns. If you make those passes then they mean something’” (35). 
Paco accepts the challenge because he has courage. He is eager to show that he can be a 
bullfighter: 
 Running with head down Enrique came toward him and Paco swung the apron 
 just ahead of the knife blade as it passed close in front of his belly and as it went 
 by it was, to him, the real horn […]. Then the [imaginary] bull turned and came  
 again and, as he watched the onrushing point, he stepped his left foot two inches 
 too far forward and the knife did not pass. (36-37)  
 
The imaginary bullfight turns into a fatal outcome due to Paco’s lack of skill. He does not 
enjoy the second requisite of a real matador. In “The Capital of the World” Paco engages 
with bullfighting to the extent to which he acts courageously when he is in front of the 
other waiter with the knives, but his lack of technique makes this courage worthless.  
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 Mitchell notes that “bullfighting can best be understood as an unusually dynamic 
variety of folk craft […]. It constitutes a traditional body of knowledge and practices 
transmitted orally through something like an apprentice system” (396). Hemingway 
always remarked on the importance of this knowledge to advocate bullfighting as a 
tradition that is in constant progression from the past to the present. When he affirms in 
The Dangerous Summer that “[w]atching Antonio with the bull I saw that he had 
everything his father had in his great days. […]. [But] Antonio was very much better” 
(17), Hemingway compares a performance from the present under the standards of the 
past, at the same time that he suggests an improvement in the present in relation to the 
past. Hemingway analyzes—as Eliot said about tradition—“the good New growing 
naturally out of the good Old” (TCC 184). Hemingway considers bullfighting as “a living 
tradition” (184) and he points out that the maintenance of this tradition depends on the 
performance of an action within certain technical parameters. As McCormick argues, 
Eliot wrote that “‘[tradition] cannot be inherent, and if you want it you must obtain it by 
great labour.’ The same must be said of the torero. His craft and art is in the strictest 
sense traditional, […]; to master that tradition requires a great labor” (McCormick 67-
68). Antonio Ordóñez is part of the tradition that he learnt from his father and he masters 
it through his performances in the ring.    
  The main character of “The Capital of the World” is only a waiter with “no 
father” (CSS 29) who did not have the chance to undertake the necessary apprenticeship 
to master the skills required of a matador. He has not done the required labour to be part 
of the tradition of bullfighting. His lack of technique deprives him of access to this 
tradition. As Hoffman notes, the pivotal moment of this story can be viewed as a 
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poignant example of what the tradition of bullfighting assuredly is not (99). Paco has 
courage, but he does not have the body of knowledge to perform according to the 
tradition of bullfighting. Hemingway underlines in this story the extent to which it is 
necessary to have both “courage” and “skill in his profession” to reach “grace in the 
presence of the danger of death” (Hemingway, DS 18). According to Hemingway, only 
the confluence of courage and skills in a bullfighter makes his performance in the ring 
“very moral” (DIA 4). Paco does not enjoy that grace.  
 When Paco is wounded in the fake bullfighting, he tries to behave courageously 
like a matador in the ring. He asks for a “‘rubber cup’” because “[h]e has seen that used 
in the ring” (CSS 37). He tries to keep calm. “‘Don’t worry,’ said Paco, his voice 
sounding far away. ‘But bring the doctor’” (37). He attempts to act like a matador, but he 
is not. “He was frightened and he felt faint and he tried to say an act of contrition” (37). 
There is no “grace” in the presence of “death” (DS 17) in this story. There is just 
compassion in Paco’s death because, as Hemingway underlines at the very end of the 
story, “[h]e died […] full of illusions. He had not time in his life to lose any of them” 
(CSS 38). Alternatively, in his recall of Ordóñez’s gore in The Dangerous Summer, 
Hemingway focuses on this grace intrinsic to a real matador. “Everyone saw the gravity 
of the horn wound and his brother, his manager and his sword handler grabbed him and 
tried to hold him […]. Antonio shook them all off […]. He went out to the bull bleeding 
heavily […]. [H]e was going to kill this bull” (60). In these lines, Hemingway engages 
with what he called in Death in the Afternoon the “feeling of life and death and mortality 
and immortality” (4) that he qualified as “moral” (4). This feeling only takes places while 
a bullfighter acts with “grace in the presence of the danger of death” (DS 17). As Wolff 
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remarks, “the supreme excellence for a bullfighter is making what he has to make. He 
must execute his mission. He is a matador regardless of what happens” (my translation, 
122). Hemingway found the execution of this mission “very moral” (DIA 4). Only a 
performance that includes a sense of duty towards the profession of bullfighter makes 
bullfighting moral.  
 Hemingway’s estimation of bullfighting as moral can be constructively 
considered in relation to Kant’s question of “‘[w]hat is a moral action?’” (Warburton 41). 
For Kant the only acceptable motive for moral action was a sense of duty.10 “The Capital 
of the World” engages with Kant’s question. This story shows a character that does not 
understand this sense of duty. Paco dies because he was charmed by the “appearance of 
respectability” and “decorum” of the “second-rate matadors” at the Luarca (Hemingway, 
CSS 29-30), not because he wanted to execute his mission regardless of the 
consequences. Paco does not have the sense of duty towards bullfighting and, therefore, 
his actions lack moral value. Paco’s performance does not lead to the moral feeling that 
Hemingway identified in a real matador executing his duty, only to feelings of pity due to 
a meaningless death.  
 The moral value of the action of a matador depends on his performance out of a 
sense of duty towards the tradition of bullfighting regardless of what happens. The ideal 
of this tradition is the execution of a duty through the actions in the ring. As Robert N. 
Johnson explains, according to Kant, those actions “possessing moral worth deserve 
esteem; […]. Perhaps, then, for an action to have moral worth is just for it to be worthy—
in the sense of deserving—of an attitude such as esteem” (39). Hemingway does not 
                                                
10 See Warburton 42. 
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show any attitude of esteem towards Paco’s behaviour at the pension Luarca. He only 
points out disappointment. Hemingway emphasizes Paco’s inability to be part of the 
tradition that would make his engagement with bullfighting worthwhile. In this story 
Hemingway does not reflect on the way of feeling intrinsic to bullfighting, but on the 
impossibility of experiencing it without deeply understanding the moral value of its 
traditions. As Hoffman states, “[t]he pension becomes the place where tradition breaks 
down and inevitably collapses” (95). Paco does not understand the ideal value intrinsic to 
this tradition. Similarly, in “The Undefeated,” Hemingway looks again into the 
breakdown of bullfighting, but here he goes deeper into the reasons of this collapse.  
 In The Dangerous Summer Hemingway showed his concern about the decline of 
bullfighting. “After the last corrida at Zaragoza I was disgusted and decided I was 
through with the bulls for a while. I knew Antonio could deal with any bulls and could be 
one of the greatest matadors of all time and I did not want his place in history to be 
denied him or to be fouled up by the manoeuvres that were going on” (25). As Mandel 
notes in relation to Hemingway’s reflections on these manoeuvres, Hemingway reacted 
“against the new (dishonest) bullfighters, their new (corrupt) styles, the new (dictatorial) 
type of management, and the ignorant and passive audiences that permitted all of this” 
(235). In “The Undefeated” Hemingway mingles an old matador, his corrupted manager 
and the public of Madrid to examine the elements that, according to Hemingway, were 
destroying the tradition of bullfighting. 
 The veteran bullfighter Manuel Garcia leaves the hospital after being seriously 
gored. He pays a visit to his manager Renata. The agent encourages him to quit: “‘Why 
don’t you get a job and go to work’” (CSS 184). Bullfighting though is all Manuel has: 
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“‘I don’t want to work,’ Manuel said. ‘I am a bullfighter’” (184). Finally, Manuel gets a 
shameful offer. He will perform in a nocturnal bullfight to kill “[w]hatever stuff they’ve 
got in the corrals. What the veterinaries won’t pass in the daytime” (185). The manager 
Renata is only concerned about the economic profit. Manuel respects bullfighting, but he 
is under the command of Renata and he will fight under his purely economic dictates. As 
Curtis states, for Hemingway this “commercialism is a cancer that even threatens the 
purity of bullfighting” (63). Manuel respects the purity of this tradition, but his only 
chance of being again part of it is accepting Renata’s rules. “‘I got to do it. […]. I got to 
stick to do it’” (CSS 189) the old matador insists. However, by sticking to it, he betrays 
bullfighting. He takes part in the commercialism that is killing the tradition he belongs to.  
 Manuel asks his old friend Zurito to help him as a picador. He is reluctant. Zurito 
shares with Manuel the duty towards the tradition of bullfighting, but he realizes that 
Manuel cannot execute it properly anymore. “You’re too old” (CSS 189), Zurito insists. 
Finally he affirms, “I’ll pic for you and if you don’t go big tomorrow night, you’ll quit. 
See? Will you do that?” (189).  He hopes that Manuel will fail and he will “cut his 
coleta” (190).11 Zurito realizes that Manuel is trying in despair to fight again and he is 
aware that this attitude situates him within Renata’s careless consideration of 
bullfighting. It will make Manuel a dishonest bullfighter. He will be forced to trick the 
audience at the nocturnal fight.  
 In Death in the Afternoon Hemingway underlines the extent to which the survival 
of bullfighting depends on the public because “any suerte […] will surely die out in 
                                                
11 The coleta is the symbol that says that somebody is a bullfighter, while the cutting of 
the pigtail means that he is not a matador anymore. 
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bullfighting unless the public demands that fighters perform it” (193).12 In “The 
Undefeated” Manuel follows the public’s demands. He fights after a comical 
performance that mocks a real bullfight, but when Manuel’s turn arrives the public 
behaves as they did in the “burlesque” (190). They are not interested in “classic passes” 
that are “extremely dangerous” (DS 18), only in being entertained as they were by “the 
Charlie Chaplins” (CSS 190). Renata gives the public “[a]ll they want” (184) to make an 
economic profit. The public is only preoccupied with having fun, as with the “Chaplins” 
when there was “applause, prolonged applause, going on and on” (190). Manuel has no 
other alternative than giving the public what they ask for.  
 In his analysis of the evolution of bullfighting Hemingway warns that “many trick 
passes have been invented in which the man really passes the bull instead of having the 
bull pass him, or takes advantage of his passage, saluting him, in effect, as he passes 
rather than controlling and directing the moves of the bull. […] [T]he public loves these 
tricks” (DS 18). In the nocturnal fight Manuel performs these tricks. “Out in the center of 
the ring, under the lights, Manuel was kneeling, facing the bull, and as he raised the 
muleta in both hands the bull charged, tail up” (CSS 200). Manuel gets “the applause 
from the dark plaza” (200) and carries on with his performance. Manuel’s movements 
deceive everybody but Zurito. When one of Renata’s men affirms “‘that’s a great bull-
fighter’” (200), Zurito affirms, “‘[n]o, he’s not’” (200). The picador is fully aware that 
Manuel is not executing his duty. He is only covering his weaknesses in front of the bull. 
Manuel’s performance turns into a pitiful spectacle and he is eventually wounded.  
                                                
12 The word suerte refers to “any lance or pase or other action to the bull in the ring” 
(McCormick 24).  
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 In this story Hemingway outlines how the tradition of bullfighting has 
degenerated into pure entertainment. He points out the extent to which the moral value of 
bullfighting becomes neglected under the demands of the public and the management that 
follows these dictates to obtain financial gain. Only Zurito realizes that Manuel also 
becomes part of this lack of respect for tradition. Brooks affirms that “[t]he old bull-
fighter […] is finally defeated, but only in his own terms” (8). Yes, but these terms 
respond to Manuel’s self-interest, not to the terms of the tradition of bullfighting. Zurito 
understands that Manuel prefers living as a matador and dying in the ring than cutting his 
pigtail, but he does not respect that. Zurito is the only one in this story who realizes that 
Manuel did not execute his mission as a matador. He does not offer the public the 
experience that Hemingway qualified as “moral” (DIA 4) because he follows the desires 
of the crowd. The public no longer values “the feeling of life and death” (4) that a real 
performance should offer.  As Conklin explains in his analysis of the final moment of the 
killing of the bull, “[h]ere is the mind and emotion of the revolutionist capable of 
transforming the collective […], he discovers meaning in the fight and that intense 
passion becomes generalized for the spectators” (166). In “The Undefeated” Hemingway 
reflects on the extent to which the tradition of bullfighting no longer offers this meaning 
intrinsic to the fight. There is no moral value in Manuel’s performance. The public does 
not share the ideal of acting out of sense of duty. They are not aware of the extent to 
which this ideal makes an action worth of moral value, as Kant argued in relation to the 
principle of acting from duty.13 There is no common sense of morality amongst the public 
of the ring.  
                                                
13 For Johnson, “[i]t is only when the action is based on a choice whose principle gives 
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 Hemingway not only considered moral feelings in relation to bullfighting and its 
tradition, but he also applied his concerns to society as a whole. In To Have and Have 
Not Hemingway reflects further on the lack of a common sense of morality within the 
community. He presents a character focused exclusively on his own survival. Harry 
Morgan’s motivation throughout the whole novel is based on his need to sustain himself 
and his family: “Where’s the money coming from to keep Marie and the girls?” (146). 
This is his duty, as he states when he claims, “[t]he hell with their revolutions. All I got to 
do is make a living for my family and I can’t do that. Then he tells me about his 
revolution. The hell with his revolution” (168). Morgan does not care about any ideology. 
He does not believe in anything else than his family. He does not identify himself with 
anybody’s interest. As Frederking affirms, “[h]e does not reach out for others’ wisdom to 
determine action and there is little coordination of action. […] Morgan does not rely on 
camaraderie, solidarity, or advice for guidance” (180). Morgan’s lack of common interest 
leads him to be concerned exclusively with his own destiny and therefore ignore any 
common value. 
 Morgan puts his life at risk to perform his duty, but events systematically deny 
him any hope of achieving it. He struggles against people more powerful than he. As 
Knott explains, “[Harry] puts all politicians and rich tourists into one category, labeling 
them as threats to his existence” (80). They have more money and power than him and 
this makes his fight useless. This story divides society into those who have money and 
                                                                                                                                            
that choice unqualified value that the action expresses an unqualifiedly good will and so 
has moral worth. The motive ‘It is my duty’ is just a stand-in for this principle, and its 
value is quite different from self-interest and the rest of those motivations” (42-43). In 
this story, Manuel acts for self-interest and therefore his actions lack any moral value.  
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power and those who have not. As Frederking notes, in To Have and Have Not “[l]ife 
becomes a game to negotiate individuals’ livelihoods with strategies for domination over 
others” (174-75). This is the only code in the society Hemingway represents in this story. 
As Harry insightfully states when he is involved in one of his dirty businesses, “[t]hey 
don’t give you any choice now. I can let it go; but what will the next thing be? I didn’t 
ask for any of this and if you’ve got to do it you’ve got to do it” (HHN 105). Harry has no 
chance of succeeding in this situation.  
 To Have and Have Not reflects on the absence of any common moral sense. The 
characters act out of a sense of duty towards themselves, never towards a common sense 
of benevolence. This makes life unbearable for the weakest. For Knott, this novel does 
not “provide a simple or idealized moral center from which to judge his central 
characters” (85). There is no moral centre in the society depicted in this novel. According 
to Kant, “[t]he only specially moral incentive that can motivate us to act dutifully […] is 
the reverence or respect we unavoidable feel for the moral law” (Sullivan 139). 
Hemingway points out that the lack of the ideal of a moral law results in a society where 
fighting for individual survival is the only option.  
   At the end of the novel, Harry faces the failure of his struggle to offer his family 
a decent life. He realizes the uselessness of an individual fight against those who stole 
from him the possibility of giving prosperity to his family: 
  ‘A man,’ Harry Morgan said, looking at them both. ‘One man alone ain’t 
 got. No man alone now.’ He stopped. ‘No matter how a man alone ain’t got no 
 bloody fucking chance.’ 
  He shut his eyes. It had taken him a long time to get it out and it had taken 
 him all his life to learn it. (HHN 225) 
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At the beginning of the story Harry rejects any common value beyond his own survival. 
These words at the end of the story alternatively point to the necessity of gathering 
forces. The end of To Have and Have Not outlines Hemingway’s later reflections in The 
Fifth Column and For Whom the Bell Tolls on the necessity of a common duty within the 
frame of a political ideology to achieve a common moral law that may revert the situation 
of injustice he presents in this novel. 
 
 
4. Distinctive propositions for social cohesion 
 
Eliot focused on religious feelings resulting from the pursuit of the ideal of the divine 
intrinsic to the Christian tradition. Hemingway reflected on moral feelings related to the 
tradition of bullfighting and the ideal of acting out of a sense of duty towards this 
tradition. These two authors pointed out the extent to which the experience of these 
feelings requires a correlation between individual and society. This led them towards 
reflections on a social unity in which the ideals of the self and of society become one. 
Eliot and Hemingway considered in their writings distinctive modes of reinforcing this 
correlation. Eliot praised the Christian faith: “Lord, shall we not bring these gifts to Your 
service?/ Shall we not bring to Your service all our powers/ For life, for dignity, grace 
and order,” (CPP 111) whereas Hemingway turned to political ideology to propose a 
common duty towards society where “all [are] working for the same cause” (FC 7). 
Therefore, in this section I shall consider Eliot’s and Hemingway’s distinctive 
propositions for social cohesion along with F.H. Bradley’s reflections about an ideal 
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unity or “oneness” (ES 342) in Ethical Studies (1876). Bradley intended to unify the 
particular, or personal side, with the universal, or social side, to form a whole. I consider 
that Eliot and Hemingway explored in their respective works a similar sort of ideal unity 
to Bradley’s in Ethical Studies.14   
 Bradley affirmed that “[t]o know what a man is […] you must not take him in 
isolation. He is one of a people […]. An individual man is what he is because of and by 
virtue of community” (ES 173-74). Bradley relates the achievement of this unity to an 
ideal moral value that, as he explains, “has two dialectical sides, the outer side of social 
institutions and the inner side of personal morality” (Nicholson 23). The inner struggle of 
the individual and his actions are in direct connection with the social structures he aims to 
construct. The personal side cannot be considered without taking into account the outer in 
the development of a coherent and complete social system. Eliot and Hemingway 
pursued such unity and they considered not only the inner side of this ideal, but also the 
outer side in their shared aim of a cohesive system that may condense both. Bradley 
noted that “[i]ndividual and community are equally real because interdependently real, 
the particular and the universal sides of a single whole, each presupposing the reality of 
the other” (Nicholson 28). Eliot and Hemingway tried to unify the two sides of the whole 
by deploying distinctive ideals in which the experience of the individual conforms to 
social cohesion, but they worked with opposed values in terms of ideals.  
 In a paper addressed by Eliot to an Anglo-Catholic conference in 1933, the poet 
stated that ‘a Christian world-order, the Christian world-order, is ultimately the only one 
                                                
14 See Nicholson 45. My understanding of F.H. Bradley’s Ethical Studies owes a great 
deal to the analysis by Nicholson. When I use some of his clarifications in relation to 
Bradley’s theories in this chapter I acknowledge that use. 
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which, from any point of view, will work” (EAM 114). Despite the assertion of that 
Christian social order, he underlined that “[w]e do not […] deny that society is very 
deeply affected morally and spiritually by material conditions” (134).15 The individual 
lives in the material world and he needs to deal with the actions performed in society. 
Eliot considered that these actions should be subsumed under a Christian point of view 
because “the real issue of our time” is between “the secularist—whatever political or 
moral philosophy they support—and the antisecularist: between those who believe only 
in values realizable in time and on earth, and those who believe also in values realized 
only out of time” (qtd. in Douglas 57-58). In these words, Eliot looks at the two different 
points of view that Eliot’s Murder in the Cathedral and Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell 
Tolls represent. Eliot and Hemingway explore a social order where the ideal of the 
individual and that of the community become one; but, whereas the former focuses on 
“values realized only out of time” to succeed in such an enterprise, the latter is concerned 
exclusively with values achievable in the material world.  
  In his reflections on an ideal moral value in Ethical Studies, Bradley makes an 
apparently contradictory statement. He presents to the individual the possibility of 
realizing himself by performing the duties that he has as a member of society, but always 
considering an ideal value beyond himself: 
 The basis and foundation of the ideal self is the self which is true to my station 
 and its duties. […] The good in my station and its duties was visibly realized in 
 the world, and it was mostly possible to act up to that real ideal; but this good 
 beyond is only an ideal; for it is not wholly realized in the world we see, and, do 
 what we may, we can not find it realized in ourselves. (220)  
 
                                                
15 This paper was published three years later in Essays Ancient and Modern (1936); see 
Kojecky 126.  
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According to Bradley, the ideal good is beyond the boundaries of the individual, but this 
ideal value is still at the core of the duties that the individual should perform in his 
station. Bradley contends that a man cannot be taken in isolation, but always according to 
his position within society. It is necessary to consider his station, but always in relation to 
the whole unity. “What he has to do depends on what his place is, what its function is, 
and that all comes from his station in the organism” (Bradley, ES 173). The individual 
cannot ignore his position as a member of society, therefore his actions cannot be alien to 
the outer side of the social institutions; but, at the same time, the realization of the ideal 
self is beyond the temporal values of those social institutions. Eliot adopts a similar 
argument when he affirms that:   
 [O]ur spiritual faith should give us some guidance in temporal matters; that if it 
 does not, the fault is our own; that morality rests upon religious sanction, and that 
 the social organization of the world rests upon moral sanction; that we can only 
 judge of temporal values in the light of eternal values. (EAM 113-14)  
 
Eliot proposes the subsumption of the individual under the social, but always under the 
necessity of an ideal that is above them. Eliot, like Bradley, relates the actions of the 
individual to an ideal value that should be considered under the sanctions of the social 
organizations, but those sanctions must be subsumed under the ideal good that is beyond 
those social structures.   
  The interaction between the individual and society under an ideal unity is also 
presented in Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940). Hemingway, in ways which 
relate to Eliot’s social criticism, stresses the necessary correspondence between the duty 
of the individual in his station and the pursuit of an ideal that is beyond the self. As Pilar 
jokes in reference to Robert Jordan’s seriousness about the use of the Spanish word 
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camarada: “You art very religious about thy politics,” (FWBT 66).16 When the guerrilla 
Robert Jordan affirms: “Camarada to me is what all should be called with seriousness in 
the war” (66), he claims, as Eliot argued, “the obligation to improve […] according to 
definitive ideals” (Eliot, EAM 115). The conception of the individual is always 
subordinate to his relation to a higher ideal. In the case of Eliot this ideal is the Christian 
God. In Hemingway’s case the Republic plays this role, as Robert Jordan suggests when 
he talks to Pablo at the very beginning of the story: “I have heard that you are an 
excellent guerrilla leader, that you are loyal to the republic and prove your loyalty 
through your acts” (FWBT 10). Both Eliot and Hemingway condition the action of the 
individual in these works under the premise of an ideal value that should reunite the inner 
and the outer side of that ideal whole. The actions of the individual in the social world are 
dictated by the nature of the ideal according to which the individual acts within his own 
station.  
 When Eliot affirms in Choruses from “The Rock” that “[t]he LORD who created 
must wish us to create/And employ our creation again in His service” (CPP 111), the 
poet is suggesting that the dyad formed by individual and society should be considered 
under the unity of an ideal whole, being God itself.  Hemingway raises the same premise 
in For Whom the Bell Tolls by using Anselmo’s voice to reflect on the running of society 
under the values of the Republic once the war finishes: “If we no longer have religion 
after the war then I think there must be some form of civic penance organized that all 
may be cleansed from the killing or else we will never have a true and human basis for 
living” (FWBT 196). Eliot and Hemingway look into distinctive ideals that should 
                                                
16 The Spanish word in English means comrade. 
 203 
command the actions of individuals, but in this shared consideration, they describe 
individuality not as an end in itself, but as a tool for the enterprise of achieving the social 
structures that should themselves be subsumed under the unity of an ideal whole. This 
feature is clearly symbolized in the use that Eliot and Hemingway make of the 
Archbishop Thomas Becket and the guerrilla Robert Jordan respectively as martyrs for a 
cause beyond that of the self.  
 In Murder in the Cathedral (1935) Eliot does not consider individuality as an end 
in itself only in relation to his duty according to God’s will. In this play Eliot represents 
the premise he defends in his social criticism when he affirms that “[t]he conception of 
individual liberty,[…], must be based upon the unique importance of every single soul 
[…]. But unless this humanity is considered always in relation to God, we may expect to 
find an excessive love of created beings” (EAM 119). In this play the value of Thomas 
Becket is related to the extent to which he renounces to his own life to achieve the ideal 
that should command the actions of the individual in the social world. Eliot symbolizes in 
Becket’s actions the premises defended by Bradley in his reflections on an ideal moral 
value; and Eliot praises these reflections in “Francis Herbert Bradley” when he affirms 
that: 
 The distinction is not between a ‘private self’ and a ‘public self’ or a ‘higher self’, 
 it is between the individual as himself and no more, a mere numbered atom, and 
 the individual in communion with God. The distinction is clearly drawn between 
 man’s ‘mere will’ and ‘the will of the Divine.’ (FLA 81) 
 
In Murder in the Cathedral Eliot represents the main character fusing his will to the will 
of the Divine. As the interlude of Murder in the Cathedral says, “A martyrdom is never 
the design of man; for the true martyr is he who has become the instrument of God, who 
has lost his will in the will of God, not lost it but found it, for he has found freedom in 
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submission to God” (CPP 199). As Cooper notes, this play explores “the theme of 
martyrdom and the logic of submission to God’s will” (Introduction 88). When Becket is 
informed of his murder in advance, he accepts it with no worries: “To meet death gladly 
is only/The only way in which I can defend/The Law of God, the holy canons” (CPP 
209). Murder in the Cathedral represents an ideal self whose actions conform to his 
duties as a member of a community which submits to the unity of an ideal whole.  
 The exploration of an individual submitting his will to an ideal is symbolized by 
the figure of the guerrilla Robert Jordan in For Whom the Bell Tolls. As in the case of 
Thomas Beckett, Hemingway’s martyr is informed in advance of his death. Pilar reads 
his hand and “she look[s] at him without smiling” (FWBT 33). Jordan suspects that the 
woman predicts a tragic end in the blowing of the bridge, but he only affirms that he does 
not “‘believe in such things’” (33). Then, when Pilar asks him about his beliefs, he 
answers that he believes only “’[i]n [his] work’” (33). In a comparable way to Thomas 
Becket’s steps in Eliot’s play, Robert Jordan accepts Pilar’s premonition about the fatal 
outcome of his mission, and he subsumes his life under the higher value of his work for 
the Republic. Ben Stoltzfus states that Jordan’s actions under the political ideology of 
communism stress “the dignity of the individual because those who are willing to die for 
the general good affirm a value that transcends them as individuals” (45). In comparable 
ways, both Becket and Jordan subsume their will under an ideal. 
 On same premises defended by Bradley in Ethical Studies, Eliot and Hemingway 
explored the extent to which a man realizes himself by performing his duties as a member 
of a community subsumed under an ideal. But, whereas Eliot affirms that his duties “rests 
upon religious sanction” (EAM 114) Hemingway turns to political ideology. Eliot’s and 
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Hemingway’s characters undertake a similar movement in the execution of their duties. 
First, their identities as individuals depend on their function as a member of a 
community. Their individual actions are measured in relation to the cause for an ideal. 
Thomas Becket states: “I submit my cause to the judgment of Rome” (CPP 206) and 
Robert Jordan affirms: “But I feel nothing against it [killing people] when it is necessary. 
When it is for the cause” (FWBT 39). Second, the submission of their actions under their 
respective causes leads these characters to embrace social organizations. Eliot and 
Hemingway use the figures of their martyrs to reflect on social organizations as the mode 
of guaranteeing this ideal within society, but the distinctive nature of these ideals 
conditions Eliot’s and Hemingway’s different propositions in this respect.  
 Murder in the Cathedral presents an individual who acts according to the dictates 
of the Christian church. In The Idea of a Christian Society, Eliot clarifies that in his 
consideration of a Christian society he was not simply “concerned with […] spiritual 
institutions,” he was preoccupied with the “organization of values” (42).  Eliot reflected 
on the extent to which the church may guarantee a society capable of a religious 
commitment that eventually involves the individual in the pursuit of the divine. Thomas 
Beckett is a member of the Christian church, the social institution that should guarantee 
the unity of the individual and the social under the ideal value of the divine. Eliot looked 
into an ideal based on values “realizable only out of time” (qtd. in Douglas 58). For Eliot 
this ideal unity is beyond the material world because as Bradley argues “ if Christianity 
be brought […] [t]he ideal here is […] God’s will” (ES 231). Eliot proclaims the 
necessity of subsuming the actions of the individual in the material world under God’s 
will. To do so, he considers the church as the social institution to articulate this aim. 
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 In his analysis of Ethical Studies Eliot clarifies that “‘[r]eflection on morality,’ 
[…] [as Bradley says] ‘leads us beyond it. It leads us, in short, to see the necessity of a 
religious point of view.’ Morality and religion are not the same thing, but they cannot 
beyond a certain point be treated separately” (FLA 83). I consider that Eliot followed 
Bradley in this reflection. Bradley affirmed that a man should be judged not by how far 
he has succeeded outwardly, but how far he has identified his will with God: 
 Here our morality is consummated in oneness with God, and everywhere we find 
 that ‘immortal Love’, which builds itself for ever on contradiction, but in which 
 the contradiction is eternally resolved. (ES 342)  
 
 Eliot, as Bradley did, defended the necessity of moving from morality to religion to 
judge “morality [under] religious sanction” (EAM 114). Eliot aims for a Christian society 
“in which the natural end of man—virtue and well-being in community—is 
acknowledged for all” (Idea 62). As Kojecky notes, “Eliot believed that Christianity 
necessarily required expression in social institutions” (130). Eliot considers the Christian 
church as the vehicle to proclaim this expression and warns about the dangers of ignoring 
it because, as Becket asserts, the temporal cannot be governed by faith in material values: 
 Temporal power, to build a good world? 
 To keep order, as the world knows order. 
 Those who put their faith in worldly order 
 Not controlled by the order of God, 
 In confident ignorance, but arrest disorder, 
 Make it fast, breed fatal disease. (CPP 187)  
 
Eliot claimed that Christian faith is necessary to construct a society where “religious 
thought […] inevitably proceeds to a criticism of political […] systems” (ICS 42).  As 
Cooper notes, Eliot warned against a society moving inexorably toward thoroughgoing 
secularism and he advocated the Christian church to be woven into society (26-31). Eliot 
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urged that society be regarded “under the light of eternal values” (EAM 114). He 
defended the Christian faith as the necessary mechanism for social cohesion.   
 In contrast, in For Whom the Bell Tolls Robert Jordan is a revolutionary fighting 
for a cause that pursues temporal values. He only trusts in his own actions under the 
command of a political party. He is “a bridge-blower now. Not a thinker” (17), but he 
conditions his performance to the accomplishment of the ideal of the Republic. His duties 
as a soldier depend on the dictates of the communist party because “in the conduct of the 
war, they were the only party whose program and whole discipline he could respect” 
(163). Hemingway turns to political ideology for the maintenance of the ideal of the 
Republic: “But one thing I have that no man nor any God can take from me and that is 
that I have worked well for the Republic. I have worked hard for the good that we will all 
share later” (197). If Eliot demanded a society based on a religious pattern to achieve a 
good beyond the material world, Hemingway fought for imposing a political ideology to 
achieve social justice in the material world. Hemingway relates the accomplishment of 
this aim to the performance of the soldier in war. The success of Hemingway’s ideal 
depends on the performance of the soldier.  
 In The Fifth Column (1938) Hemingway again reflects on the ideal of the 
Republic, but here he represents the struggles of the individual to act in accordance with 
it. At the beginning of this work a Republican soldier affirms that he “came to fight for an 
ideal” (17).17 When this character alludes to the Republic he praises this ideal; but, at the 
                                                
17 The Fifth Column is Hemingway’s only full-length play. It was first published in 
October 14, 1938 in an anthology of writings titled The First Column and the First Forty-
Nine Stories. It was poorly received upon publication and it has been overshadowed by 
many of the short stories published within the same anthology.  According to Kale, the 
play is regarded as “an anomaly in the Hemingway canon” (131) and it has garnered little 
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same time, this soldier struggles to sacrifice himself to achieve it: “I am not a soldier by 
profession” (17).  Alternatively, Commissar Phillip claims that “[w]hen you put the 
uniform on you’re a soldier” (17). Phillip praises this uniform and the duty it implies. 
“The best people I ever knew died for that son [Bandera Rosa]” (58). He is proud of all 
the comrades in Madrid who are “working for the same cause” (70), and he dislikes the 
attitude of the solider doubting about his duty.  
 When Phillip pronounces these words he seems to subsume his will under the 
ideal that everybody has to work for regardless of individual interests. However, this is 
only an illusion in Hemingway’s play because, as Noël Valis affirms, Phillip’s moral 
ambiguities lead him to betray the Republican ideals (20). Hemingway looks at the extent 
to which the physical execution of duties towards the ideal depends on the morals of the 
individual. As Hemingway explains in Men at War, “once we have a war there is only 
one thing to do. It must be won” (5). The success of the ideal depends on the success of 
the war, but the latter depends on the extent to which the soldier submits to the duties of a 
political ideology to fight for.  
 In For Whom the Bell Tolls Robert Jordan performs his moral duty and he acts 
according to the dictates of political ideology as the means of securing the success of the 
ideal of the Republic. Hemingway subsumes the moral actions of the individual under the 
norms of a political party. As Jordan reminds us, “your own death seemed of completed 
unimportance; only a thing to be avoided because it would interfere with the performance 
                                                                                                                                            
critical or commercial attention. In fact, it was not until 2008 that the Mint Theater in 
New York City gave life to its characters; this was the first time that Hemingway’s play 
was professionally produced according to its original script, so in a sense it was both a 
revival and a first run (131).  
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of your duty” (235). Hemingway embraced political commitment to explore the extent to 
which the individual should subsume his actions under an ideal. But instead of embracing 
religious faith to secure this ideal, Hemingway reflected on political ideology: “I put 
great illusion in the Republic. I believe firmly in the Republic and I have faith. I believe 
in it with fervor as those who have religious faith believe in the mysteries” (FWBT 90). 
Robert Jordan embraces an ideal moral value that only is realizable in the material world: 
“You believe in Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. You believe in Life, Liberty and the 
Pursuit of Happiness” (FWBT 305). The pursuit of this ideal shall lead to an improvement 
of society because the ideal of the Republic is an ideal value “realizable in time and on 
earth” as distinct from Eliot’s value “realized only out of time” (Eliot, qtd. in Douglas 57-
58).18 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the similarities and differences between Eliot’s interest in the Christian 
tradition and Hemingway’s concern with the bullfighting tradition results in five main 
                                                
18 In 1937, during the Spanish civil war, Hemingway worked on a propaganda film, 
significantly entitled The Spanish Earth in support of the democratically elected 
Republican government. The film was co-written by John Dos Passos and Hemingway 
himself, and narrated by Orson Welles in English. An additional English language release 
was narrated by Hemingway. As Stephens illustrates, the film focuses on the countryside 
to show “the struggle of the Spanish workers and peasants to throw off feudal land barons 
and fight their way into the twentieth century” (23). The very title of the film 
meaningfully points out the extent to which Hemingway’s focus on republicanism, and 
its intrinsic value, is a result of the writer’s concern with a political ideology that is at 
heart social. Hemingway paid attention to a secular society rather than the anti-secularist 
society outlined by Eliot.  
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points that I consider crucial for an understanding of the distinctive propositions explored 
by these two authors for social cohesion. First, they both considered tradition as 
something dynamic that is in constant reference to the past and to the present. Second, 
they comparably identified tradition with a distinctive “way of feeling” (Eliot, ASG 29). 
Third, while Eliot focused on religious feelings intrinsic to the pursuit of an ideal that the 
Christian tradition identified with the divine Christ, Hemingway reflected on moral 
feelings resulting from the ideal of performing out of a sense of duty. Fourth, they 
focused on the extent to which the experience of these feelings implies the interaction 
between individual and society. Finally, this common concern led them to reflect on a 
social unity in which the ideals of the self and society become one. 
 Eliot and Hemingway considered distinctive social institutions to guarantee this 
social cohesion. Eliot focused on the church as a mode of securing religious faith within 
society. In contrast, Hemingway focused on a political party to strength the political 
ideology of the members of society. These alternative propositions for social cohesion 
result from the distinctive nature of the ideals they paid attention to. Whereas Eliot was 
committed to the necessity of subsuming the actions of the individual in the material 
world under God’s will, Hemingway focused on the moral value to be achieved in the 
material world 
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Chapter Five 
The American Author: Eliot’s and Hemingway’s Late Works 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In previous chapters I have reflected on Eliot’s and Hemingway’s concerns with an 
“immediate” or “all-inclusive experience” (Eliot, KE 31) beyond the intellectual 
categorizations of the material world.1 This chapter deals with these two authors’ 
considerations of the flaws of language to express this experience, while at the same time 
showing that they deployed language to convey such experience in words. In particular, I 
reflect on the extent to which this approach to language relates them to the literary 
tradition of their American forebears. In an interview for The Paris Review Eliot 
recognized the inevitable connection of his work with the tradition of American 
literature. He declared, “[my work] wouldn’t be what it is if I’d been born in England and 
it wouldn’t be what it is if I’d stayed in America. It’s a combination of things. But in its 
sources, in its emotional springs, it comes from America” (Plimpton 110).2 Similarly, 
Hemingway was an American author who lived and wrote mostly away from his country, 
                                                
1 “Immediate experience” (Eliot, KE 31) is a term used by Eliot in reference to the 
philosophy of F.H. Bradley. I have fully described and engaged with this concept in the 
first three chapters. 
 
2 Eliot moved from America to England in 1914. He became officially a British citizen in 
1927. For a detailed account of this event in his biography, see Gordon.  
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but the presence of America was a constant influence in his work and life.3 In a letter 
written in 1922 from Paris, Hemingway explains how the French capital “is so very 
beautiful that [it] satisfies something in you that is always hungry in America” (LEH 
328). His homeland is the point of reference to reflect on the new experiences of his life. 
Hemingway would not have written about Spain, Italy or Africa in the way he did if he 
had not been an American. The question is then of the extent to which it is possible to 
articulate an analysis that recognizes Eliot and Hemingway as distinctive American 
authors.4 Therefore, this chapter focuses on Eliot’s Four Quartets (1943) and 
Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea (1952) to identify the common features that 
connect these two authors with the tradition of American literature. The first section notes 
Eliot’s and Hemingway’s broadly similar mistrust of language to signify experiences 
alien to the mechanical categorization of reality. I situate this analysis within the 
                                                
3 In his life Hemingway made several public statements about his favorite books and 
authors. American literature had an important presence in those statements. In Green 
Hills of Africa Hemingway praises Henry James, Stephen Crane and Mark Twain as 
“good writers” (26) and reflects on the American “early classics” (25). In his private 
library Hemingway owned titles of American classics such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry James, Herman Melville, Mark Twain and Walt Whitman. 
He also had a wide variety of titles about American history and culture. For a detailed list 
of Hemingway’s library, see Brash and Sigman. 
   
4 Several critics such as Childs, Jay, Gordon (American), Oser or Sigg have analyzed 
Eliot as a distinctive American author. Childs argues that Eliot applied, in both his prose 
and poetry, the pattern of rhetoric and ideology inherited from his puritan ancestors. Jay 
pays attention to Eliot’s exposition of American philosophy in his studies at Harvard to 
reflect on the possible influence on his thinking by philosophers such as Royce, Babbitt 
or Santayana. Gordon recalls some biographical aspects of Eliot to decipher the 
American aspect of his poetry, particularly “The Dry Salvages.” Oser considers Eliot’s 
literary inheritance as well as some aspects of Puritan culture to analyze different stages 
of his poetry. Sigg explores how Eliot reacted against American culture and the family 
values of his youth and the extent to which those influenced his work.  None of these 
critics has related Eliot’s reflections on the intrinsic correlation between language and 
experience and the use of the symbol of the American Jeremiah as I do in this chapter.  
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framework of the American Renaissance. In particular, I focus on Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and William James to show how their consideration of the correlation between language 
and experience led them to endorse the use of symbols. In the second section, I look at 
the symbol of the American jeremiad to analyze Eliot and Hemingway as distinctively 
American authors.  
 
 
2. Language, Ralph Waldo Emerson and William James 
 
The concern of this section is with how Eliot and Hemingway shared an understanding of 
language inherited from the American Renaissance. In Chapter One I analyzed Eliot’s 
“objective correlative” (SP 48) and Hemingway’s “real thing” (DIA 2) as similar 
aesthetic propositions concerned with producing an emotional experience that allies the 
physical and the psychological in the experience of reality (see pp. 48-51). In this 
chapter, I develop further this common deployment of symbolic images to reflect on the 
extent to which this feature related them to a distinctively American literary tradition. 5 I 
position this analysis in the context of the revolt of the writers of nineteenth century 
America against the systems of thought inherited from the European tradition, and the use 
of symbols as a result of this rebellion. For Feidelson, the group of writers of this epoch 
constitutes a unified period of literary production, a coherent epistemological paradigm 
                                                
5 Feidelson’s seminal book on American symbolism has been a key influence on my own 
analysis. When I use Feidelson’s ideas I specify it accordingly.   
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that defines American literature.6 I argue that Eliot’s and Hemingway’s concern with the 
correlation between language and experience can be traced back to this literary tradition. 
First, I focus on Emerson and his consideration of the power of language at the same time 
that he suspects it. Second, I pay attention to William James, because as Poirier notes, he 
was the point of transmission that links Emerson with the authors of the twentieth century 
such as Frost, Stein or Eliot.7 All those authors inherited from Emerson, via James, their 
suspicion of the dependability of language, especially in the drift of one’s feelings 
(Poetry 5).  
 In Nature Emerson argues that “[e]very word […], if traced to its root, is found to 
be borrowed from some material appearance” (36). He points out the correlation between 
language and the experience of the material world at the same time as stressing that 
“[t]his immediate dependence of language upon nature, this conversion of an outward 
phenomenon into a type of somewhat in human life, never loses its power to affect us” 
(36). In comparable ways, William James also alludes to this dependence when he 
explains that “[p]ractically to experience one’s personal continuum in this living way is 
[…] to know what the words stand for concretely, to own all that they can ever mean” 
(ERE 26-27). Both Emerson and James point out the interdependence of language and 
experience, but they also warn about the necessity of restraining language to lose this 
power. In that respect, Emerson urged the use of symbols to prevent “words los[ing] all 
power to stimulate the understanding” (37). For Emerson language does not simply report 
                                                
6 See Reising 178. 
 
7 Although surprisingly Poirier does not include Hemingway among those American 
authors who were influenced by Emerson through James’ philosophy.  
 
 215 
reality, but creates it. Emerson advocated the use of symbols as a mode of preserving the 
power of language to adequately explain an experience of reality that is in continuous 
progress. Symbolism is a result of this consideration of reality as a reaction against the 
dualistic thinking opposed by the authors of the American Renaissance.8 
 In the nineteenth century the authors of the American Renaissance moved beyond 
the metaphysical concepts inherited from European thinking based on a dualistic 
conception of reality.9 As Emerson urged, it was necessary “to look at the world with 
new eyes” (54). “[He] did not suppose that the steps of intellectual history could be 
retraced; given the results of dualism, he tried to think through to the other side” 
(Feidelson 125). In “Experience” life is described as a “flux” (208) and Emerson’s 
vocabulary in this essay suggests progress and movement: “Everything good is on the 
highway” (204). Emerson appeals for a continuous action in the experience of reality to 
affirm that “the philosophy we want is one of fluxions and mobility” (238). In “Circles” 
Emerson affirms that “[t]here are no fixtures to men, if we appeal to consciousness. 
Every man supposes not to be fully understood” (176). Emerson focuses on process to 
claim the necessity of “build[ing], therefore, your own world” (55). This call of 
Emerson’s for process and building beyond fixed intellectual concepts is later found in 
                                                
8 In Chapter One I analyzed the extent to which Eliot and Hemingway engaged with the 
theories that revolted against a dualistic conception of reality (see pp. 25-47). In 
particular I paid special attention to William James and his reflections on consciousness. 
Therefore, in this chapter I do not engage with Emerson’s and James’s considerations in 
that respect. I intend to focus exclusively on the correlation between Emerson’s and 
James’ consideration of language as correlative with experience.   
 
9 For a full account of the particularities of the American literary tradition in the 
nineteenth century and its separation from the metaphysical values of Western thought, 
see Rowe 17-48. 
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William James and his redefinition of the real by locating it in an experience that—as in 
Emerson’s philosophy—is in continuous process (Kress 42). As Feidelson argues, the 
rejection of fixed intellectual categories of reality undertaken by American authors of the 
nineteenth century led toward the conception of experience as process, “[t]he only reality, 
therefore, lies in the process of becoming; not in the illusory permanence of guidebooks, 
but in the hazards of change” (180). This approach to experience as process requires a 
language that conveys such a continuous state of becoming, and therefore the writers of 
the American Renaissance advocated the use of symbols as a mode of securing this 
becoming. They “grappled with the problems posed by a new way of perceiving, of being 
in the world, a struggle which generated their overtures to symbolism” (Reising 176).  
 In “The Poet” Emerson notes, “all symbols are fluxional; all language is vehicular 
and transitive, and is good, as ferries and horses are, for conveyance, not as farms and 
houses are, for homestead” (195).  Emerson stresses the use of language as something 
that denotes movement because “[w]ords are also actions, and actions are a kind of 
words” (185). Emerson advocates language as part of this continuous becoming that is 
reality. For Feildelson, the symbolism of Emerson and the other writers of the American 
Renaissance “was an attempt to hew out such a form in defiance of intellectual methods 
that denied its validity” (89-90). This consideration of language is still at play in Eliot’s 
reflections on language in Knowledge and Experience when he suggests that reality is the 
development of language: “without words, no objects” and “no objects without language” 
(KE 133).10 He rejects the separation between object and language to claim that the 
symbol should be “not arbitrarily amputated from the object which it symbolizes […] No 
                                                
10 See Lewandowski 52-53.  
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symbol, I maintain, is ever a mere symbol, but is continuous with that which it 
symbolizes” (KE 132). Eliot—like Emerson—advocated the correlation between 
language and object within experience at the same time that he also pointed to symbols to 
secure such interaction. 
 Eliot remarked on the role that language plays in the experience of reality. In 
Knowledge he affirms, 
   you quite underestimate the closeness with which particular words are woven into 
 reality. […] The object qua object would not exist without this bundle of 
 experiences, but the bundle would not be a bundle unless it were held together by 
 the moment of objectivity which is realized in the name. (KE 133) 
 
Eliot underlines the intrinsic correlation between language, object and experience. 
Language orders and patterns the experience of reality and the knowledge we gain from it 
(Cooper, Introduction 75). In this analysis Eliot refers to a moment of objectivity, but 
throughout all his poetry he questioned the achieving of such a moment through the use 
of language. As Prufrock complains, “[t]hat is not what I meant at all./That is not it, at 
all” (Eliot, CPP 6). He cannot find the words to convey the meaning of his experiences. 
Eliot presents a language that has become “shabby equipment always deteriorating/In the 
general mess of imprecision of feeling” (128). For Prufrock language is an inadequate 
manifestation of the complexities of his feelings. He cannot fix the meaning of those 
experiences through the use of language.  
 In “Burnt Norton” Eliot affirms that words “[c]rack and sometimes break” (CPP 
121). Eliot remarked throughout his poetry how language may lose the power of moving: 
“The word within a word, unable to speak a word” (CPP 21). The awareness of this 
limitation positions Eliot with Emerson’s similar recognition of this flaw of language. 
Emerson “regarded language as potentially a trap which is liable to check us to the point 
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of stagnation and even decay—indeed, ‘stationariness’” (Tanner 5). However, at the same 
time, Emerson claimed in “The Poet” the use of language to convey fluidity. Eliot 
adopted this premise and in his poetry he always struggled to employ language “as 
vehicular and transitive” (Emerson 195). 
 In Knowledge Eliot considers the role of language in the experience of reality, but 
in his poetry he always looked into the experiences language cannot attain. In his poems 
Eliot engages with language “to realize its own potentialities within its limitations” (qtd. 
in Douglas 51). In “Burnt Norton” Eliot outlines these very limitations:   
 Words strain, 
 Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
 Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
 Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
 Will not stay still. (CPP 121)  
 
Eliot underlines how language cannot fix our experiences. “Words move” (121) and Eliot 
takes advantage of this condition. As Moody notes, “[g]etting the better of words is the 
essence of Four Quartets. Its major design is to so use words as to make them mean what 
is beyond words” (Ideology 147). For Eliot, word and meaning are continuous insofar as 
they become manifest in experience (Lewandowski 52). For Emerson, “[m]eaning was 
‘not what, but how,’ or rather the substance via the manner, like the recapture of being in 
becoming’” (Feidelson 130-31). Eliot assumes that “that which is only living/Can only 
die./ […]/Only by the form, the pattern,/Can words or music reach/The stillness, as a 
Chinese jar still/Moves perpetually in its stillness” (CPP 121). Eliot aims at a “still point” 
beyond language, but he pursues it through language. He conveys in his poetry the 
pattern of  “word and meaning being continuous” (KE 104). This is the stillness that 
“[m]oves perpetually” (CPP 112). Eliot claims the development of a continuous pattern 
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that may reach this moment that he named in his dissertation “the moment of objectivity” 
(KE 133). But he underlines that only a language creating continuously new patterns may 
reach it, because “[t]he detail of the pattern is movement” (CPP 122). Eliot moved 
beyond any fixity to engage with a permanent struggle with words: “Trying to learn to 
use words, and every attempt/Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of 
failure/Because one has only learnt to get the better of words” (CPP 128). Eliot was 
concerned with patterns of language in which the name and the object form a “mystic 
marriage” (KE 135).11 Eliot advocated this use of language to convey experience that is 
continually changing.  
 Eliot’s consideration of language is framed within two features that relate him to 
Emerson’s continuous struggle with language. First, Eliot stressed the correspondence 
between language and object. In “Swinburne as Poet” Eliot affirmed that “[l]anguage in a 
healthy state presents the object, is so close to the object that the two are identified” (SW 
127). Emerson stated that “‘in good writing, words become one with things’” (qtd. in 
Matthiessen,  Renaissance 30). Second, Eliot accepted the limitations of language, but he 
claimed “new patterns” to move beyond these limitations. For Emerson “‘there is 
somewhat in all life untranslatable into language,’ yet the necessity of trying to make a 
translation, of approximating that reality in words, remained urgent” (Matthiessen, 
                                                
11 Significantly, when Eliot uses this expression in relation to symbols, he explains that it 
should clarify his previous example about the “imaginary bear” of a child for whom 
“[t]he name has terminated in an experience” (KE 135). As Greenham notes, Emerson 
also made the learning of language by children into an analogy for the creation of 
language in general (104). This critic compares Locke’s and Emerson’s use of this feature 
to argue that the latter deployed a poetic reasoning in contraposition to Locke’s pure 
observation.  I consider that Eliot’s reasoning about language—even in a philosophical 
work such as Knowledge—is closer to Emerson’s poetic modes as his use of words such 
as ‘mystic’ shows.   
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Renaissance 41). Like Emerson, Eliot recognized that language should deal with its own 
limitations to pursue what is beyond language. This consideration led Eliot to underline 
the correlation between a “fluxional” language and a stream of experience.   
  In “East Coker” words are in a continual movement, they “[w]ill not stay still”, 
and Eliot underlines this by stressing how they “slip, slide, perish” (CPP 121). Eliot 
alludes through the use of language to a continuous experience or becoming reminiscent 
of William James’ remarks about language and experience when he affirms that:  
  [t]he word is a useful one to plunge forward into the stream of our 
 experience. […] It is a definitive instrument abstracted from experience, a 
 conceptual reality that you must take account of, and which reflects you totally 
 back into sensible realities. (Humanism 116) 
 
In Four Quartets Eliot depicts this stream of experience because he understood that the 
value of words rests on their capacity to immerse the individual in a continuous 
experience. “We had the experience but missed the meaning,/And approach to the 
meaning restores the experience/In a different form, beyond meaning” (CPP 133). In 
these lines Eliot adopts James’ premise that we should “set [each word] at work within 
the stream of […] [our] experience” (Poirier, Poetry 130). James noted this necessity 
when he claimed: “You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at 
work within the stream of your experience” (POW 28). Eliot understood the importance 
of this cash value and the extent to which it implies the correlative experience of the 
continuous becoming that is reality.  
 In “Swinburne as Poet” Eliot affirms that “[t]he bad poet dwells partly in a world 
of objects and partly in a world of words, and he never can get them to fit” (SW 127). In 
this statement Eliot confronts a use of language based on a separation between object and 
language with a language in which this detachment does not take place. Eliot proclaimed 
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in his criticism the language that he adopted in his poetry. Eliot deployed a language in 
which “symbol and that which it symbolizes […] are continuous” (Eliot, KE 104). He 
inherited this conception of language from his American forefathers. His reflections on 
language and his poetry can be traced back to the same pursuit undertaken by Emerson of 
creating a language where object and name are one. Eliot got the cash value of a language 
that conveys a continuous experience of reality.   
 Hemingway was also part of this tradition that underlined the correlation between 
language and experience at the same time as dealing with the suspicion of language. In 
his remarks about writing Hemingway also looked at the necessary correspondence 
between language and object to explore the use of symbols. He questioned the capability 
of language to attain something that is beyond language, but this feature led him to 
deploy language in a mode that relates him to his literary forefathers.  
 In a letter written in 1925 Hemingway attempts to explain to his father the value 
of his work: “You see I’m trying in all my stories to get the feeling of the actual life 
across—not to just depict life—or criticize it—but to actually make it alive. So that when 
you have read something by me you actually experience the thing” (SL 153). In these 
lines Hemingway accepts the intrinsic correlation between language and experience. But 
in his early stories he outlined his concerns about the possibility of transmitting “the 
feeling of the actual life” (153) through language. In his reflections on this matter 
Hemingway seems to be sure about the interdependence of language and experience, but 
in his works he questioned the possibility of achieving fully this correlation. In “The End 
of Something” Nick mistrusts language throughout the entire story to convey his feelings 
after breaking with Marjorie. “I feel as though everything was gone to hell inside of me. I 
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don’t know Marge. I don’t know what to say” (CSS 81). He is not only unsure about his 
feelings, but also about his own words to convey them. Thus, he neglects to use language 
when his friend asks him “[h]ow do you feel?” (82) and Nick’s only answer is “[o]h, go 
away, Bill! Go away for a while” (82). Nick cannot find the words to express his feelings 
and therefore Hemingway finishes the story without trying to explain them.   
 In “On Writing” a young Nick Adams reflects on his work as a writer to state that 
“[t]alking about anything was bad. Writing about anything was bad. It always killed it” 
(NAS 237). These words of Nick Adams are reminiscent of the apologetic sentence of 
Emerson in “Intellect” when he states that “if I speak, I define, I confine, and am less” 
(qtd. in Tanner 8). However, in spite of this recognition of the limitation of language, 
Emerson always proclaimed the “necessity that one must struggle with language in the 
effort to appropriate its otherwise hidden powers” (Poirier, Renewal 30). This 
Emersonian struggle with language may be also identified in Nick’s words in “On 
Writing” when he affirms that “[i]t was a thing you couldn’t talk about. He was going to 
work on it until he got it. Maybe never, but he would know as he got near it. It was a job 
for all his life” (239). In this short story, Hemingway presents a young writer who is 
learning how to use words in his fiction. Hemingway shows through this character 
ambivalence in his consideration of language and the possibility of attaining something 
beyond language by using it, but in later remarks Hemingway pointed to a precise mode 
of using language to pursue such an enterprise. He devoted his work as writer to the 
deployment of a use of words that relates him to Emerson within the similar parameters 
that also positioned Eliot under the tradition of the American Renaissance. 
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 In A Farewell to Arms the protagonist complains that “[a]bstract words such as 
glory, honor, courage or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the 
numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates” (185). 
Hemingway rejects abstract words to praise the use of concrete words at the same time 
that he identifies this concreteness with words that denote movement. This reflection is 
reminiscent of Eliot’s attitude towards language and his claim that in a healthy language 
name and object are one (SW 127). Hemingway advocates the similar premise defended 
by Emerson in Nature when he affirms that “wise men pierce this rotten diction and 
fasten words again to visible things” (37). For Emerson, the power of language depends 
on avoiding flabby abstraction and bonding word to object (Buell 110). So it was for 
Hemingway. 
 In A Moveable Feast Hemingway recalls his period of apprenticeship to clarify 
that his main concern as a young writer was “to make instead of describe” (156). He 
praises the mentoring of the American Ezra Pound, “the man who believed in […] the 
one and only correct word to use—the man who taught me to distrust adjectives” (134).12 
Pound gave Hemingway the advice of avoiding the use of abstractions. As Pound wrote, 
“[g]o in fear of abstractions” (5)—and, specifically, the mixture of an abstraction with the 
concrete. This common mistake, Pound maintained, “comes from the writer’s not 
realizing that the natural object is always the adequate symbol” (5). Hemingway 
followed Pound’s advice of using symbols to translate the equivalence of object and 
                                                
12 It is worth noting that Pound mentored Eliot as well in the process of editing the first 
draft of The Waste Land. Eliot dedicated the poem with the Italian phrase “il miglior 
fabbro” (CPP 37) to him. It means “the better craftsman” (Rainey 76).  
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language, because as Pound claimed, “the proper and perfect symbol is the natural object, 
[…] a hawk is a hawk” (Pound 9). 
 This lesson is at the core of Hemingway’s remark about the iceberg technique in 
Death in the Afternoon: 
 If a writer of prose knows enough about what he is writing about he may  omit 
 things that he knows and the reader, if the writer is writing truly enough, will 
 have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the writer state them. The 
 dignity of movement of an ice-berg is due to only one-eight of it being above 
 water. (DIA 192) 
 
This remark has two features that relate the iceberg to the symbol. First, Hemingway 
equates the iceberg to the object that denotes experience or feeling. Second, this object 
that is one with language implies movement. In addition, this movement points to 
something beyond the very image or symbol. Hemingway’s iceberg theory is within the 
same parameters of symbolism. As Matthiessen notes, Emerson’s “desire for a quality of 
expression that cleaves to the fact and yet stands for something larger than itself, which 
suggests more than it can denote, led him to the symbol” (American 41). Even when 
Hemingway disliked publicly the use of symbols, it cannot be ignored that he advocated 
its use in his remarks about writing.13 Hemingway proclaimed that the name and the 
object should become one to plunge into an experience that is in continuous movement.  
                                                
13 In an interview with The Paris Review, Hemingway affirms in relation to The Sun Also 
Rises: “I suppose there are symbols since critics keep finding them. If you do not mind I 
dislike talking about them and being questioned about them” (Plimpton 229). In relation 
to The Old Man and the Sea, Hemingway wrote that “there is the other secret. There isn’t 
any symbolism (mis-spelled). The sea is the sea. The old man is the old man. The boy is 
the boy and the fish is the fish. The sharks are all sharks no better and no worse. All the 
symbolism that people say is shit. What goes beyond is what you see beyond when you 
know” (SL 780). I consider that Hemingway neglected the critic’s interpretation of 
symbols, not the use of symbols in his fiction, as I argue.   
 225 
 Eliot’s and Hemingway’s considerations of language position them within the 
parameters explored by their American forefathers about the use of symbols.  According 
to Eliot, “[w]e look, in a poet as well as in a novelist, for what Henry James called the 
Figure in the Carpet” (qtd. in Gordon, American 39). As Rowe contends in relation to 
Henry James’ famous symbol, “[i]t is the process of observation as part of the creative 
process that makes a pattern in the carpet at all. The quest is the goal” (42). The goal is 
not to fix an experience, “but to make it alive” (SL 153), as Hemingway explained to his 
father.  
 Eliot and Hemingway adopted the use of symbols to create an experience that gets 
its meaning as a reflection of the process of symbolization itself. The symbolism 
inherited from “the American Renaissance expresses man’s existence in an ultimately 
teleological manner. The quest of the poet or hero is an attempt to resolve the dualism of 
his condition” (Rowe 21). In the next section I shall consider the extent to which the 
symbol of the American jeremiad can be traced in Eliot’s and Hemingway’s final works. 
Thus, by juxtaposing in my analysis the symbol of the jeremiad with the intrinsic quest of 
symbolism to overcome dualism, I shall clarify the extent to which Eliot and Hemingway 
succeed in this quest within the context of a distinctive American literary tradition. 
 
 
3. Eliot, Hemingway and the American jeremiad 
 
This section focuses on Eliot’s Four Quartets and Hemingway’s The Old Man and the 
Sea to question the extent to which these two authors internalized a pattern of rhetoric 
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inherited from the Puritan tradition, including its use of the symbol of the American 
jeremiad. To do so, I use the work of Sacvan Bercovitch in relation to this tradition.14 As 
he argues, “the search for meaning is at once endless and self-enclosed. Any possibility 
we propose invites a host of different possibilities, all of these inherent in the symbol” 
(178). Thus, I consider the possibilities he explores in relation to the symbol of the 
American jeremiad to deploy an analysis of Eliot and Hemingway within this framework. 
In particular I pay attention to four of the main features that Bercovitch considers in his 
study. First, I reflect on the similar sense of mission intrinsic to the patterns of the Puritan 
narrative tradition. Second, I pay attention to the imagery of the frontier that shapes the 
mission. Third, I take into account the concept of the errand as being at the core of the 
previous two features. Finally, I examine the promise of ultimate success and fulfillment 
of destiny as correlative to the American jeremiad, at the same time as reflecting on the 
extent to which Eliot and Hemingway convey in their respective works this sense of 
achievement.  
 In reference to the sense of mission intrinsic to the sermons of the first Puritans 
who arrived at Massachusetts Bay, Bercovitch notes that “[t]he American Puritan 
jeremiad owes its uniqueness to this vision and mode of rhetoric” (Bercovitch 9). In the 
last stanza of “East Coker” Eliot conveys this sense, one that simultaneously affects our 
                                                
14 In recognizing Eliot as at least narratively American, Childs uses Bercovitch’s 
understanding of the American jeremiad.  Childs’ analysis has influenced me, specifically 
in the use of the work of Bercovitch, but this chapter focuses exclusively on Eliot’s later 
poetry rather than in Eliot’s whole body of work. When I use the ideas of this critic, I 
specify it accordingly. Different scholars have undertaken a wide variety of work on 
Puritanism and the jeremiad in America. For a list of the most prominent works in that 
respect, see Reining 49-91.  
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reading of Four Quartets as a whole.15 Eliot points to a new terrain that should be 
explored by a group of men that shall succeed in this enterprise: 
 Old men ought to be explorers 
 Here and there does not matter 
 We must be still and still moving 
 Into another intensity 
 For a further union, a deeper communion 
 Through the dark cold and the empty desolation,  
 The wave cry, the wind cry, the vast waters 
 Of the petrel and the porpoise. In my end is my beginning. (CPP 129) 
 
 In these lines Eliot alludes to a new terrain. This stanza implies undertaking a mission of 
exploring something new, at the same time as stressing the communal dimension of this 
mission. These lines remind us of the American jeremiads and their “triumphant assertion 
of their destiny, migration and pilgrimage entwined in the progress of New England’s 
holy commonwealth” (Bercovitch 15). In addition, this stanza at the end of the first two 
quartets sets the confluence between “the first world” that Eliot explores in “Burnt 
Norton” and “East Coker” and the pursuit of “a deeper communion” (CPP 129) 
unavailable in the “deception” of the “first world” (118). This important moment in the 
overall design of the four quartets confronts the “the old” with “a new world” (119). It 
connects the first two quartets with the last two in a progression from the old to the 
exploration of the new. As Gordon notes, “[t]he very notion of an Old World implies a 
New-World perspective from which the Old World may be seen, made explicit” 
(American 44). This Puritan rhetoric may be identified in the whole structure of The Four 
                                                
15 Four Quartets is composed of four different poems that were published over a period 
of six years. The first poem is “Burnt Norton” and it was first published in 1936. The 
other three, “East Coker,” “The Dry Salvages” and “Little Gidding” were written during 
the Second World War. The four poems were not published together in a collection until 
1943.  
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Quartets and it offers a useful framework for reading Eliot’s attention to the world he 
tries to leave behind in his pursuit of this “further union” (CPP 129).  
 “Burnt Norton” and “East Coker” present a world that Eliot depicts as a point of 
departure. Eliot moves from this “place of disaffection” (CPP 120) framed by a 
mechanical categorization of time and space to “the intersection of the timeless moment” 
(139). In the first two quartets Eliot pays detailed attention to an urban world spatially 
delimited:  
 Houses rise and fall, crumble, are extended, 
 Are removed, destroyed, restored, or in the place  
 Is an open field, or a factory, or a by-pass. 
 Old stone to new building, old timber to new fires. (123)  
 
Eliot equates the evolution of this landscape with a progression conditioned by a 
mechanical conception of time or “succession” where “Houses live and die: there is a 
time for building/ And a time for living and for generation” (123). In this world “[i]n my 
beginning is my end” (129), but Eliot aims to move beyond this “world of sense” (120) 
and he proposes to: 
 Descend lower, descend only 
 Into the world of perpetual solitude 
 […] 
 Internal darkness, deprivation 
 And destitution of all property 
 Desiccation of the world of sense, 
 Evacuation of the world of fancy. (120) 
 
 Eliot points out a mission that he frames within the abandonment of this world of 
mechanical “succession” (123) to reach a world of “stillness” (145) where “[i]n my end is 
my beginning” (129). The abandon of the old will lead to the beginning of the new, as 
with the colonists when they first arrived in New England.  
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 In the Four Quartets Eliot moves from “the old made explicit” (CPP 119) to point 
out an alternative consideration of time in “The Dry Salvages”: “Measures time not our 
time, rung by the unhurried/Ground swell, a time/Older than the time of chronometers, 
older/Than the time counted by anxious worried women” (131). Eliot speculates about 
the nature of a time beyond man’s measure and he relates the experience of this time to 
the involvement in the mission of pursuing it: “Because we have gone trying;/We, 
content at the last/If our temporal reversion nourish/[…]/The life of significant soil” 
(137). The mission implies the aim of this “significant soil.” This soil is beyond a frontier 
that Eliot shapes at the end of the second quartet. Eliot uses the frontier as an element that 
separates the old from the new, and where Eliot outlines moments these two worlds seem 
to merge: “Caught in the form of limitation/Between un-being and being” (122). Eliot’s 
treatment of the frontier in the whole structure of the poem resembles the imagery of the 
American frontier that “lies at the higher edge of a free land” (Turner 3). Eliot aspires to 
conquer free land where “[t]he inner freedom from the practical desire” (CPP 119 ) will 
be available. Eliot aspires to cross the frontier beyond the material world.  
 In “East Coker,” just before his allusion to the  “explorers” (CPP 129), Eliot notes 
that “[h]ome is where one starts from” (129).16 By referring to home as a point of 
departure, Eliot considers the physical boundaries or frontiers that will be crossed in “a 
lifetime burning in every moment” (129). Eliot reflects on material borders in an attempt 
to recover what the material world deprives him of. As Lobb argues, “the important thing 
is to accept limitation, not simply as an act of humility but because life itself is 
                                                
16 Gordon notes that “East Coker is the village in Somerset from which Andrew Eliot 
[one of Eliot’s forefathers] set out for America in 1669” (American 43). Gordon hints at 
this event to suggest that “‘East Coker’ is a poem about family origins” (43). For an 
alternative consideration of Eliot’s allusion to his family history in this poem, see Oser.  
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limitation” (35). Eliot reflects on the limitation of the material world as a frontier that 
should be crossed. This frontier shapes the mission that aims to move beyond the very 
limits that Eliot explores in “Burnt Norton” and “East Coker.” Eliot organizes a 
progression within the four quartets, and by doing so, he deploys boundaries that are in a 
continuous flux.   
 In “The Dry Salvages” Eliot engages with the frontier imagery through the use of 
the river and the sea. He underlines that the former is “at first recognized as a frontier” 
(CPP 130) that “is the land’s edge also” (130). Eliot points to a frontier that will be 
crossed to enter into the new terrain of the ocean. He leaves the coast to suggest the 
necessity of exploring the new world. As Bercovitch notes, “the ‘American character’ 
was shaped by […] ‘the fact of the frontier’” (10). This intrinsic feature of the American 
experience cannot be neglected in Eliot’s allusion to physical borders in the Four 
Quartets, but for Eliot this frontier is not simply a physical one: “The river is within us, 
the sea is all about us” (CPP 130). Eliot refers to a physical frontier, but he points out an 
interior frontier that comes along with the journey undertaken by the “explorers” (129) in 
their exploration of significant soil beyond the border. As Gordon notes in his analysis of 
“The Dry Salvages,” Eliot was attached to the American dream of self-transformation 
that, at the same time, was projected through the frontier imagery that Eliot identified 
with the Atlantic ocean and the Massachusetts’ shore as experienced by the first settlers 
(American 41). Eliot uses the imagery of the frontier in the Four Quartets, but for Eliot 
the New World is a not a physical land, but a spiritual state that should be conquered by 
leaving behind the old world he identifies with the material world inhabited “[b]y 
worshippers of the machine” (CPP 130). As Oser notes, “the expatriate poet and High-
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Churchman returned to his native traditions to set down the spiritual experience that 
culminated in Four Quartets” (107). Eliot presents a mission that achieves something 
beyond the frontier, but the significant soil beyond this border is not a physical land, but a 
spiritual state or “[a] condition of complete simplicity” (CPP 145) where the limits of 
temporal life are neglected.  
    In The Old Man and the Sea Hemingway also conveys a sense of mission, at the 
same time as involving the element of the frontier in the exploration of this mission. Like 
Eliot, Hemingway confronts two worlds and similarly uses a mechanical conception of 
space and time to depict one world in contraposition to the other. As Baker affirms, 
“[t]his short novel, in the words of Eliot, explores yet ‘another intensity’ […]. Among the 
vast waters of the petrel and the porpoise, [Hemingway] seemed […] to have found the 
means of establishing ‘a further union’ and ‘a deeper communion’” (293). However, to 
fully understand Hemingway’s exploration of this ‘deeper communion,’ it is necessary to 
take into account the world that Santiago leaves behind in the performance of his 
mission. This sense of mission also relates Hemingway’s work to the rhetoric of the 
American jeremiad and the Puritan narrative tradition.17  
 The very first line of The Old Man and the Sea explains how Santiago “was an old 
man who fished alone in a skiff in the Gulf Stream and he had gone eighty-four days now 
without taking a fish” (9). Significantly, Hemingway refers to time and space to set the 
situation of the main character. Hemingway is very specific in that respect throughout the 
whole story. In the first pages he underlines the material world in which Santiago lives, 
                                                
17 It is not easy to delimit the concept of Puritan tradition. As Reising makes clear, many 
theorists have used different approaches to do so. In this section I engage exclusively 
with Bercovitch’s work. For an account of the different studies on the Puritan tradition 
and its influence on American literature, see Reising 49-74.  
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describing “the old man’s shack” (15) in detail. He pays attention to the spatial 
boundaries that frame the old man’s life: the harbour, the local bar, and the way home 
from the beach: “When the wind was in the east a smell came across the harbour from the 
shark factory” (11, 15). Similarly, a mechanical conception of time is used in a very 
precise way: “But remember how you went eighty-seven days without fish and then we 
caught big ones every day for three weeks” (10). Time is important for framing the action 
of fishing, but Hemingway mainly uses it when he considers Santiago’s fishing from a 
practical point of view: “In the first forty days a boy had been with him. But after forty 
days without a fish the boy’s parents had told him that the old man was […] salao 
[unlucky]” (9). At the beginning of the story Hemingway focuses on the life of the old 
man and his activities on shore. Fishing belongs to this life. But Hemingway also 
explores fishing regardless of its fruits and it is then when he does not use time to frame 
the actions. 
 These two different considerations of fishing correspond to the two worlds that 
Hemingway explores in this novella. One refers to the land and the other is the sea, 
understood as the world beyond the frontier that Santiago crosses when he leaves the 
harbour behind to embark on his fishing trip: “My big fish must be there somewhere” 
(35). The mission will be performed in a world without specific limitations, in contrast to 
the clearly delimited world of the harbour. Like Eliot in “Burnt Norton” and “East 
Coker,” in The Old Man and the Sea Hemingway is very precise in outlining these two 
worlds, at the same time that he sets a moment where they blur before the final 
exploration of the new terrain. 
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 [M]ost of the boats were silent except for the dip of the oars. They spread apart 
 after they were out of the mouth of the harbour and each one headed for the part 
 of the ocean where he hoped to find the fish. (28) 
 
 The old man leaves behind the harbour—a delimited spatial area—to enter into the 
wilderness or new dimension that contrasts with the world from which he is moving 
away.  Hemingway juxtaposes the limited world of the land with the ocean in which 
Santiago undertakes the exploration of a new dimension. This moment can be read as the 
temporary abandonment of one world, but also as the outbreak of the performance of the 
mission that is being pursued in the new one. This is an important moment in the overall 
design of the novella because Hemingway juxtaposes the two worlds to establish the 
nature of the mission that old Santiago will undertake.  
 Hemingway also presents a mission that achieves something beyond the frontier 
that he uses to shape this endeavour. The Old Man and the Sea juxtaposes the world of 
the harbour where Santiago lives with the world of the sea where the old man chases the 
fish. Once Santiago is in the ocean he affirms that it “is the time to think of only one 
thing. That which I was born for” (OMS 40). Hemingway points out the extent to which 
now is the moment to focus exclusively on the performance of Santiago’s mission. When 
the struggle starts in the middle of the sea, Santiago and the fish become one: “Now we 
are joined together […]. And no one to help either one of us” (50). His mission is not 
simply to catch the fish, but above all to be a fisherman. Santiago’s actions relate to those 
of Nick Adams in “Big Two-Hearted River” or Jake’s in The Sun Also Rises, but the 
vastness of the sea differs from the limitation of the river in the other two works. In The 
Old Man and the Sea the frontier is to be conquered by the individual as a mode of final 
attempt of succeeding in his performance. Santiago fishes in this story as an ultimate 
 234 
fishing trip while in previous works Hemingway’s characters knew that “there were 
plenty of days coming when he could fish” (IOT 156). Santiago fishes “because he is a 
fisherman” (OMAS 105) and his mission implies a self-transformation.  
  Santiago has already crossed the frontier and he is ready to perform his 
endeavour. There is a moment within the timeline of Santiago’s fight in the sea when 
Hemingway avoids any mechanical arrangement of reality.18 This “further union” (Eliot, 
CPP 129) arises when Santiago is away from the harbour and he is immersed in the 
mission that implies the experience of a new dimension unavailable for him on shore: 
 He looked across the sea and knew how alone he was now. But he could see the 
 prisms in the deep dark water and the line stretching ahead and the strange 
 undulation of the calm. The clouds were building up now for the trade wind and 
 he looked ahead and saw a flight of wild ducks etching themselves against the 
 sky over the water, then blurring. (OMS 60-61)  
 
Santiago has crossed the spatial boundaries of the land as a result of the performance of 
the mission he is devoted to. As Hollenberg notes, “[t]he sky, in this moment, becomes a 
space of signs, of nonhuman markings” (36). The mission leads Santiago to cross the 
spatial frontier. Similarly, during the fight, Santiago does not refer to time in the same 
way as he does at the beginning of the fishing trip. He does not care about a mechanical 
categorization of time any longer and he ignores it. The pursuit of the mission leads him 
to this consideration. The mission—the fishing of the fish—leads him to this new 
dimension. If “he stays down forever. Then I will stay down with him forever” (OMS 60). 
The endeavour of the mission offers Santiago a timeless moment while the fight with the 
fish is being undertaken.   
                                                
18 As Sylvester accurately notes, “[t]he marlin’s fight lasts exactly forty-eight hours; it is 
seventy-two hours, from morning to morning, between Santiago’s departure and his 
resurgence of vitality at the story’s end” (68). 
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 Hemingway outlines a mission that leads Santiago to enter into a boundless 
dimension beyond time and space. The nature of this mission attains to something beyond 
a frontier, but it cannot be ignored that the performance of this mission depends on a 
physical activity. As Santiago reminds himself, “You were born to be a fisher man as the 
fish was born to be a fish” (OMS 105). He assumes the circumstances of the mission, but 
those condition the boundless moments intrinsic to the fight: “‘Fish,’ he said softly, 
aloud, ‘I’ll stay with you until I am dead’” (52). Santiago explores in the ocean a new 
dimension or further union—using Eliot’s words—in the world beyond the borders of the 
land. The fish and the old man are one while the fight takes place and Santiago 
experiences “a deeper communion” (Eliot, CPP 129) as a result of this physical 
performance.  
 Fishing in this novella symbolizes the performance of action as the only mode of 
moving beyond the limitations of the material world. As Baker argues in relation to 
Santiago, this grasp of the relationship between the temporal and the eternal is expressed 
in Hemingway’s fiction through the use of symbols (291). In The Old Man and the Sea 
fishing is a symbol of the pursuit of a transcendental centre to reach a unified experience 
of reality, but only the physical fight with the fish provides Santiago with the clash 
between the eternal and the temporal. The old man’s mission is a physical endeavour and 
it brings him an experience that may be compared to the state beyond the limitations of 
the material world that Eliot pursues in Four Quartets. Hemingway aims at a comparable 
state, or “condition of complete simplicity” (Eliot, CPP 145) where the limits of temporal 
life are neglected. In addition, Hemingway also outlines in Santiago’s fight a moment of 
stillness beyond time. When Santiago is in the sea, he refers to the past and present at the 
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same time that he identifies himself with the fish, in order to allude to the future: “‘Never 
have I seen a greater, or more beautiful, or a calmer or more noble thing than you, 
brother. Come on and kill me. I do not care who kills who’” (OMS 92). The fight goes on 
and the old man finally manages to kill the fish:  
 Then the fish came alive, with his death in him, and rose high out of the water 
 showing all his great length and width and all his power and his beauty. He 
 seemed to hang in the air above the old man in the skiff. (94) 
 
In this image, Hemingway confronts life to death and movement to stillness to deploy 
“the intersection of the timeless moment” (Eliot, CPP 139). But in the next sentence 
Hemingway writes how the fish “fell into the water with a crash that sent spay over the 
old man and over all of the skiff” (OMS 94). This moment of time beyond time is only a 
temporary illusion framed within the performance of the fishing. 
 This moment in Hemingway’s novella can be compared in instructive ways to 
Eliot’s, as when he writes in “Burnt Norton”:  
 Time past and time future 
 Allow but little consciousness. 
 To be conscious is not to be in time 
 But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden, 
 […] 
 Be remembered; involved with the past and the future. 
 Only through time time is conquered. (CPP 119-20) 
 
Eliot confronts time to timelessness as Hemingway does in the scene of the fish above the 
old man’s skiff, but Eliot stresses the necessity of moving beyond time to conquer it. For 
Cooper, “[t]he collapse of strict temporal distinctions leads to an extraordinary dilatation 
of consciousness beyond the confining grammars of time” (Introduction 97). Hemingway 
also deploys a similar breakup of temporal distinctions, but after that, he returns to a 
mechanical consideration of time to finish the story. Hemingway is condemned to remain 
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within the limitation of the physical world because he frames the old man’s mission 
within the duration of his fight. The experience of this new dimension is bound to the 
limitations of the fishing trip and the final outcomes of Santiago’s performance in the sea. 
In The Old Man and the Sea Hemingway confronts time and timeless moments in the 
endeavour performed by Santiago. He even tries to convey the collapse of strict temporal 
distinctions, but he does not achieve this experience beyond time because his mission is 
correlative to the very deployment of time. After the timeless moment conveyed by 
Hemingway, Santiago keeps struggling in the sea to return to the harbour with his catch. 
He continues in the errand to finish the mission that condemns him to the boundaries of 
the material world.  
 Eliot and Hemingway use the ocean where “the fishermen” sail “[i]nto the wind’s 
tail” (Eliot, CPP 132) to reflect on distinctive missions. Eliot underlines the progressive 
nature of the voyage of the old men, because their wives “think of them as forever 
bailing,/Setting and hauling” (132). Hemingway also stresses the continuity of Santiago’s 
mission. In their use of the sense of mission intrinsic to the American jeremiad, these two 
authors recur to another pattern that is at the core of that jeremiad. As Bercovitch 
illustrates, the Puritan tradition established a vision of errand that assesses continuity and 
change (33). Eliot’s Four Quartets and Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea convey 
this sense of “errand [that] means progress” (12) and as the American jeremiad, they 
“attest to an unswerving faith in the errand” (Bercovitch 6). But the distinctive mission of 
these two authors will condition the continuity and the sense of ultimate success of this 
errand.  
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  In Four Quartets Eliot deploys a gradual conquest of the frontier: “So here I am, 
in the middle way, having had twenty years—/Twenty years largely wasted, […]/There is 
only the fight to recover what has been lost/ […]/For us there is only the trying” (CPP 
128). Eliot underlines the progressive nature of the mission and sets the sense of the 
errand at the core of the Four Quartets. As Konkle argues, the Puritan sense of errand 
implies “[a] new beginning, then, and a newly urgent sense of ending; and intermediate 
between these, at once linking them in time and confirming the overall design” (156). In 
the overall design of the Four Quartets Eliot constantly alludes to the new beginning that 
implies an end: “In my beginning is my end. In succession” (CPP 123). At the same time, 
this succession requires the constant pursuit or creation of new patterns that lead towards 
the new: “To become renewed, transfigured, in another pattern” (142). Eliot deploys a 
pattern to oppose time to timelessness and this pattern achieves its meaning when it is 
considered under the structure developed by Eliot in Four Quartets as a whole. “Each 
quartet duplicates the five-part structure of the preceding quartet and repeats the 
dominant themes of the sequence as a whole, […], each quartet is the same, but different, 
and reconciles sameness and difference in its use of a repeated form” (Lobb 33). This 
pattern deployed by Eliot in the Four Quartets provides the whole work “with a sense of 
purpose, direction, and continuity” (Bercovitch 80). The creation and pursuit of these 
patterns are intrinsic to the nature of the errand because only the achievement of the 
mission will bring a sense of progress.  
 Eliot underlines the endless nature of the mission because “the faith and the love 
and the hope are all in the waiting” (CPP 127). As he affirms in The Idea of a Christian 
Society, “we have to remember that the Kingdom of Christ on earth will be never 
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realised, and also that it is always being realised” (qtd. in Childs 184). Similarly, in 
relation to the American jeremiad, Bercovitch notes that “[t]he very concept of errand, 
after all, implied a state of unfulfillment. The future, though divinely assured, was never 
quite there, and New England’s Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that 
would ensure the outcome” (23). Eliot embraces this sense of insecurity to stress that 
only the embracement of the divine will assure the achievement of the mission: “The only 
wisdom we can hope to acquire/Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless” (CPP 
126). Eliot underlines how the process of moving beyond the material world is an 
ongoing mission that will be never completely realized in the material world: “And right 
action is freedom/From past to future also/For most of us, this is the aim/Never here to be 
realized;/We are only undefeated/Because we have gone on trying” (136). Right action is 
freedom and the performance of this endeavour requires faith in the errand. In order to 
fully achieve this “further communion” (129) we must fully leave behind the old world.  
 Eliot accepts endless continuity and change as a requirement for the achievement 
of the mission. In contrast, Hemingway is ambiguous in the embracement of this endless 
progress of the errand. Hemingway explores the ongoing dimension of the mission, but 
he does not point to an endless performance, because Santiago’s mission implies an end. 
In the middle of the fight the old man affirms: “‘The fish is my friend too,’ […] ‘I have 
never seen or heard of such a fish. But I must kill him. I am glad we do not have to try to 
kill the stars’” (OMS 75). In this statement, the old man clearly rejects an endless pursuit. 
He praises the limited nature of his endeavour and the necessity of performing it to fulfill 
his mission. It is significant that Hemingway includes the narration of a meaningful event 
during the old man’s fight with the fish. Santiago recalls “the time in the tavern of 
 240 
Casablanca when he had played the hand game with the great negro from Cienfuegos 
who was the strongest man on the docks” (69). Hemingway tells the story of an arm 
wrestling and he specifies how “[t]he match had started on a Sunday morning and ended 
on a Monday morning” (70). He is as precise with the timeline of the event in Africa as 
he is with Santiago’s fight in the sea. Similarly, he underlines the importance of finishing 
the physical mission in which Santiago gets involved and he is particularly clear in 
emphasizing the result of the contend: “He had finished it” (70).   
 Alternatively, Eliot’s emphasis is on process rather than exclusively on the final 
outcome of the mission. As Bercovitch argues, the Puritans were far less concerned with 
the final event than with the design of gradual fulfillment (98). Four Quartets is a work 
designed within a pattern that underlines the process of fulfillment rather than stressing 
the final outcome. As Eliot states in the last part of “Little Gidding” “[e]very phrase and 
every sentence is an end and a beginning,/Every poem an epitaph. And any action/Is a 
step to the block, […]/We die with the dying:/[…]/We are born with the death” (CPP 
144). The rhetoric of the Puritan jeremiads is at the core of the end of the Four Quartets. 
In these lines Eliot “joined lament and celebration in reaffirming […] the mission as the 
Puritan Jeremiads (Bercovitch 11). There is a continuous celebration that leads towards 
the final sense of achievement as a result of undertaking the mission outlined in the Four 
Quartets.  
 Eliot claims that “[w]e shall not cease from exploration” because at the “end of all 
our exploring” we will “arrive where we started/ And know the place for the first time” 
(CPP 145). Eliot hopes for something new at the end of the mission, and he points to this 
sense of fulfillment in the very last stanza of the Four Quartets, when he offers this 
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“further union” that he aimed at at the end of “East Coker.” Eliot has crossed the frontier 
between the old and new worlds and at the end of the last quartet Eliot describes the steps 
undertaken throughout the mission: 
 There are three conditions which often look alike 
 Yet differ completely, flourish in the same hedgerow: 
 Attachment to self and to things and to persons, detachment 
 From self and from things and from persons; and, growing between  
 Them, indifference […] 
 For liberation—not less of love but expanding 
 […], and so liberation. (142) 
 
Eliot achieves liberation from the material world. He looks into “intersection of the 
timeless/With time” that “is an occupation for the saint—/No occupation either, but 
something given/And taken, in a lifetime’s death in love” (136). Eliot equates the “still 
point” to the “death in love” of the “saint” (136).  In “Little Gidding” Eliot overcomes the 
limitations imposed by the “the knowledge derived from experience./ The knowledge 
imposed a pattern, and falsifies” (125). In the last quartet, Eliot reaches “[t]he only 
wisdom we can hope” (125). As Moody affirms, “Four Quartets systematically subverts 
and inverts ‘normal’ humane values. Its wisdom is the negative wisdom of humility; its 
love is concerned only to conceive the Word heard in humble submission to death, and its 
history would record nothing but the deaths in that Love of saints and martyrs” (154). 
Eliot aims at the union of the eternal and the finite, the timeless and the temporal that is 
only actualized in love towards God.19  
 In The Old Man and the Sea, Santiago identifies himself with the mission of being 
a fisherman to the same extent that Eliot embraces the mission of loving God.  Only the 
struggle of Santiago to catch the fish may offer the old man a broadly similar experience 
                                                
19 See Blamires 120. 
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as the one pointed out by Eliot in a “lifetime’s death in love” (CPP 136). As Taylor 
notes, the old man’s attitude equates to “the value of the heroic individual taking the 
greatest risk in order to achieve the greatest fulfillment” (qtd. in Eddins 73). After the 
fight with the fish Santiago claims: “But man is not made for defeat,’ he said. ‘A man can 
be destroyed but not defeated’” (OMS 103). Only the struggle, the constant fight in the 
sea gives meaning to his experiences in the sea. Santiago experiences a sense of 
fulfillment, but his mission is condemned to end while Eliot’s mission of love towards 
God implies the endless “stillness” (CPP 121) beyond the contradiction of the material 
world.  
 It is remarkable how in The Old Man and the Sea the powerful image of the fight 
between the marlin and Santiago does not move beyond the proper limitations of the 
timeline of Santiago’s experience and the spatial boundaries of his life. Hemingway’s 
narrative form condemns the symbol of Santiago and the fish—“we are joined together” 
(50)—to remain within the boundaries of the pattern of the story. The writer of fiction 
frames Santiago’s failed attempt to embrace an experience beyond time in a literary form 
conditioned by the limited lineal plot. Alternatively, Eliot’s final symbols of union at the 
end of the Four Quartets move beyond time and space to reach “the stillness/Between 
two waves of the sea” (CPP 145). Eliot uses poetry to move beyond the frontier he 
outlines in these poems, because as he states, “the poet is occupied with frontiers of 
consciousness beyond which words fail, though meanings still exit” (qtd. in Oser 111). 
As Douglas claims in relation to “Burnt Norton,” “[it] enacts, insofar as it can, a process 
of awakening to the meaning of an intuitive experience” (95). For Eliot, there is a 
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meaning unattainable through the use of words in his poetry. There is meaning beyond 
death—the material world—because “my end is my beginning” (CPP 129). 
 In contrast, in Hemingway’s final symbol there is no meaning beyond Santiago’s 
performance, but only dreaming in an endless experience. As Grimes notes, “[t]he main 
thing that remains is the dreaming […]. The main thing that remains is a mode of 
perceiving and being that provides access to life without borders, truly wild territory, 
undescribed, and hence unlimited” (Lions 64). But it cannot be ignored that the journey 
of the old man finishes within the same boundaries where it starts. There is none of 
Eliot’s boundless experience as Santiago returns to the world he fails to leave behind in 
his frustrated attempt of reaching a life without borders. For Hemingway there is no 
meaning after death. 
 Physically exhausted in his shack up the road, the main character of The Old Man 
and the Sea sleeps under the gaze of the young boy: “Up the road, in his shack, the old 
man was sleeping again” (127). The journey of the failed fishing trip reaches its end and 
Hemingway presents the consequences of the physical fight performed by the old man in 
his battle with the big fish. The old man has not succeeded in his enterprise. Again, 
Hemingway explores in his fiction the impossibility of moving beyond the intellectual 
categorization of reality; and, hence, time and space. He finishes the story with a symbol 
of defeat: “The old man was dreaming about the lions” (OMS 127). Like all 
Hemingway’s characters, old Santiago remains trapped in the physical realm and 
condemned to the eternal dream of an experience of stillness beyond the limitations of the 
material world. In contrast, in the very last line of Four Quartets Eliot offers a symbol of 
harmony: “And the fire and the rose are one” (CPP 145). The poet reaches the desired 
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moment of spiritual communion beyond the self. He overcomes the limits imposed by the 
categorization of reality to experience the silence and stillness of God.  
 Simultaneously, Eliot’s and Hemingway’s final symbols represent both the pursuit 
and the final outcomes of their shared mission to attain a unity of experience. For Rowe, 
the symbolism of the American Renaissance depended upon a movement toward a 
transcendental centre (21). In their late works Eliot and Hemingway kept moving towards 
this centre, just as their literary forefathers did. In Four Quartets Eliot succeeds in this 
movement and presents a final symbol of unity. In contrast, Hemingway’s symbol 
presents the frustrated attempt to reach such unity of experience.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has established the extent to which Eliot and Hemingway may be considered 
as distinctive American authors. To do so, I focused on their shared understanding of 
language inherited from the American Renaissance. First, I considered their reflections 
on the correlation between language and the experience of reality at the same time that 
they mistrusted language to convey experiences beyond a mechanical categorization of 
reality. This awareness of the limitations of language led them to the use of symbols 
inherited from their American literary forefathers. The second section analyzed the extent 
to which Eliot and Hemingway internalized the patterns of rhetoric of the Puritan 
tradition and its intrinsic use of the symbol of the American jeremiad. I identified how 
Eliot’s Four Quartets and Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea deployed a sense of 
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mission intrinsic to the American jeremiad, and went on to explore the extent to which 
they shaped this mission through similar use of the imagery of the frontier. Finally, I 
reflected on the sense of fulfillment they conveyed in their respective works in relation to 
accomplishment of their distinctive missions. I concluded that Eliot succeeds in moving 
beyond the frontier of the material world while Hemingway remains trapped within these 
boundaries. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In Hemingway’s “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” (1936) Harry is dying under the shade of a 
mimosa in the African wilderness. He recalls through different flashbacks moments of his 
life. He recollects scenes from Paris as a young writer and scenes related to the First 
World War. Hemingway relates Harry’s experience of these events to Harry’s work as a 
writer:  
 He had seen the world change; not just the events; although he had seen many of 
 them and had watched the people, but he had seen the subtler change and he 
 could remember how the people were at different times. He had been in it and he 
 had watched it and it was his duty to write of it. 1  (CSS 49).  
 
Hemingway points out the correlation between Harry’s experience of all these changes 
and his fiction as a result of those changes. He suggests that Harry’s work—to use Eliot’s 
expression—“is a document of its time” (SW xi). Hemingway and Eliot were part of the 
world that the protagonist of “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” recollects in the last moments 
of his life. These two authors also experienced this world of change and they conveyed it 
in their respective works. In this thesis I have shown how Eliot’s and Hemingway’s 
works were similar but contrasting attempts to make sense of this world of experience in 
the early twentieth century.  
 At the beginning of this inquiry, I reflected on a cultural and philosophical 
paradigm from the turn of the twentieth century that I noted was at the core of Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s early works. These two authors conveyed the lines of thinking that 
emerged from theories praising an original flux of sensuous experience beneath the 
                                                
1 Italics in original. 
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rational forms that organized daily existence. By using the theories of William James and 
Henri Bergson, I have shown the extent to which Eliot’s and Hemingway’s early 
characters were involved in a flow of experience in which the inner life clashes with the 
requirements of the outer world. These two authors explored a similar idea of the self in 
which two levels of experience are identified with two levels of corresponding 
consciousness. This reflection on a fragmented experience of reality led them to deploy 
images to represent an experience in which the dissociation between these two levels of 
experience disappears.  
 I have noted how Eliot and Hemingway engaged with the distinction between 
rational abstraction and flux of sensation, as explored in the theories of James and 
Bergson, and the extent to which this distinction led them to adopt Modernist poetics. 
Eliot’s “objective correlative” (SP 48) and Hemingway’s “real thing” (DIA 2) responded 
to this attempt to recast the inner and the outer world in a unity of experience through the 
use of images in their works. Critics had previously pointed out the similarities between 
Eliot’s and Hemingway’s deployment of images, but the lines of inquiry I have expanded 
in that respect were not fully developed by those critics.2 I have established the 
correlation between Eliot’s and Hemingway’s aesthetic propositions and the pursuit of a 
sensuous flow of experience beyond the limitations imposed by the intellect. Thus, the 
analysis of some of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s images as a representation of temporary 
immersions of the individual in a flow of experience has indicated the attraction of these 
two authors to a primitive state of mind beyond an intellectual categorization of reality. 
                                                
2 I have named the most relevant critics in that respect in Chapter One (See p. 50).  
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 Eliot and Hemingway felt attracted by a sensuous experience of reality that was at 
odds with both the industrial modernization inherited from the nineteenth century and the 
necessity of adopting the requirements of a civilized life in a distinctive urban world. 
These two authors attempted to convey a primitive state of mind, and they explored in 
their early works the idea of neglecting a civilized world to embrace sensual experiences 
at the expense of the intellect. Eliot’s Sweeney poems and some of Hemingway’s early 
stories such as “The Battler” demonstrate the common attraction of these two authors for 
this sensuous experience of reality, but also show their consideration of the primitive as a 
dangerous allure. Through the analysis of these early works I have noted to what extent 
Eliot and Hemingway internalized the parameters of thought promoted by the debate 
around the concept of the primitive in the early twentieth century. By using Babbitt’s part 
in this debate and his critique of a civilization that was “sentimentalizing the primitive” 
(MFC 24), I have shown Eliot’s and Hemingway’s ambivalent consideration of this state 
of mind. This conflicting involvement with the primitive resulted in a questioning of the 
world they lived in. Similarly, Eliot and Hemingway reflected on the necessity of 
collective modes of experience, which they considered absent in the society of the early 
twentieth century, in order to restrain the tendency of the individual towards the 
satisfaction of the primitive sensual instincts. 
  In the first part of this dissertation I showed how Eliot’s and Hemingway’s early 
works were a product of the war of ideas in which the key thinkers of the period were 
involved, in relation to the clash between the original flux of sensations and the 
instrumental conventions that shape ordinary life. Chapter One and Chapter Two set the 
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parameters to comprehend the distinctive paths that these two authors explored to unify 
this fragmented world of experience in their late works.    
 Many critics have examined to an extent the commonalities between Eliot’s The 
Waste Land and Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises. In Chapter Three I engaged with all 
those previous critics and their common analysis of Eliot’s and Hemingway’s use of 
ancient myths as a mode of reflecting on the disorder of contemporary experience. This 
was my point of departure in the third chapter. I noted, however, how this commonality 
disposed these two authors to explore different rituals, and the extent to which this 
difference eventually conditioned their later reflections on the possibilities of overcoming 
the disordered experience of reality. I clarified how Eliot and Hemingway identified 
rituals as collective experiences, to argue that while Eliot’s exploration of the myth of the 
Fisher King disposed him to focus on Christian rituals, Hemingway’s use of the same 
myth conditioned him to pay attention to pagan rituals. Eliot and Hemingway deployed 
“the mythical method” to give “significance” to the experience of modern society (Eliot, 
SP 177), but this ground led them to alternative terrains in their later works.   
 I have shown how Hemingway’s engagement with the pagan ritual of bullfighting 
resulted in his concern with a physical level of experience to attain unity. Alternatively, 
Eliot’s engagement with Christian rituals led him to focus on a spiritual level of 
experience. These two contrasting concerns with the physical and spiritual realms of life 
respectively triggered in Eliot an interest in religious feelings and in Hemingway an 
attraction to moral ones.  
 In Chapter Four I deciphered the extent to which the distinctiveness of these 
feelings led Eliot to embrace the Christian tradition as a mode of experiencing the ideal 
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unity of the divine, while Hemingway focused on the tradition of bullfighting in service 
of his aim of an ideal of performance in the material world undertaken out of a sense of 
duty. Eliot and Hemingway reflected on the experience of these feelings as a mode of 
securing social cohesion. To do so, they proposed alternative social orders where the 
ideal of the individual and that of the community become one. Eliot looked into values 
realized only out of time and defended the Christian faith as the necessary mechanism for 
social cohesion. In contrast, Hemingway paid attention to values achievable in the 
material world and embraced political ideology to defend these values. 
  Eliot and Hemingway aimed at an ideal unity that remained at the core of their 
final attempts to move beyond the disorder of experience explored throughout all their 
works. I have shown how they conveyed, through the use of language, distinctive feelings 
in their respective works to experience such unity, but they always questioned the success 
of this endeavour.   
 In the discourses that Eliot and Hemingway delivered when they were each 
awarded the Nobel Prize, both authors focused on the limitations of language to convey 
feelings. Eliot affirmed that "the expression of one's feelings calls for resources which 
language cannot supply.”3 Eliot pursued throughout all his work the unified sense of 
feeling beyond the contradictions of the material world, but he was aware of the 
limitations of language to express such experience. Hemingway explained how "[f]or a 
true writer each book should be a new beginning where he tries again for something that 
                                                
3 Eliot’s speech at the Nobel Banquet at the City Hall in Stockholm, December 10, 1948.  
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is beyond attainment”.4 Chapter Five analyzed this mistrust of language to convey an 
experience that is beyond attainment. I noted how Eliot and Hemingway adopted the use 
of symbols intrinsic to the American literary tradition to prevent this flaw of language. I 
indicated how Eliot and Hemingway internalized in their late works a pattern of rhetoric 
inherited from the Puritan tradition and its use of the symbol of the American jeremiad. I 
concluded that Eliot succeeded in moving beyond the frontier of the material world while 
Hemingway failed in this mission.  
 From their earliest works, Eliot and Hemingway reflected on an “all-inclusive 
experience outside of which nothing shall fall” (Eliot, KE 31). These two authors pursued 
a unified sense of feeling to overcome a dissociated experience of reality. They 
confronted the same problems throughout their shared journey, but they covered 
alternative paths to reach different conclusions in their common enterprise. Eliot reached 
this unity of experience through endless love of the divine. Alternatively, Hemingway 
remained in a physical level of experience performing endlessly physical activities. He 
remained trapped in the eternal dreaming of the transcendent because, as he confessed to 
Fitzgerald: “To me heaven would be a big bull ring with me holding two barrera seats 
and a trout stream outside that no one else was allowed to fish in” (qtd. in Josephs 153).  
 My methodology has been to arrange a textual interplay between these two 
writers. Both have inspired extensive critical attention individually. Eliot’s and 
Hemingway’s works have been, and continue to be, the subject of study in many areas. It 
has also been revealing to study the works undertaken by many critics who have analyzed 
                                                
4 As Hemingway was unable to be present at the Nobel Banquet at the City Hall in 
Stockholm, December 10, 1954, the speech was read by John C. Cabot, United States 
Ambassador to Sweden.  
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these writers together. From my point of view, these two authors are more alluring when 
they are considered within a wider scope in which their communalities and differences 
can be pondered. Examining the texts of one partly through the lens of the other has 
resulted in revealing reflections and readings. 
 It is important to bear in mind that these readings are not definitive. For instance, I 
have provided a previously unavailable perspective to see these authors as occupying two 
poles of a dissociated experience of reality. In the same way, there are also other 
methodologies that can be adopted when studying them. One methodology I rejected is 
the biographical criticism that relates the author’s life and thought to his works. 
Traditionally, Hemingway’s life has played an important role in the criticism of his 
fiction. I considered that it was necessary to move beyond this approach to articulate an 
analysis of the textual interaction of his works with those of Eliot in a terrain of common 
ideas. However, I acknowledge that this may be a valid point of departure for further 
research. I have also not chosen the influence route, because even though there are 
communalities in how they deployed language in their works to convey experience, it is 
difficult to prove to what extent Hemingway looked at Eliot’s poetry as a possible model 
for his fiction. The fact that they were writing in different genres makes this approach 
even more challenging to develop.  
 The expectation is that this thesis will serve as a stepping-stone for further 
research. One aim of this work has been to show how Eliot and Hemingway tried to 
attain a unity of experience, yet altogether in contrasting ways. I hope that my research 
has raised awareness of this issue. There are a number of directions in which academic 
work on this topic could be further developed from here. I am personally interested in 
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focusing at how both authors were differently perceived in their time. It would be 
necessary to take the overlooked road in this research of biographical criticism to 
decipher why the poetry of Eliot was considered high literature while Hemingway’s 
fiction was labeled as low literature, even though both authors engaged with similar 
concerns. Some critics have pointed out this issue without developing it further. Poirier, 
for instance, articulates this consideration when he compares Eliot’s and Hemingway’s 
literary apparatus:  
 Ideally, that is, the apparatus of Eliot or Joyce functions the way bullfighting or 
 boxing functions metaphorically in Hemingway […]. The apparatus therefore 
 probably deserves, though still on the other side of a bookishness that Hemingway 
 does not require, the same kind of pretend-casualness of response. (Renewal 106) 
  
This passage underlines the misconception of reading Hemingway and Eliot as two 
opposed authors within a contemporary literary landscape. To understand this position it 
would be necessary to take into account not only the works of these two authors but also 
the public image they had, along with how their works were perceived by their readers.  
 Eliot and Hemingway appreciated the literary value of each other’s works, 
ignoring the distinction between high and low literature. The former stated that, “Mr. 
Hemingway is a writer for whom I have considerable respect; he seems to me to tell the 
truth about his own feelings at the moment they exist” (qtd. in Curnutt 41). Hemingway 
also expressed his admiration towards the work of Eliot when he considered him “a 
dammed good poet and a fair critic” (SL 701). Eliot’s and Hemingway’s judgments are 
made by exclusively considering the literary value of their works, as opposed to the 
public images of these writers or the personal dislike that Hemingway shows when he 
affirmed that Eliot “can kiss my ass as a man and he never hit a ball out of the infield in 
his life” (SL 701). Alternatively, public and critics have traditionally chained Eliot’s and 
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Hemingway’s works with the struggle in the field of cultural production that labels these 
two authors as high and low literature. This is definitely a road worth pursuing.  
 In 1937 Eliot wrote in Criterion that “[p]eople are only influenced in the direction 
in which they want to go, and influence consists largely in making them conscious of 
their wishes to proceed in that direction” (IMH 385). In this dissertation I have not looked 
at the possible influence that these two writers had on each other, but questioned the 
extent to which they proceed in distinctive directions that converged and diverged within 
a common order of experience. Eliot’s poetry and Hemingway’s fiction cohere with each 
other within the significance of the mutual relationship of their respective works. It is the 
coherence of this relation that has offered an enriching understanding of Eliot and 
Hemingway because, as the former claimed, “[n]o poet, no artist of any art, has his 
complete meaning alone” (SP 38). 
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